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This thesis explores the role of gist memory and gist representation in the formation of 
false recognition, specifically in the Deese, Roediger and McDermott Paradigm. We 
found that normal individuals displayed a range of susceptibility to false recognition and 
true recognition and this was related to their scores on both the Autism Spectrum 
Quotient and the Toronto-Alexithymia Scale. More ‘male-brained’ participants exhibited 
less susceptibility to false recognition but also less veridical recognition. The reverse 
was true for more ‘female-brained’ participants. The idea of false recognition and gist 
memory lying along a continuum was further emphasised by work on individuals with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder. We found they were less susceptible to false recognition but 
also produced less veridical recognition. We also found differences in performance 
between two groups of autism individuals who also differed in age. The results of further 
manipulations using both picture and word paradigms suggested that gist memory could 
be improved in younger individuals with autism. We also examined a patient group with 
Functional Memory Disorder using the DRM paradigm and a confabulation task and 
found them less able to produce true recognition in the DRM compared with a control 
group. Their memory impairments could not be attributed to depression since none were 
clinically depressed, so we suggested that they represent the tale end of impairment to 
gist memory. We also explored gist memory in a patient with dense anterograde amnesia 
who showed reduced true recognition and a tendency to reduced false recognition, but 
through manipulation of the stimuli using word and pictorial material she could perform 
like controls due to improved item-specific discrimination. A new face recognition 
paradigm was also tested in which she showed a tendency towards increased false 
recognition in comparison with controls.  
 Finally, we suggest the use of the DRM paradigm as a test for memory 
malingering since we found participants could not replicate the performance of amnesia 
patients without a cost in their response latencies. This is discussed through the case 
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Chapter One: Introduction to False Memory Research 
 
Memory is strange - part movie, part dream. You can never 
know if what you remember is the essential thing or 
something else entirely, a grace note. Of my father here’s 
what I have: it’s late at night, and from a darkened hallway I 
see a man in a plaid bathrobe yelling at my mother, who’s 
standing before him in a long, pink nightgown, her hands 
clasped in front of her chest. I watch for a long time, but they 
don’t see me, and though the man is yelling, the memory is 
soundless.  
 
Anne Packer, The Dive From Clausen’s Pier, 2002, p.28. 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Hollywood film producers would like us to believe that memory is neatly packaged 
on videotape to be recalled accurately at a moment’s notice, or by expedient 
prompting. But as the opening quote from Clausen’s Pier demonstrates, memory is 
not so convenient or accurate. In this, the heroine of the story struggles to recall 
images of her father before he left when she was still a young child. The writer, Anne 
Packer, grasped the observation that memory often lacks detail; some images seem to 
be indelible, others changeable, and important sensory information, in this case 
sound, is missing. However, despite this, the heroine is able to comprehend that the 
man is shouting due to the overall gist of events. But as a child, did she recognize 
these signs as that of an argument, or was it only later in life when her knowledge of 
human behaviour incorporated adult conduct? 
The questions regarding the elusive nature of recall are unanswered in the 
book, but the passage above demonstrates how thinking about memory and its 
influence on our lives does not remain the preserve of philosophers and scientists. 
Why do we recall certain events with such clarity, others only with prompting and 
some with uncertainty? Do we remember an event, or do we know that it happened? 
These are questions that are explored by people from all walks of life: poets, writers, 
artists, scientists and musicians. 
 In the opening chapter of Memory Distortion, Daniel Schacter draws 
attention to the classic film Rashomon, by director Akira Kurosawa (Schacter, 1995). 
The film revolves around the philosophical question, what is the truth? Set in ancient 
Japan it portrays the rape of a woman and the subsequent murder of her Samurai-
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husband from the viewpoint of four different witnesses. Each witness is convinced 
their version of events is the truth, but the versions are conflicting, exonerating the 
witness and implicating one of the other three in the crime. The viewer is left with 
the question which version of the event is true? Can we believe any of the 
testimonies, or are all the witnesses lying to exonerate themselves from the crime? 
Memories are constructs, subject to individual interpretation; a conundrum 
observed by Elizabeth Loftus who notes that, “memory is not always the same thing 
as the truth” (Loftus & Ketcham, 1991, p.xiv). She argues that, “Humans hold 
fiercely to the belief that our memories are preserved intact, our thoughts are 
essentially imperishable, and our impressions are never really forgotten” (Ibid, p.16). 
Yet, research into memory demonstrates this is simply not the case. Perhaps we hold 
on to this belief because our memories are so personal. They form the very 
foundation of our learning experiences and beliefs, our loves and our losses. Indeed, 
the belief that memory is accurate and unchangeable is the basis for accepting eye 
witness testimony in courtrooms today, something Loftus demonstrates is fraught 
with problems in her book Witness for the Defense (Loftus & Ketcham, 1991). In 
this, Loftus examines several miscarriages of justice that were brought about as a 
direct result of the misguided belief that eyewitness testimony, which by its nature is 
reliant on human memory, is infallible. It is perhaps not surprising in the light of 
such evidence, that the need to explain how and why false memories occur has 
become of such interest to researchers. 
  
1.2 The Origins of False Recognition and False Memory Research 
In 1932 social psychologist, Sir Frederic Charles Bartlett, wrote a book called 
Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology. It is a collection of 
experimental results that explore Bartlett’s fascination with human memory, and 
more importantly, his observations of the inaccuracy of memory. Bartlett noticed 
early on that memory is a dialogue between perception and recall. On presentation of 
a scene to later recall, the observer perceives only a minority of the details and later 
fills in any gaps by using their knowledge of similar situations, something he later 
referred to as ‘schematic modes’ (Bartlett, 1932, p.304). Commenting on the recall 
performance of his subjects, Bartlett noted, “He may do this without being in the 
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least aware that he is either supplementing or falsifying the data of perception” (Ibid. 
p.14). 
Bartlett’s work was different to his predecessors in that he entered into a 
discourse of what is actually meant by the terms remembering, perceiving and 
imaging. He was also aware of the artificiality of laboratory experiments, and desired 
more naturalistic settings in which to observe memory performance. Bartlett held the 
view that memory was a reconstructive process that was continually renegotiated 
throughout an individual’s lifetime and experiences: “Life is a continuous play of 
adaptation between changing responses and environment” (Bartlett, 1932, p.16). 
Perhaps most importantly, Bartlett rejected the idea that the majority of 
memory recall was accurate, a belief that tends to persist even to this day. In a survey 
conducted by Elizabeth and Geoffrey Loftus, 169 individuals were asked to read two 
statements and say which one they thought related to their own belief about human 
memory (Loftus & Loftus, 1980). Of the 169 subjects, 75 had formal graduate 
training in psychology; the remainder came from a variety of backgrounds. In 
essence the statements were either, A) that memory is permanent and even ‘lost’ 
memories can be recovered by using special techniques (e.g. hypnosis) or; B) 
memories can be forgotten and, once lost, cannot be recovered by special techniques. 
The responses demonstrated the persistent belief, even amongst those with 
psychology training, that memory is permanent with 84% of psychologists and 69% 
of non-psychologists selecting statement A. 
One of Bartlett’s experiments involved the recall of a story called The War of 
the Ghosts, a traditional Native American folktale. Subjects read the story twice and 
were then later asked to recall the story after intervals of fifteen minutes up to several 
years. The story itself to any non-Native American is rather unusual, and Bartlett 
observed several interesting phenomena that occurred during the recall phase of the 
experiment. The first was perhaps not surprising: after a few hours’ subjects recalled 
the story in an abbreviated form and this shortening process persisted throughout the 
subsequent repetitions. Subjects also changed details of the story in order to make it 
more salient to their own cultural framework; for example, the majority of the 
participants changed the title to ‘Battle of the Ghosts’. Bartlett also noticed that 
details that were hard to integrate into his subjects' cultural knowledge were simply 
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omitted from the story. In other words, details that could be interpreted by an 
individual's active schema were more easily recalled than the items that could not. 
These latter schema-irrelevant items were either dropped or altered to fit the 
individual’s rationale.  
Another observation made by Bartlett on this experiment was that the word 
‘war’ appeared four times in the original story, yet subjects often intruded words like 
‘battle’ and ‘enemy’, which never appeared but were more congruent with his 
subjects’ cultural reference and had stronger associative links. Bartlett noted that at 
the time of the experiment many of his subjects had had first hand experience of the 
First World War and so their experiences may have influenced their subsequent 
choice of words. Such observations led him to form his model of ‘schematic modes’ 
that describe memory encoding and decoding in terms of not only an individuals 
experiences, but also their cultural references.  Bartlett made several conclusions 
regarding this experiment, the most salient to this thesis being, “It again appears that 
accuracy of reproduction, in a literal sense, is the rare exception and not the rule” 
(Bartlett, 1932, p.93). He also noted that for each individual once they had produced 
their final version of the story, even if it contained inaccuracies, it remained, 
“remarkably persistent, once the first version has been given” (Ibid.).  
However, later attempts to replicate Bartlett’s experiments by others did not 
produce such dramatic results or even failed to produce false memories entirely, so 
the experiment faded into the background (e.g. Gauld & Stephenson, 1967; 
Roediger, Wheeler & Rajarma, 1993). This may be because Bartlett’s work focused 
on a naturalistic setting of false memories and use of cognitive theories to explain the 
results, while behavioural theory and stimulus-response research were the focus in 
psychology research. But subsequent attempts to replicate the work have missed the 
essence of Bartlett’s aim: he was not trying to create false memories but rather 
explore why falsehoods in recall were clearly so persistent. He was trying to identify 
the cognitive processes that were entwined in this process. Regarding The War of the 
Ghosts experiment, Bartlett was aware that he had to set certain limitations on his 
methodology so as not to be overwhelmed by data. He commented, “Consequently, 
the results of the experiment as they are here described no doubt represent a section 
only of an incomplete process of transformation” (Bartlett, 1932, p.63). 
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 Bartlett was not alone in his work on the inaccuracy of memory recall. 
Others, such as Alfred Binet (1900) and Stern (1910), examined the production of 
false memories in the light of subjects being asked misleading questions. Children 
were asked to view a particular event or a series of objects, and were subsequently 
asked questions about what they had seen. Some of these questions were designed to 
be misleading and therefore produce false memories. More recently the work of 
Elizabeth Loftus and her colleagues has provided some compelling evidence that 
false memories can be induced even in adults (Loftus et al., 1978; & Loftus 1991). In 
what is now known as the ‘misinformation task’, subjects were shown a sequence of 
events during a study phase, such as a car approaching a junction. In the next study 
phase of the same events they were given additional information, some of it, 
unbeknown to them, misleading; in this case the introduction of a ‘Stop’ sign on the 
road that was not present in the original sequence of events. Loftus and her 
colleagues found that during a final retrieval phase, subjects were more likely to 
recall the event, not as it had occurred, but in such a way that the misleading 
information, and hence the ‘Stop’ sign, was now incorporated into the memory of the 
original event. 
An obvious conclusion of this work is that what is encoded into our 
memories is not always the same as what is decoded at a later date and that the 
processes of encoding and decoding are subject to falsehoods. Why should this 
occur? At the beginning of the twentieth century, the German biologist Richard 
Semon developed a theory of memory encoding and decoding. Although Semon is 
not well known today he formed a model of the memory and coined the term 
memory ‘engram’ which is widely used in describing memory processes by his later 
contemporaries. Semon hypothesized that there was a strong relationship between 
the encoding and decoding processes, which he called ‘engraphy’ and ‘ecphory’ 
respectively (see Semon 1904/1921; 1909/1923). He argued that at encoding, or 
engraphy, the brain had to use ecphory processes in order to encode new information 
with relevance to the individual’s current circumstances and previous knowledge. 
Therefore, the newly formed memory engram was not a literal version of reality but 
rather an interpretation of events. This is not dissimilar to Bartlett’s model, which 
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also views memory recall as a reconstructive process. Indeed, the idea of memory 
recall being reconstructive and subject to change is now widely accepted. 
 Semon’s theory means that false memory formation can occur quite easily at 
not only the encoding but also at the decoding stage. Even the consolidation of 
memory can be blighted by falsehoods. As we saw above, the work of Stern, Binet, 
and Loftus relied on misleading questions or information, and this may cause the 
person to focus on more relevant schema of the question in light of the current 
circumstances, rather than the actual recall of events as they occurred. If, as Semon 
and Bartlett theorized, a person uses past knowledge to interpret new events, using a 
leading question such as, “Can you describe the getaway car used by the bank-
robbers?” implies that a car was already present at the scene, and therefore can 
mislead the memory into forming a description of a car, since this is relevant to our 
current cultural idea that bank-robbers tend to use a getaway vehicle.     
However, the studies that use this type of methodology of presenting 
information and then subsequently asking misleading questions, or that use the 
misinformation task to generate false memories, lack a robust paradigm that can 
produce consistent, reliable results. Not everyone is lured by leading questions and 
misinformation; in fact most of the participants are adept at filtering out the 
misleading information (Loftus, 1991). Therefore, a paradigm was needed that would 
produce reliable results again and again and offer more in depth examinations of the 
underlying processes of false memory formation. 
 
1.3 The DRM Paradigm 
In 1959 James Deese ran an experiment to investigate the intrusion of previously 
unstudied words on selected word lists. Each subject saw 36 lists consisting of 12 
words that were constructed from primary associates of a critical item. For example, 
the critical word needle produced the list: thread, pin, eye, sewing, sharp, point, 
pricked, thimble, haystack, pain, hut, and injection.   Subjects were then given an 
immediate free recall. He found that, “the probability of a particular [critical] word 
occurring as an intrusion in immediate free recall of a list of words may be predicted 
from the tendency for the intruding word to occur as a response in free association to 
the items on the list. It is implicit that such association frequencies represented 
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previously learned habits” (Deese, 1959, p.21). He posited the hypothesis that, “the 
probability of an intrusion in recall is proportional to the average association strength 
of that item in the context of the material being recalled” (Ibid.). He proposed the 
associative account of verbal intrusion in which words that could prime easily both 
forwards and backwards were more likely to be subject to subsequent false intrusions 
during recall. Underwood (1965) took up Deese’s argument and formulated his 
‘implicit associative response’ theory, which argued that presenting a word such as 
hot would automatically trigger the activation of the word cold, so that during the 
recall stage the word cold was highly likely to appear as an intrusion on the list even 
if it had never been presented. 
 Oddly, this tantalizing step into a paradigm that would produce reliable false 
recognition was forgotten until 1995 when Roediger and McDermott resurrected 
Deese’s original experiment. They carried out two experiments; the first was a 
replication of Deese’s and produced 40% false recall of the critical lures. In the 
second they expanded the test materials using twenty-four lists each consisting of 
fifteen words generated as associates from a critical lure. Roediger and McDermott 
examined both false recall and also whether the critical lures would be falsely 
recognized during a study phase, in which subjects were also asked to respond 
‘remember’ or ‘know’ as to whether the words had been shown during the original 
study phase. In this study phase subjects were also shown non-studied words, which 
had no association to the previously studied word lists. In order for there to be no 
false recognition, subjects should reject the critical lures as often as they rejected the 
non-studied words. Roediger and McDermott (1995) found a high false recognition 
rate of 55% for the critical lures. Furthermore, subjects reported a strong confidence 
in remembering the critical lures as having appeared during the original lists. 
Roediger and McDermott argued that schematic processing was applicable to this 
form of false recognition since the word needle fitted with the overall schema of the 
studied items: thread, pin eye, sewing and so on.  
 
1.4 False Memory or False Recognition? 
False memory research has rapidly escalated in the last few years, partly as a result 
of the robustness of the Deese (1959), Roediger and McDermott (1995) (DRM) 
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paradigm. However, Pezdek and Lam (2007) recently carried out an analysis of 
research which used the title 'false memories' and argued that the term should be 
used with caution, particularly when referring to studies which employ the DRM 
paradigm. This paradigm does not create false memories; it only elicits false 
recognition of previously unseen critical lures. In fact, out of the one hundred and 
ninety-eight articles that used the term 'false memory' in their title, Pezdek and Lam 
found that only twenty six (13.1%) used the term as it was originally intended; that is 
the creation of entirely new events or erroneous information about an event that later 
becomes implanted as memory in the brain. It is important to differentiate between 
the two in order to clarify what a research experiment is actually intending to 
investigate about memory and for what purposes. 
 In a later reply to their original paper Pezdek comments, “it is bad science to 
use the same term to refer to two different phenomena because it implies that the 
same cognitive or neuropsychological processes underlie both phenomena in a way 
that is theoretically meaningful. And, different cognitive processes appear to underlie 
the formation of memories for entirely new events and memories for changes in 
details of observed events” (Pezdek, 2007, p.29). 
  However, this assertion that the DRM paradigm and experiments designed to 
elicit false memories utilize different cognitive functions may not be true. For 
example, Eisen et al. (1999) found a positive correlation between false recognition 
errors in the DRM and errors in an experiment investigating the susceptibility of 
individuals to report on misleading information. Furthermore, Platt, Lacey, Iobst and 
Finkelman (1998) also found a positive correlation between false recognition errors 
in the DRM paradigm and errors in autobiographical memory. It should be noted, 
however, that Wilkinson and Hyman (1998) failed to find such a correlation when 
they examined false recognition errors in the DRM and autobiographical memories. 
This could, of course, simply be down to the different methodologies used by the 
various research teams to elicit false recognition and false memories. For example, 
Eisen et al. (1999) used the DRM for their false recognition task and then a 
misleading information task to elicit false memories, whereas Wilkinson and Hyman 
(1998) also used the DRM but then used a task designed to elicit false 
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Figure 1: Example of Anderson's spreading activation theory 
autobiographical memories whose methodology is not comparable to Eisen et al.’s 
misleading information task.  
This thesis recognizes Pezdek and Lam’s (2007) criticism and only applies 
the term ‘false memories’ in experiments that are specifically designed to elicit 
memories of previously unpresented information and reserves the term ‘false 
recognition’ when discussing the Deese, Roediger and McDermott paradigm.  
 
1.5 Theories of false memory recognition and formation 
1.5.1 Implicit Association and spreading activation theories 
Roediger and McDermott (1995) touched upon Deese (1959) and Underwood’s 
(1965) association theories, primarily Underwood’s ‘implicit association theory’ 
which argues that people unconsciously generate the critical item in response to 
being presented with the closely associated word lists. But what is the cognitive 
mechanism that produces such implicit association? Roediger and McDermott (1995) 
also briefly touch upon Anderson’s spreading activation theory (Anderson, 1983). In 
this Anderson proposes that 
units of memory processing are 
called cognitive units, which can 
be made up of several elements, 
for example short sentences, 
pairs of words or even single 
items (see Figure 1). So the word 
cat may trigger dog, which 
triggers bone which triggers 
skeleton and so on. As each 
new unit is formed its strength increases with practice along a spreading activation 
throughout the whole network. This leads to a considerable overlap in information, 
for at retrieval working memory gathers information from available sources, 
including long-term memory. This overlap is important as it may explain why 
subsequent recognition tests cause semantically similar items to be falsely 
recognized at the point of retrieval. If the network is activated strongly enough, such 
as by the presentation of an associated word list (e.g. dog, bone, skeleton), then 
presenting a critical lure (e.g. cat) at the recognition stage in the Deese, Roediger and 
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McDermott paradigm will prompt the network into mistaking the critical lure for one 
that appeared earlier. 
 
1.5.2 Parallel-Distribution Models 
McClelland’s (1995) parallel distribution model works on the principle that, 
“memories are not stored as discrete traces but rather are superimposed on 
preexisting memories in a composite representation” (Schacter, 1995, p.19). In 
essence, the parallel distribution processing system is a huge network of 
interconnecting, but relatively simple, processing units. Forming a particular memory 
begins by activation of a series of these units, and encoding this memory relies on the 
strength of the activation between the various units. But since each learning event 
can be influenced by subsequent experiences and previous connections there is room 
for the formation of distortions, either by omission or addition of information 
(McClelland, 1995). In other words previous learning may exert an inhibitory, or in 
some cases excitatory, influence over the strength of the connection pathways and 
therefore lead to the formation of false memories.  
 A way of demonstrating how this ‘propagation of activation’ works is to use 
the scenario of trying to name an actor in a film. We have all had the experience of 
watching a film and finding ourselves unable to name a famous actor. We can often 
name the character in the film or describe the actor’s features or what the character 
did, but the name remains elusive on the tip-of-our-tongues. Gradually, as the 
information builds up there is often enough activation of the system to finally 
propagate the name (usually several hours later when the conversation is long since 
over!). 
 In a similar manner false memory and false recognition occurs as the 
pathways are strongly excited or inhibited. In the case of excitatory connections a 
word such as needle may be activated when the word list thread, pin eye, sewing and 
so on, is presented causing needle to be falsely recognized during the recall stage. 
For false memories the situation is more complex as added information may form 
excitatory pathways that lead an individual to believe new, misleading information 
and therefore incorporate this into the memory trace. Or we may simply forget as the 
pathways are inhibited, therefore not forming strong enough connections between the 
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various units, allowing new but erroneous information to be incorporated into the 
memory. 
 This model is harmonious with both Bartlett’s schema-relevant theory and yet 
broad enough that it can also encompass the association models as well. Yet what all 
these models imply is that formation of such false memories remains unconscious 
and implicit which may not always be the case, as we shall see below.  
 
1.5.3 Fuzzy Trace Theory 
Reyna and Brainerd’s (Reyna, 1995) fuzzy-trace theory (FTT) of memory 
hypothesizes that at encoding subjects develop both a verbatim memory trace and a 
‘gist’ memory trace. Verbatim traces are described as the ‘memory of form’, that is 
memory of contextual details and surface features; whilst gist traces are the ‘memory 
of meaning’, that is the memories created from the overall themes or associations of 
the presented stimuli. Although similar to Tulving’s (1981) model of episodic and 
semantic memory, the FTT model does not view the two processes as dichotomous, 
rather verbatim and gist traces are seen as opposite ends of a continuum that interact. 
A key concept of the FTT model is that since gist traces are the accumulation of the 
associations of verbatim traces, they are more robust than the verbatim memory. In 
essence, the FTT model predicts that for experiments that use misleading information 
or questions to create false memories, the false memories will remain robust because 
they are harmonious with the gist trace of the overall theme of the stimulus. 
However, the other side of the FTT hypothesis is that verbatim traces are more 
vulnerable to degradation since they lack the accumulation of traces found in gist 
memory. Hence, false recognitions are more prevalent than true recognitions, which 
is consistent with Bartlett’s observation that accurate memory recall was, “the rare 
exception and not the rule” (Bartlett, 1932, p.93). The persistence of false memories 
in light of the fuzzy-trace theory has been further supported by the work of Brainerd, 
Reyna and Brandse (1995) in children, and by Payne, Elie, Blackwell and Neuschatz 
(1996) in adults. It may also explain why Bartlett found his subjects adhered to their 
inaccurate recall of The War of the Ghosts. 
When the fuzzy-trace theory is applied to the DRM paradigm it predicts that 
participants will recall the studied items by utilizing both verbatim and gist traces. 
However, the critical lures are falsely recognized as a result of the durability of gist 
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traces due to a strong sense of familiarity to the original word lists (Barnhardt et al. 
2006). The strength of this activation can be so strong that during the study phase, 
that is when studying the word list sharp, prick, point etc., the subjects may 
automatically come up with the critical lure needle before it has even been presented. 
Hence, during the subsequent recognition phase, on seeing the critical lure needle 
subjects are prompted by their gist memory to falsely recognize this word as having 
been presented on the original study list. 
Brainerd and Reyna (1998) were also among the first to develop the subject 
of gist representation as one of the processes that underlie false memory formation. 
The influence of this theory is widespread in that it incorporates many of the ideas of 
previous models. What exactly is ‘gist’ memory? We know that verbatim memory is 
the ability to recall specific details of an event, for example: the man was wearing a 
suit, there was map of Britain behind him, and he was pointing to cloud and snow 
symbols on the map and numbers. Gist memory is the ability to see the broader 
picture and make semantic and generic links between the information being 
presented in order to give us a general ‘feel’ of the event, for example: the man was 
giving the weather forecast on television. 
 The advantage of gist representation is that it can incorporate theories such as 
schema-relevant information and yet still be congruent with theories such as 
McClelland’s parallel distribution model. When applied to the Deese, Roediger and 
McDermott paradigm we can argue that a strong gist representation of a studied 
word list will mean the critical lure will often be falsely recognized due to the fact 
that it fits the general gist of the previously studied list, or in other words it is 
strongly associated. A non-presented word does not fit and so can be quickly 
rejected. 
 When applied to false memory formation we can use our weatherman 
example to argue that congruent information, even if it is misleading, will be 
accepted into the gist representation. We could use a leading question such as 
“Where on the map was the sunshine symbol?” even if one was not present, as this is 
harmonious with most subjects’ general gist knowledge about what we can expect to 
see on a weather forecast map.  
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1.5.4 Source Monitoring Errors 
Perhaps the commonest memory error we make is that of remembering the precise 
where and when an event happened. Most of us have experienced the family 
squabble when individuals cannot agree on the specifics of a past family occasion. 
Each person is convinced his or her version of events, such as who was present or 
what day it was, is the truth. The failure to correctly attribute a memory to its original 
trigger is called a source monitoring error. Source monitoring theory was first 
proposed by Johnson, Hashtroudi and Lindsay (1993), and describes memory errors 
as a result of participants failing to determine accurately the source of activation 
associated with the stimuli. 
Source monitoring errors apply to a large percentage of the memory errors we 
all make, but it was Clancy et al. (2002) who suggested that the DRM paradigm may 
also show this type of error, in that subjects simply forget the where and when of 
learning the critical lure and so falsely recognize it as having being studied on the 
original list. The same argument applies to the false recognition of non-studied 
words, and the incorrect rejections of any studied words. 
However, one area where source monitoring theory excels is in the 
investigation of ‘flashbulb’ memories. For example, most people will be able to 
relate the story of when and where they were when they heard the news of Princess 
Diana’s death. Most of us can recall in vivid detail the moment we heard the news, 
what we were doing and whom we were with. Brown and Kulick (1977) argued that 
such events were ‘frozen’ into the memory, which suggested that they were not 
susceptible to false memory intrusion. Further research has lent credence to this idea 
that flashbulb memories retain a high degree of veracity (Conway et al., 1994).  But 
are they really that accurate?  
A number of researchers have challenged the hypothesis that flashbulb 
memories are accurate. Sadly, world events have provided ample opportunities for 
this phenomenon to be examined, most recently with the terrorist attack on 
September 11th, 2001. Talarico and Rubin (2003) questioned university students on 
their memories not only of the attack, but also for a recent, everyday event that 
preceded the attack. Subjects completed questionnaires about the events on 12th 
September 2001 and for their everyday event. They were then divided into three 
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groups and called back to answer questionnaires at 1 week-, 6 week- or 32 week-
intervals respectively after the event. This methodology ensured that concerns 
regarding forced rehearsals of the memory would not interfere with the question of 
veracity. Talarico and Rubin found that contrary to previous assumptions regarding 
the accuracy of flashbulb memories, they were just as susceptible to inaccuracies as 
everyday memories. What contrasted flashbulb memories from everyday memories 
was the confidence with which subjects reported them. This complimented the work 
of Christianson (1989) who also noted the inaccuracy of flashbulb memories but 
noted such confidence was also tied to the emotional weight of the events.  
In a similar vein, Neisser and Harsch (1992) examined the subsequent recall 
of the Challenger disaster in 1986, which demonstrated the high incidence of source 
monitoring errors. People were asked after the event to recall the details of the 
disaster, and then again at periods of weeks, months and years. The details of when 
or where a person was at the time of the disaster often changed dramatically, also 
bringing into question the whole concept that ‘flashbulb’ memories were fixed and 












Traditionally, cognitive neuroscience has focused on damage to specific regions of 
the brain in order to hypothesise which regions were responsible for particular 
cognitive functions. In the case of false memory recognition and formation it is the 
normal healthy brain that provides these ‘damaged’ memories. As we saw in 
Chapter One accuracy of memory recall is the exception, false memories occur quite 
readily in healthy individuals.  However, just as we can turn to damaged cognition in 
order to understand healthy memory processes, so too can we uncover information 
about the formation of false memories in healthy individuals by examining clinical 
and patient populations.  
 
2.2 Healthy Populations: Children and Older Adults 
 
All the world's a stage,  
And all the men and women merely players.  
They have their exits and their entrances,  
And one man in his time plays many parts,  
His acts being seven ages.  At first the infant,  
Mewling and puking in the nurse's arms.  
Then the whining schoolboy with his satchel  
And shining morning face, creeping like snail  
Unwillingly to school… 
 …The sixth age shifts  
Into the lean and slippered pantaloon,  
With spectacles on nose and pouch on side,  
His youthful hose, well saved, a world too 
wide  
For his shrunk shank, and his big manly 
voice,  
Turning again toward childish treble, pipes  
And whistles in his sound. Last scene of all,  
That ends this strange, eventful history,  
Is second childishness and mere oblivion,  
Sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans 
everything. 
 
Extract of Jaques’ Speech in As You Like It,  




William Shakespeare regarded the process of ageing and development as a cycle that 
returned man to his original, child-like first age resulting in ‘oblivion’ to his 
degenerated circumstances. The fascination with the process of ageing and the loss 
of mental faculties was not lost on this English playwright and he returned to the 
theme frequently in both plays and poetry. 
The interest in the polar extremes of the human development continuum is 
also a frequent source of false memory research. By examining the deficits of both 
polar groups we can enlarge our understanding of the development of human 
memory. Such research has further important implications in the legal sphere when 
investigating the reliability of eyewitness testimony.  
Memory development is progressive, and if we take Bartlett’s (1932) 
schemata model it is subject to significant change as an individual builds on their 
social and cultural knowledge. In harmony with this, Ornstein and Haden state that, 
“developmental changes in prior knowledge about events that are being experienced, 
in the strength and organization of underlying representations in memory, and in 
fundamental information processing skills can all influence what can be remembered 
and reported” (Ornstein & Haden, 2002, p. 30). 
 
2.2.1 Children 
Children do not have the same scope of schematic or language information to draw 
from as adults. For example, when relating a story that was heard previously children 
will report it as a sequence of events as opposed to adults who are more likely to 
relate the overall gist, or theme of the story (Wells, 1986). One linguistic 
phenomenon is joke telling, which is a skill that requires the teller to manage 
material in order to preserve the sequence, motives and hence the punch line. It also 
involves understanding the concept of misleading information, and beyond the one-
liner jokes produced in early childhood, from the ages of eight to twelve years of age 
there is often an explosion of quite sophisticated joke telling in children as their 
language skills develop (Bancroft, 1985). This occurs at about the same age as when 
a child begins to move away from the narration of a story as a sequence of events to 
the more adult performance of relating the theme or gist, a developmental process 
that will continue into adulthood (Wells, 1986), 
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The implications that gist may not be fully developed until adulthood predicts 
that very young children in particular will be less susceptible to false recognition of 
the critical lures in the DRM paradigm. They will be unable to build the gist 
representation of the studied words (e.g. nap, doze, bed, night etc.) and so will not 
respond ‘Yes’ and produce false recognition to the critical lures (e.g. sleep). This 
failure to form gist representation also predicts that they will produce less true recall 
to the studied words. Consistent with this hypothesis is the work of Brainerd, Reyna 
and Forrest (2002) who examined the performance of three age groups (five-year 
olds, eleven-year olds and college undergraduates) in the DRM. For true recall of 
studied words adults produced more correct responses than eleven-year olds, and the 
eleven-year olds produced more than the five-year olds. The pattern for false 
recognition was similar with adults producing more false recognition than eleven-
year olds, and eleven-year olds producing more than the five-year olds. However, 
this did not mean that children were less susceptible to false recognition overall since 
both age groups produced far more intrusions to the non-studied words than adults. 
The argument posited for this pattern of recognition is that gist in children is 
underdeveloped, meaning they cannot maintain the thematic gist of the studied words 
and so do not respond to the critical lures. However, the false recognition to the non-
studied words is explained in terms of an inability to make informed diagnostic 
processes based on the underdeveloped gist (Ibid.). 
The idea that gist is underdeveloped in children is supported by the earlier 
work of Felzen and Ansifeld (1970) who discovered that third-graders were less 
likely than sixth-graders to produce false recognition to critical lures that were 
semantically related to previously studied words. There is also evidence that the 
developmental processes in children influence false recognition of particular types of 
words. Dewhurst and Robinson (2004) found that when comparing false recognition 
to words that were phonologically or semantically related, five-year olds produced 
more false recognition to the phonological words than semantic words compared 
with eleven-year olds. In fact in the eleven-year olds the opposite pattern was found 
with more false recognition to the semantic words, again supporting the theory that 
gist is underdeveloped in young children since semantic relationships rely on the gist 
process. This finding is also in harmony with linguists’ observations of story telling 
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patterns in children who gradually revert from the recitation of the sequence of 
events, to the adult recitation of gist and themes that require semantic processing 
(Wells, 1986). 
In experiments designed to elicit false memories in children and examine 
their suggestibility, Saywitz and Lyon (2002) note that several factors will influence 
a child’s performance: 
1. Children’s recall is deficient. “Memory begins with understanding 
an event as it is being experienced…as children’s basic knowledge 
and understanding of events being remembered changes as a result 
of instruction or experience, their memories may shift in the 
direction of the newer understanding” (Ornstein & Haden, 1996, pp. 
30 – 31). 
2. Young children trust adult’s knowledge. This information coupled 
with other factors such as the motivation of the individual, can result 
in children being more susceptible to suggestibility when questioned 
by adults as opposed to their peers (e.g. Ceci, Ross & Toglia, 1987; 
Kwock & Winer, 1986). 
3. Young children find it difficult to identify the sources of their 
beliefs. Several studies have shown dramatic age differences in 
children’s source monitoring abilities. Children have 
underdeveloped skills in this area and so are unable to always 
correctly attribute information to its source, the danger being that 
misinformation can be easily incorporated into a child’s memory (for 
review see Saywitz & Lyon, 2002). 
This susceptibility to suggestion leads to the hypothesis that in experiments designed 
to elicit false memories children will be just as likely as adults to form illusory 
memories. Indeed, this does seem to be the case, with children also subsequently 
holding firm to their belief in the new, but false, memory (for review see Loftus, 
Feldman & Dashiell, 1995). This supports the findings that children have 
underdeveloped source monitoring abilities. Similarly, Ackil and Zaragoza (1998) 
examined age differences in a paradigm that involved participants studying a video 
of a series of events and subsequently answering questions. Some questions were 
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true, that is they were about events that had actually occurred in the video, others 
were leading questions about events that had not occurred. They found that first-, 
third-, and fourth- graders were more likely to produce confabulations to leading 
questions than adults. 
Such findings in the Deese, Roediger and McDermott (DRM) paradigms in 
comparison with experiments designed to elicit false memories by suggestibility 
could be used by supporters of Pezdek and Lam’s (2007) argument that the cognitive 
processes underlying the two paradigms are different. However, it should be noted 
that in both cases it is the underdevelopment of different cognitive processes that 
produce the two conflicting results. That is, reduced false recognition in the DRM 
paradigm in children is a result of the underdevelopment of gist processing; whereas 
the increased susceptibility to false memory formation in experiments employing 
suggestibility and leading question paradigms is a result of the underdevelopment of 
source monitoring. 
 
2.2.2 Older Adults 
As humans age, there are physiological changes in the brain, specifically cerebral 
blood flow to the anterior regions (Gur, et al., 1987) and a loss of neural tissue (Raz 
et al., 1993). The prefrontal cortex of a healthy brain is involved in the encoding and 
retrieval of information as well as the temporal organization of memory (specifically 
the dorsolateral prefrontal regions), and so is vital for source monitoring processes 
(for review Gazzaniga, Ivry & Mangun, 2002, Ch. 12, pp. 511 – 521). However, in 
ageing there is a decline in memory performance for tasks that rely on the frontal 
regions, with episodic memory and source monitoring being among the most 
vulnerable to decay (for review see Grady & Craik, 2000). The physiological 
evidence of a decrease in the volume of the frontal lobes due to atrophy has driven 
the main hypothesis for those interested in false memory research to argue that as 
source monitoring decreases as people age, then older adults will demonstrate 
increased susceptibility to false recognition in the DRM paradigm and an increase in 
suggestibility and hence false memory formation in misinformation tasks and 
confabulation paradigms.  
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Examining the formation of false memories, Dodson and Krueger (2006) 
used an eyewitness suggestibility paradigm in which participants viewed a video of a 
police  chase and subsequently answered questions, some of which were misleading. 
The two participant groups were divided between the ages of seventeen to twenty-
three years of age, or sixty to seventy-nine years of age. Dodson and Krueger found 
that older adults were more likely to commit suggestibility errors to the misleading 
questions than the younger adults, especially if they were confident of their response. 
The younger adults only showed an increase in susceptibility errors to misleading 
question when they were uncertain of the correctness of their response. 
 Daniel Schacter and his colleagues have also found a similar pattern of 
increased susceptibility to false memory recognition in older adults in the Deese, 
Roediger and McDermott paradigm (DRM). Kensinger and Schacter (1999) 
investigated age differences by examining whether older and younger adults could 
suppress false recognition of the critical lures if they were given multiple study-trial 
phases. After one trial of a standard DRM paradigm, older adults produced 
significantly more false recognition to the critical lures. They decided to examine 
whether repeated study phases and trials would help the older adults suppress false 
recognition. They found that after five study-trial phases both young and older 
adults’ veridical recognition to the studied words increased, as did their correct 
rejection of the non-studied words. However, only the younger adults showed a 
significant decrease in their false recognition to the critical lures, and this was 
confirmed by examining the corrected false recognition rates, (that is subtracting the 
false alarm responses to the non-studied words from the false alarms to the critical 
lures) with only young adults showing the decreases in false recognition across the 
trials.  They then used signal detection theory to examine whether these results were 
due to changes in sensitivity to the stimuli or response bias (for example, older adults 
might be more bias to making ‘old’ responses).  Kensinger and Schacter (1999) note 
that because of the different assumptions underlying signal detection analysis and 
corrected recognition analysis (see Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988), signal detection 
analysis does not provide additional information to the corrected recognition analysis 
but rather provides a different perspective on the results. Age differences were only 
found in the signal detection data for gist memory; specifically older adults were 
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unable to reduce the influence of gist memory.  Kensinger and Schacter (1999) 
applied the Fuzzy-Trace Theory (FTT) to these age related findings in the DRM 
paradigm, suggesting that older adults relied more on gist trace processing than 
younger adults in order to compensate for age-related decrements in verbatim traces. 
Schacter and his colleagues have also used the DRM paradigm to look at 
false recognition of pictorial stimuli as opposed to words. In a paradigm that used 
categorically related pictures (e.g., boats, cats, shoes and teddy bears), Koutstaal and 
Schacter (1997) found that younger and older adults had comparable results for true 
recognition of studied items. However, older adults produced higher false 
recognition to both the critical lures and non-studied items compared with younger 
adults, a finding that was important since Koutstaal and Schacter (1997) argued that 
pictures should reduce source monitoring errors and hence suppress false 
recognition. However, if source monitoring processes are vulnerable in older adults 
due to the physiological changes in the frontal lobe, then their decision as to whether 
an item is new or old will rely on general conceptual or gist information. This finding 
was also supported by the signal detection data, which showed that for gist-specific 
memory older adults showed heightened sensitivity to gist. On a final note, Koutstaal 
and Schacter (1997) note that older adults may also fail to encode the ‘distinctive’ 
properties of pictorial stimuli.  
Subsequently, Schacter, Israel and Racine (1998) carried out an experiment to 
examine what Schacter describes as the ‘distinctiveness heuristic’ theory: “a mode of 
responding based on participants’ metamemorial awareness that true recognition of 
studied items should include recollection of distinctive details” (Ibid, p.3). In turn, 
this awareness of the distinct features of pictures should suppress false recognition to 
the critical lures, since although similar a participant will remember not seeing them 
previously. Following Koutstaal and Schacter’s (1997) findings, Schacter, Israel and 
Racine (1999) argued that older adults were unable to use the distinctiveness 
heuristic in order to suppress their false recognition to critical lures in a pictorial 
DRM paradigm. They hypothesized that if they could manipulate the experimental 
conditions in order to remove the younger participants’ reliance on the distinctive 
features of the picture stimuli, then false recognition suppression would be 
eliminated in both older and younger adults. They produced a within subject design 
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in which all participants saw a pictorial version of the lists and a word version. 
Schacter et al. (1999) argued that the word version would suppress the 
distinctiveness of the pictorial stimuli as participants would rely on list-specific 
information rather than distinctive information during the recognition phase. Their 
results supported the hypothesis and false recognition to the critical lures was 
increased in both age groups. Additionally, older adults maintained increased false 
recognition and decreased true recognition in comparison to the younger age group. 
Earlier, Bartlett, Strater and Fulton (1991) examined age differences in face 
recognition by using a paradigm in which participants had to study two lists of faces 
with a one-week interval between the two study phases. They then underwent a 
recognition phase in which they saw 24 faces from week one, 24 faces from week 
two and 24 new faces that had not been studied. They had to make ‘last week’, 
‘today’ or ‘new’ judgements for each face. Older adults produced more false 
recognition to the new faces compared with younger adults. Furthermore, in a second 
experiment participants had to study 48 non-famous faces. One-week later in a 
recognition phase they saw these faces again along with 48 famous faces. 
Participants were asked to rate each face they saw as ‘definitely famous’, ‘possibly 
famous’ or ‘non-famous’. They were also reminded that a face studied the previous 
week was to be judged as non-famous. Older adults produced more false fame 
judgments to the non-famous faces than the younger adults. Taking into account the 
results of both experiments, Bartlett et al. (1991) argued that older adults relied more 
on familiarity judgments in recognition than their younger counterparts. However, in 
light of Schacter, Israel and Racine’s (1998) findings we could also argue that 
Bartlett et al.’s (1991) work could be attributed to a failure in older adults to use the 
distinctiveness heuristic of facial recognition in order to suppress both false 








2.3 Amnesia  
What happens to false memory formation in those individuals who have damage to 
the areas of the brain commonly thought to be responsible for memory formation, 
such as the medial temporal lobes (MTL) and related diencepahlic structures, or the 
frontal lobes? There is little research involving examining amnesia patients’ 
formation of false memories using suggestibility type paradigms, but researchers 
have relied on the Deese, Roediger and McDermott paradigm in order to explore 
false recall and recognition in amnesia patients. 
 
2.3.1 Medial temporal lobe amnesia & Korsakoff’s Syndrome 
The medial temporal lobe (MTL) consists of the hippocampus, subiculum, dentate 
gyrus and surrounding neocortical regions. It is well established that damage to the 
MTL region, for example as a result of encephalitis or lesions due to epilepsy, can 
result in amnesia. The case study of a patient known as HM, who had a procedure to 
remove his temporal lobe bilaterally in order to ease his epilepsy in the 1950s, 
revealed how important these regions are to memory. Subsequent to the operation, 
HM demonstrated impaired memory in that he could no longer learn new 
information (anterograde amnesia); he had difficulty with his autobiographical 
memory and retaining new semantic information (review Gazzaniga, Ivry & 
Mangun, 2002, Ch. 8, pp. 301 – 302).  
 Korsakoff’s Syndrome is a memory impairment caused by thiamine 
deficiency in the brain that is the result of nutritional depletion and alcohol is one 
cause (and by far the most common) of this. It often presents after an episode of 
Wernicke’s encephalopathy but can also have a more insidious onset (for review see 
Kopelman, Thomson, Guerrini & Marshall, 2009). The symptoms include 
anterograde and retrograde amnesia, and in some cases confabulation of memories. 
Episodic memory is severely damaged in Korsakoff’s syndrome while implicit 
memory remains intact. The neuropathology of Korsakoff’s syndrome implicates 
damage to the thalamic and mamillary bodies, general cortical atrophy, loss of 
neurones from the superior frontal cortex and a decrease in cerebral blood flow to the 
frontal and parietal regions (Kopelman, et al., 2009, Harper & Kril, 1987).  This 
suggests that patients with Korsakoff’s may differ in their memory performance from 
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other amnesia patients who have aetiologies involving the MTL region, as we shall 
see below. 
 
Daniel Schacter and his colleagues have led the research into false recall and 
recognition in amnesia populations. Schacter, Verfaellie and Pradere (1996) took 
twelve amnesia patients with mixed aetiologies and exposed them to the Deese, 
Roediger and McDermott paradigm (DRM). Six patients had Korsakoff’s syndrome, 
5 had medial temporal lobe damage and 1 had thalamic damage. The amnesia 
patients produced fewer correct hits to previously studied words, and had more false 
alarms to the non-studied words compared to the controls. However, they also made 
fewer false alarms to the critical lures than the controls; in other words, amnesia 
patients showed an apparent reduced false recognition.  
 This reduced false recognition was a result of Schacter and colleagues’ 
analysis methods which used corrected false recognition rates. On first observation, 
the false recognition rates for the amnesia patients were comparable to the control 
groups. However, when taking into account the amnesia groups response bias to say 
‘yes’ even to non-studied words, the corrected false recognition rates (i.e. the false 
alarm rate to critical lures, minus the false alarm rate to non-studied words) were 
considerably reduced in comparison to controls. Schacter, Verfaellie and Koutstaal 
(2002) defend this analysis method by arguing, “Because such a tendency could 
inflate estimates of false recognition to related theme words, it is important to use 
corrected false-recognition measures (or signal detection analyses) that take into 
account such a response bias” (Schacter, et al., 2002, p.117).  
To account for this pattern of reduced false recognition, Schacter et al. (2002) 
argued that the results showed a deficit in amnesia patients in both conceptual and 
perceptual gist representation. In healthy individuals strong links are formed between 
the items on each of the word lists creating, and maintaining, a good gist 
representation. During the recognition phase controls can easily identify previously 
studied words, but this strong gist representation means they are more susceptible to 
identifying the critical lures words as having been on the original list, given that it 
fits with the overall gist of a previously studied list. However, a non-studied word 
does not fit with the gist of the studied word lists, and so the control can easily reject 
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this. In contrast, Schacter et al. (Ibid.) argued the impaired gist representation of the 
amnesia group does not allow them to form these strong links whilst studying the 
word lists so they find it harder to identify the studied words. Since they lack this 
robust gist formation they are not as susceptible to accepting the critical lures as 
readily as the control group. Furthermore, this damaged gist representation leaves 
them unable to distinguish the non-studied words from previously studied words so 
producing a bias response to say ‘old’ to these items. 
 With this in mind Schacter, Verfaellie & Pradere (1996) hypothesized that it 
should be possible to manipulate levels of false recognition in both control and 
amnesia groups by manipulating the conditions so they are more or less conducive to 
eliciting false recognition. Schacter, Verfaellie, Anes and Racine, (1998) tested this 
theory by using repeated study and testing of the word lists prior to the recognition 
phase in the DRM paradigm. Furthermore, they examined the performance 
differences between Korsakoff’s patients and patients with amnesia (the latter had 
MTL damage as a result of either anoxia or encephalitis). They argued that 
Korsakoff’s patients, due to the damage to the frontal lobes, should show a greater 
impairment to source monitoring processes than the amnesia patients. They also 
hypothesized that repeated study of the word lists would enable the normal control 
groups to increase their veridical and explicit memory and therefore decrease their 
false recognition to the critical lures. In contrast the amnesia patients would not be 
able to increase their veridical recollection as a result of their poor item-specific 
memory, but would show an increase in false recognition as a result of their inability 
to suppress gist based themes as the increasing trials improved their gist 
representation. Their findings supported the first hypothesis in that controls were 
able to use the repeated study phases to increase veridical recall and hence reduce 
false recognition. However, according to Schacter et al. (1998) the increased false 
recognition in the patient group was only found in the Korsakoff’s patients; the other 
amnesia patients showed a flat or fluctuating pattern across the trials. Schacter et al. 
(1998) argued that the frontal lobe damage in Korsakoff patients may contribute to 
their inability to suppress their increasing sensitivity to gist traces as the number of 
study trials increases; this is similar to the over-reliance on gist traces seen in ageing 
populations. In contrast, the other amnesia patients showed no sign of this increase in 
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gist sensitivity and so they had a flat, fluctuating pattern across an increase of trials. 
It is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from this work given the small and 
divided patient population. However, of note from this work is the finding that the 
amnesia patients without Korsakoff’s syndrome did not seem able to improve either 
their gist or veridical memory cues across trials.  
 To further support the gist theory for false recognition, Schacter had to rule 
out other theories such as Underwood’s ‘implicit associative response’. As we saw in 
Chapter One this model argues that a subject will implicitly generate the word ‘hot’ 
when shown the word ‘cold’ thereby causing the word ‘hot’ to be falsely recognized 
a later stage. The only way to exclude this theory is to use items that a subject cannot 
implicitly create. In order to explore this, Koutstaal, Schacter, Verfaellie, Brenner 
and Jackson (1999) developed a Deese, Roediger and McDermott-type paradigm that 
used novel, computer-generated, abstract patterns. Each pattern was a complex shape 
formed from a prototype, the prototype subsequently acted as the critical lure. Once 
again, Koutstaal et al. (1999) found reduced false recognition amongst the amnesia 
patient group compared with the control group (the amnesia group were of mixed 
aetiologies; anoxia, encephalitis, thalamic infarct and Korsakoff’s syndrome). The 
findings supported the argument that reduced false recognition in the patient group 
could be attributed to degraded gist representation rather than to poor memory and 
failure to implicitly respond with the prototype shape, since this had never been seen 
before and it was highly unlikely that either patients or controls could generate this 
item during the study phase. 
 However, this paradigm only examined perceptual memory processes. In 
order to examine whether semantic and conceptual gist processes are implicated in 
false recognition, Koutstaal, Verfaellie and Schacter (2001) used the categorized 
picture DRM paradigm using the same stimuli as Koutstaal and Schacter (1997). The 
authors argued that any false recognition to the critical lures would be a result of gist 
representation, either semantic or conceptual but not as a result of implicit response. 
 Once again, Koutstaal et al. (2001) found impaired false recognition among 
the amnesia patient groups in comparison with the controls. Later, Schacter et al. 
(2002) concluded the results from these experiments, “further confirm that amnesic 
patients show reduced false recognition under conditions where memory for gist, 
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rather than source confusions regarding individual items, is the primary determinant 
of illusory memory” as well as strengthening the claim that gist representation in 
normal individuals is one of the main drives of false recognition in the DRM 
paradigm (Schacter et al., 2002, p.122). Furthermore, they draw out a key point 
regarding this work that, “under conditions that favor the development of strong gist 
representations, and that work against using explicit recollection to suppress such 
representations, amnesic patients show reduced false recognition compared to 
healthy controls” (Ibid., p.123).  
 Taking this one step further, Verfaellie, Schacter and Cook (2002) used 
Brainerd and Reyna’s (1998) ‘meaning recognition’ paradigm whereby participants 
are asked not to make ‘old-new’ decisions on words but rather to say if the words 
appearing during the recognition phase are related in meaning to any of the words in 
the study phase. Participants endorse far more theme words in the meaning condition 
in comparison with the ‘old-new’ condition. According to their theory, the meaning 
condition relies entirely on gist memory for responses. By using this paradigm 
Verfaellie et al. (2002) could distinguish between the two alternative theories of gist 
memory in amnesia in order to explain their lower rates of false recognition: either 
gist memory itself is impaired or access to gist is impaired. If the former hypothesis 
was correct, and gist memory itself is damaged then the reduction in false 
recognition for amnesia patients (in comparison with controls) should be as 
pronounced in the meaning condition as it is in the standard condition. Conversely, if 
amnesia patients can still encode and store gist memory but are unable to access this 
during retrieval, then the lower rates of false recognition, compared with controls, in 
the meaning condition should be reduced, if not eliminated.  
 Verfaellie et al. (2002) took sixteen amnesia patients of mixed aetiologies 
(Korsakoff’s syndrome, encephalitis, anoxia, bithalamic stroke) and seventeen 
control participants and tested them on a paradigm that consisted of 32 lists of 16 
words. Each list was composed of 15 words with one critical lure, similar to the 
DRM paradigm. In contrast to the DRM, during the recognition phase for the 
meaning condition participants are asked to respond ‘old’ if they recognized an item 
as being related to any of the studied word lists and ‘new’ if they did not think the 
word was related to any of the themes presented in the study lists. The standard 
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condition just asked for an ‘old-new’ response as to whether the word had appeared 
on the original lists, similar to the DRM paradigm. 
 Verfaellie et al. (2002) found the amnesia patients endorsed fewer critical 
lures in the meaning condition than controls thereby exhibiting impaired false 
recognition. This failure to eliminate the reduction in false recognition in amnesia 
patients in comparison with controls supported their first hypothesis. The authors 
concluded that in patients with amnesia there is an inability to encode, store, or 
maintain a strong gist representation. 
 The conclusion regarding damaged gist memory in amnesia patients is not 
without its criticisms; however the converging evidence suggests that this pattern of 
reduced false recognition in amnesia patients is repeatable across trials. Gallo (2006, 
p. 207) offers an alternative, arguing that interpreting these results using gist 
representation is at odds with the associative activation account. This would suggest 
that impaired priming of the critical lures during the study phase could indicate that it 
is reduced associative activation that is at fault in amnesia patients.  
 
2.3.2 Frontal Lobe Damage 
As discussed earlier, the frontal regions of the brain are important for memory 
processes such as episodic memory and source monitoring. Investigating patients 
with damage to these regions provides added understanding regarding these 
cognitive processes since frontal lobe damage patients should be more susceptible to 
false recognition and recall. 
To investigate this, Melo, Winocur and Moscovitch (1999) used a patient 
group with mixed aetiologies with medial temporal lobe damage (MTL), medial 
temporal lobe and frontal lobe damage, or with frontal lobe damage (the patient 
demographics are shown in Figure 2). The group with only frontal lobe damage had 
no amnesia. The results for the recognition trial showed that patients with MTL and 
frontal lobe damage had a pattern of true and false recognition consistent with that 
seen in the above studies  
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in amnesia patients with MTL damage. That is, they had reduced false recognition 
compared with controls and produced more false recognition to the non-studied 
words. However, the frontal lobe patients without amnesia showed considerably 
higher false recognition to the critical lures compared with either controls or the 
MTL and frontal lobe population. Melo et al. (1999) argued the results demonstrated 
that the impairment in monitoring processes in the frontal lobe patients made them 
more vulnerable to false recognition. 
Budson et al. (2005) also explored false recognition in frontal lobe patients 
this time using Schacter’s distinctiveness heuristic model (Schacter et al., 1997). 
Budson et al. (2005) wanted to see if patients with frontal lobe damage could use the 
distinctive features of a picture in order to reduce their false recognition (patient 
demographics for frontal lesions can be found in Appendix H). However, the results 
showed that the frontal lobe patients could not reduce their false recognition in the 
picture paradigm indicating they could not use the distinctiveness heuristic. The 
Figure 2: Patient demographics from Melo, Winocur & Moscovitch (1999) 
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authors therefore suggest that the distinctiveness heuristic is a metacognitive strategy 
that is reliant upon the frontal lobes, and so accessible in healthy controls. 
In a case study of patient BG who had right frontal lobe damage, Curran, 
Schacter, Norma and Galluccio (1997) explored his performance over a variety of 
false recognition tasks and stimuli (including words and pseudowords, words and T-
junction counting, pseudowords and pronunciation ratings, words and liking ratings). 
All participants had to explain the basis of their remember judgement for each word. 
There was no difference in false or veridical recognition across all conditions for the 
controls. They found that only in the ‘word and liking’ condition, which required 
semantic encoding, could BG suppress his false recognition and perform as well as a 
control. In other conditions BG produced considerably higher false alarms compared 
with controls. The authors reasoned that the semantic encoding condition was ‘more 
conducive to specific recollection, and many studied items triggered relatively 
specific recollections of the encoding episode’ (Curran et al., p.1045, 1997). BG 
could utilise specific information about the items, thereby reducing his false response 
bias that was based on general familiarity features in previous conditions. This over-
reliance on general features to produce high rates of false alarms is similar to the 
pattern of false recognition we saw in older populations in the DRM paradigm. 
However, in those cases, high false alarms to the critical lures were attributed to the 
over-reliance on gist-based features in ageing populations due to an inability to 
access verbatim traces (e.g. Kensinger & Schacter, 1999).  
The implication that increased false recognition in frontal lobe damage may 
be due to over-reliance on gist traces is not mentioned in the above research. Instead 
the higher rates of false recognition found in frontal lobe patients, compared with 
controls, is usually attributed to impairments in monitoring processes, yet either 
theory seems equally valid and Schacter and his colleagues do attribute this in later 







2.4 Alzheimer’s Disease 
Patients with Alzheimer’s Disease are interesting due to their marked deficits in 
episodic memory. We have already seen above in research on older adults and 
patients with frontal lobe damage, that deficits in episodic memory lead to interesting 
patterns of false recognition in the DRM paradigm, specifically an increased 
susceptibility to false recognition of critical lures. 
 David Balota and Andrew Budson have led the research in false memory 
formation in dementia populations. Balota et al. (1999) explored false recall and 
recognition in five populations: young adults (aged 17 to 33 years); healthy older 
adults (aged 60 to 79 years); healthy ‘old-old’ adults (aged 80 to 96 years); older 
adults with very mild dementia (aged 66 to 91 years); and finally older adults with 
mild dementia (aged 56 to 90 years). Both dementia groups had a mild form of 
Alzheimer’s Disease. Using corrected true recognition (studied word hits minus non-
studied word false alarms) and corrected false recognition (critical lures minus non-
studied word false alarms) analysis, they found that as false recognition increased as 
a function of age, true recognition decreased. In contrast Alzheimer-type patients 
showed a decrease in both corrected true and false recognition. 
 In a similar manner to Kensigner and Schacter (1999), Budson et al. (2000) 
explored false recognition in Alzheimer patients after single and multiple exposure(s) 
to the word lists in the study phase in order to see if multiple exposure could enhance 
item-specific memory and thereby reduce false recognition to the critical lures. After 
a single exposure to the word lists (that is the participants studied six word lists of 
fifteen words once before the recognition phase), patients with Alzheimer’s disease 
showed a reduction in corrected false recognition. Budson et al. (2000) argued that 
Alzhemier patients have not only degraded source monitoring processes but also 
problems with their gist specific memory so that it is difficult for them to filter out 
the non-studied words but at the same time means they do not have the same gist 
memory for the studied words and hence also produce reduced true recognition. 
When patients and controls were given multiple exposure to the studied word 
lists before the recognition phase, controls were able to suppress their false 
recognition to the critical lures. However, compared with the younger adults, patients 
with Alzheimer’s Disease actually increased their false recognition to the critical, 
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non-studied words. Budson et al. (2000) argued that by giving Alzheimer patients 
multiple trials allows them to build up their gist memory for the studied words, 
thereby increasing their false recognition as their episodic memory and source 
monitoring processes are still vulnerable. In contrast the multiple exposures allowed 
controls to build on their item-specific memory and so reduce false recognition to the 
critical lures. All groups showed an increase in corrected true recognition to the 
studied words after multiple study trials.  
To investigate if reduced false recognition in Alzheimer patients is due to 
problems with processing information in semantic memory, Budson, Desikan, 
Daffner and Schacter (2001) used a DRM paradigm that used categories of novel, 
computer-generated abstract shapes. They argued that in this paradigm, due to the 
nature of the stimuli, participants would not be able to use any previously acquired 
semantic information. Using corrected true and false recognition rates, Budson et al. 
(2001) found Alzheimer patients produced reduced false recognition and true 
recognition compared with controls. They argued the pattern of findings in 
Alzheimer patients in DRM-type paradigms cannot be solely attributed to just 
deficits in long-term semantic memory, but instead highlight poorly developed and 
maintained gist information since gist encompasses both semantic information and 
perceptual information. 
 Watson et al. (2001) used a paradigm to explore false recognition in 
phonological, semantically related and hybrid word lists in controls and people with 
Alzheimer’s disease. For the semantically related word lists, they found controls 
produced more true recognition than patients. However, both groups showed 
comparable false recognition to the critical lures. However it should be noted they 
did not use the corrected false recognition analysis used by Budson et al. (2000) and 
so did not take into account the high false recognition rates to the non-studied words 
produced by the patient group. This highlights a problem in any research that 
different analytical methods can produce what appear to be on the surface, 
conflicting results between research groups. Furthermore, when using patient groups 
there is the added complication that within a group, patients will be in varying stages 
of the disease.  
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2.5 Autism and Asperger’s Syndrome 
Autism and Asperger’s are defined as developmental disorders resulting in abnormal 
communication skills, impairment in social interaction, and repetitive behaviours. 
Asperger’s is often described as ‘high-functioning’ autism in that individuals often 
present with normal language and intellectual capabilities (for review see Fay, 1988). 
There is also evidence that individuals with autism spectrum disorders have some 
difficulties with episodic memories. For example, when using Tulvings (1981) 
remember-know paradigm adults with Asperger’s syndrome produce less 
‘remember’ responses and more ‘know’ responses than matched controls suggesting 
they lack the recollective experiences and rely more on the familiarity of the ‘know’ 
response (Gardiner, Bowler & Grice, 2003). 
There is a paucity of research surrounding investigating false memories and 
false recognition in the Autism and Asperger populations. This seems surprising 
given that their developmental deficits should provide interesting insight into how 
their memories function, in particular within adult autism populations since the 
majority of research has focused on children’s populations (Bowler et al., 2000). At 
the time of writing there have only been two studies investigating false recall and 
recognition in the Deese, Roediger and McDermott paradigm and these have 
produced conflicting results. The first by Beversdorf and colleagues (2000) 
investigated a population of eight individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders 
(ASD) and sixteen age-matched adults. They found that the ASD group had better 
true recognition to the studied items than the control group, but they also produced 
less false recognition to the critical, non-studied words than the control group. 
However, the ASD group produced more false responses to the non-studied, 
unrelated words than the controls. The finding of greater true recognition was 
attributed to the high memory capacities often found in ASD populations. The 
reduced false recognition to critical words was attributed to a restriction in the 
semantic-associative networks, an idea not dissimilar to the underdeveloped gist 
representation model we saw in children which would also explain the higher false 
recognition to the non-studied, unrelated words. 
The second study by Bowler et al. (2000), involved ten participants with 
Asperger’s syndrome. They found no differences in false recognition between the 
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Asperger’s individuals or controls. However, in experiment two in which they 
monitored remember versus know responses in the recognition phase, individuals 
with Asperger’s made more know judgments to true recognition of the studied words.  
The obvious difference here is the patient populations for the two research 
studies (Asperger’s and Autism individuals), which one could argue suggest not 
conflicting results, but rather different findings for different patient groups. This will 
be discussed further in Chapter Four. 
 
2.6 Depression and Anxiety 
There is a wide acceptance amongst researchers that cognition and emotion are 
interrelated (for overview see Mineka & Nugent, 1995). Beck’s (1967; 1976) model 
of depression and anxiety is useful within the context of this thesis as it employs 
Bartlett’s (1932) schema model.  Mineka and Nugent (1995) provide a succinct 
definition of schemata describing them as “organized representations of prior 
knowledge which guide the current process of information”. Beck describes 
individuals with depression and anxiety as being in a state of over-stimulation of 
specific schemata relevant to their disorder. Hence, for people with depression this 
would mean replaying negative schemata so that there is a bias for focusing on, and 
therefore remembering, more negatively charged information. In the case of anxiety, 
there is a focus on the danger schemata meaning individuals will focus on and retain 
more information relevant to threatening stimuli (Beck, 1967). 
 Within the field of false memory research there have been surprisingly few 
studies investigating the phenomena amongst people with depressive and anxiety 
disorders. Instead, there has been a tendency to explore memories in relation to the 
mood of the event or stimulus. For example, Dewhurst and Parry (2000) found that 
negative stimuli tended to be recalled in greater vividness and detail than neutral or 
positive stimuli. Furthermore, Bless and Schwarz (1999) found that positive stimuli 
were frequently recalled only with feelings of familiarity and a general gist of the 
information. Yet few studies have attempted to explore the relationship between 
individuals with depression and susceptibility to false memories. 
 The DRM paradigm provides a reliable platform to examine depression, 
anxiety and false recognition. For example, Zoellner et al. (2000) investigated 
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individuals with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatized individuals 
without PTSD and controls who were rated according to the Beck Depression 
Inventory (Beck et al., 1996) and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et 
al.,1970). They found that both traumatised groups, with or without PTSD, produced 
more false recall to the critical, non-studied words than the control group. This was 
only related to the State-Trait Anxiety measures, no relationship was found for the 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). However, it should be noted that the group with 
post-traumatic stress disorder were all on medication to address their depression 
(selective serotonin uptake inhibitors and/or benzodiazepines), and this may have 
influenced why no relationship was found between false recall and the results for the 
BDI since benzodiazepines can cause short-term memory loss (e.g. Desai et al., 
1983). 
 Clancy et al. (2002) found a positive correlation between false recall and 
recognition to critical, non-studied words and depression as measured on the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI). However, this study examined individuals who either 
believed aliens had abducted them, or who reported ‘recovered’ memories of an alien 
abduction and so the results are discussed, perhaps unsurprisingly, in terms of an 
individual’s susceptibility to hypnotic suggestibility and schizotypic features. It 
should be noted that in an earlier study Clancy et al. (2000) failed to find such a 
relationship between BDI scores and false recognition in women who reported 
sexual abuse in childhood, although the group who reported recalling ‘repressed’ 
memories did show a greater susceptibility to false recognition of the critical, non-
studied words.  
In a similar study investigating women reporting childhood sexual abuse, 
Bremner et al. (2000) found that women who had been abused and suffered from 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) were more likely to falsely recognize the 
critical, non-studied words than either women who had been abused but had no 
symptoms of PTSD, and controls. However, no correlations were found between 
false recognition and other clinical psychological measures. 
Moritz, Gläscher and Brassen (2005) found that patients with depression, as 
measured by the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale, recalled fewer studied words 
than controls. However, within this finding they discovered that people with 
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depression did recall more emotionally charged words, but fewer neutral words, 
compared to the controls. In addition, although overall false recognition rates did not 
differ between the groups, individuals with depression did falsely recognize more 
emotionally charged critical, non-studied words more than controls. This supports 
previous research showing individuals with depression demonstrate a response bias 
to negatively charged stimuli (e.g. Bower, 1981; Segal et al., 1995). It should be 
noted that Moritz et al. (2005) departed from the DRM paradigm in that they only 
used four lists of twelve words. The original paradigm employed 24 lists of 15 
words. This departure would have a significant effect on the number of data points 
for the analysis.  
Peiffer and Trull (2000) also employed the DRM paradigm in order to look at 
individual differences that might predict suggestibility and false recall production in 
women. They found that women who were more suggestible, as rated by the 
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale, and acquiescent were more susceptible to false 
recall. This would support the findings of Clancy et al. (2000; 2002). 
However, Gallo (2006, pp. 165 – 166) advocates caution when interpreting 
the results from such studies since they use subjects from special populations (i.e. 
childhood abuse or alien abduction). There may also be other factors, such as 
medication or experimental procedure that could affect results. For example, Watts, 
Morris and MacLeod (1987) found that patients with depression, measured by the 
Levine-Pilowsky Depression Questionnaire, produced more false recognition to the 
critical, non-studied words compared to controls but only in the condition where 
participants had to vocalize words on presentation. In the silent condition there no 
difference between the two groups for false recognition. 
Despite the criticisms the research does show the usefulness of the Deese, 
Roediger and McDermott paradigm for investigating individual differences in false 
recall and recognition. In a later chapter of this thesis Gallo’s (2006) comments are 
taken into consideration when examining depression and anxiety traits in a group of 





2.7 Imaging studies and false memories 
Researchers have often employed a variety of brain imaging techniques to determine 
if someone is telling the truth or lying, since identifying conditions such as 
spontaneous confabulation can often reveal underlying medical conditions such as 
Korsakoff’s Syndrome (for review see Hirstein, 2005). However, in the case of 
determining whether a healthy individual is producing false memories or not, the 
picture becomes somewhat more confusing since we do not go out of our way to lie 
to ourselves. As we have seen, false memories are incorporated into our schemata as 
easily as true memories; they’re not intentional lies. Nevertheless, this has not 
stopped intrepid researchers exploring possible means to determine the difference in 
brain activity between false and true memories. 
 Gonsalves and Paller (2000) produced an experiment investigating event-
related brain potentials (ERPs) that implicated, perhaps unsurprisingly, visual 
imagery in the process of forming false memories. During a study phase participants’ 
ERP responses were monitored as they looked at a series of words. Participants were 
instructed to visualize a picture of each word. For half the words, a picture was 
subsequently presented, and for the other half they were not and were shown a blank 
slide instead (see Figure 3).  
During the recognition phase, participants heard a word being read out with 
2.5-second intervals allowing them to respond. For each word they had to say ‘Yes’ 
if they thought it had been studied along with its picture, and ‘No’ if they thought it 





Figure 3: From Gonsalves & Paller 2000 
  
Gonsalves and Paller (2000) found that participants produced around 30% false 
memories. That is they incorrectly said ‘Yes’ to words as having being presented 
with pictures when in fact they had been presented with a blank slide. When 
examining the event-related potential (ERP) data for the study phase, Gonsalves and 
Paller discovered that posterior ERPs were more positive for a studied word if it was 
subsequently falsely recalled as having been presented with a picture. For the 
recognition phase, ERPs were more positive for true than false memories. In both 
cases Gonsalves and Paller suggest that the posterior ERP responses correlated with 
activity in the occipital lobe region of the brain. 
 Cabeza et al. (2001) used a DRM paradigm to examine false recognition 
using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). Their results implicated the 
medial temporal lobe region of the brain, in particular the parahippocampal gyrus, 
which showed more activity for ‘True’ than ‘False’ words. The parahippocampal 
gyrus is thought to be important for sensory information processing (see Bear et al., 
2001, Ch.23, p.756). Cabeza et al. (2001) argued that this response for ‘True’ items 
indicates the recovery of perceptual information, something not available for the 
‘False’ items. They also found dissociation in the prefrontal cortex region (PFC); the 
bilateral dorsolateral PFC was more activated for the True and False words than for 
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New items, that is the non-studied unrelated words, which they suggests reflects 
monitoring processes for the retrieved information. In contrast, the left ventrolateral 
PFC showed more activation for ‘New’ items as opposed to the ‘True’ or ‘False’ 
items, which they suggest is due to semantic processing since the ‘New’ items do not 
fit with the semantic gist of the studied word lists. 
Fabiani, Stadler and Wessels (2000) looked at lateralized brain potentials to 
true and false recognition. Using the DRM paradigm, participants studied lists of 
words that were randomly presented to either the left or right visual field, Event-
related potentials were measured during the recognition phase with the studied, 
critical or non-studied words being presented centrally. Fabiani et al. found 
lateralized activity for the studied words that was absent for the critical, non-studied 
words. In other words, false memories did not produce a sensory signature. 
 As Schacter and Slotnick (2004) note, the implications of imaging studies 
suggest that there is more activation for true items in regions of the brain that are 
associated with sensory and perceptual for details, than for false items. Taking the 
hypothesis that true recognition is associated with greater sensory reactivation 
compared with false recognition, they tested subjects on the DRM paradigm using 
abstract shapes (see Koutstaal et al, 1999). The main finding was greater activation 
for true recognition as opposed to false recognition in the regions of the brain 
responsible for early visual processing. 
    
2.8 Conclusion 
 
One had a lovely face, 
And two or three had charm, 
But charm and face were in 
vain 
Because the mountain grass 
Cannot but keep the form 
Where the mountain hare has lain. 
 
Memory, W. B. Yeats 
 
The poet Yeats recognized the fragility of the human memory and its susceptibility 
to change in relationship to an individual’s circumstances. Just as grass can no longer 
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keep its form once flattened by a hare, memory changes form as our experiences and 
concepts add to our general schematic representations.  
In these two introductory chapters we have seen how the inaccuracies of the 
human memory can aid us in understanding its underlying functions. A common 
theme throughout the research is that gist memory is an underlying cognitive 
function that aids us in constructing schematic representations, but misleads us into 
forming false memories. However, there will always be unanswered questions 
regarding memory. This thesis sets out to fill some of those gaps in our knowledge, 
such as the relationship between depression and false memories; a further 
exploration into individual differences and a study investigating the performance of 
autistic individual’s in the DRM paradigm. Furthermore, it also examines the 
flexibility of the DRM paradigm and looks at whether it can be used in clinical 
settings to explore functional memory weakness and whether or not it can 
differentiate between those with genuine memory problems and those who are 
malingering. Underlying this work is the theme of gist representation and Bartlett’s 



















Chapter Three: Individual Differences and Susceptibility  
to False Recognition in the DRM Paradigm 
 
Even if several people experience “the same” event, they will 
interpret it differently depending on their prior experiences. 
Each person perceives an event with different backgrounds 
and proclivities. Each of us has had different experiences and 
likewise different attitudes, knowledge, dispositions, and 
biases. 
Roediger and Gallo (2002, pp. 4 – 5). 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The knowledge that each person encodes and subsequently interprets an event into 
their memory in a unique fashion opens the door to the question, are there specific 
individual differences that can affect a person’s susceptibility to false recognition 
and hence the formation of false memories?  Do these differences suggest a person 
who is more susceptible to false memory intrusions is therefore a less reliable 
witness, an important consideration when interpreting eyewitness testimony in 
criminal cases? Or, conversely, are there adverse aspects to being less susceptible to 
false recognition? 
Individual differences and false recognition in the Deese (1959), Roediger 
and McDermott (1995) paradigm (DRM) have been explored in clinical populations 
(e.g. depression, ageing) to investigate personality differences. For example, Clancy 
et al. (2002) found a positive correlation between depression and susceptibility to 
false recognition of critical lures in the DRM paradigm; Zoellner et al. (2000) found 
a positive correlation between anxiety and false recognition; and finally, Koutstaal 
and Schacter (1997) investigated age-related differences in the DRM paradigm 
suggesting that older adults were more susceptible to false recognition due to their 
over-reliance on gist information. However, as useful as these clinical findings are 
they encompass populations of people who may not be considered ‘reliable 
witnesses’ in a courtroom. For example, the population studied in Clancy et al. 
(2002) consisted of individuals who believed they had been abducted by aliens, or 
who thought they had undergone such an experience and subsequently suppressed it. 
They were more susceptible to false recognition but also produced less veridical 
recollection of the studied words. Perhaps more controversial is Zoellner et al.’s 
(2000) study which investigated women who were suffering post-traumatic stress 
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disorder after being victims of violent crime, including sexual assault. Their findings 
indicated that women who experienced more anxiety were more susceptible to false 
recall and recognition, but their veridical recall for studied items was not 
significantly different from the control group. Zoellner et al. (2000) are careful to 
point out such findings should not be interpreted to mean that traumatised individuals 
are more likely to form false memories of the traumatic event, but the failure to 
highlight the consistent veridical recall in the trauma group does leave such research 
open to misinterpretation. However, the majority of those who do provide eyewitness 
testimony in legal cases are not from specific clinical populations, and mounting 
research into false memories has demonstrated that no one, it would seem, is immune 
to the vagaries of their own memories. Are there fundamental individual differences 
that lead some people to produce more false recognition than others in the DRM 
paradigm? 
Before exploring this further it is important to clarify one issue regarding the 
DRM paradigm: that the results cannot be attributed to an individual’s specific 
circumstances at the time of testing. For example, if Clancy et al. (2002) found a 
positive correlation between depression and susceptibility to false recognition then a 
normal individual who might feel particularly upset on the day of testing would be 
more susceptible to false recognition than they would be, for example, a week or two 
later. Blair, Lenton and Hastie (2002) investigated this argument by testing 
individuals in two sessions separated by two weeks. Participants saw the same 
materials and undertook exactly the same procedure for both sessions. Blair et al. 
(2002) found an individual’s susceptibility to falsely recognizing a particular critical 
lure in week one was an accurate predictor of their susceptibility to falsely recognize 
the same critical lure in week two. Furthermore, across all subjects there was a 
positive correlation for false recognition between week one and week two (r = 0.76). 
To ensure this was not due to response bias (that is a bias to saying ‘yes’ all of the 
time be they critical lures, studied words or non-studied words) the levels of false 
recognition were corrected by subtracting the incorrect responses for the unrelated 
non-studied words. The same relationship was found after they corrected for true 
false recognition indicating that an individual’s susceptibility to false recognition 
remained stable across time.  
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Researchers have also examined whether there would be significant 
differences in response to gender stereotypes in the materials used in the DRM 
paradigm. Lenton, Blair and Hastie (2001) examined the possibility that gender 
stereotyping of the word lists may also influence false recognition. Participants were 
divided into two groups. The first group was assigned to the stereotypical ‘male’ 
word lists, such as lawyer and soldier; the second was assigned to the ‘female’ word 
list, for example nurse and secretary. Both groups also studied neutral words lists. 
Lenton et al. (2001) found that individuals who had studied either male or female 
stereotypes were subsequently more likely to falsely recognize the related gender 
role for the critical lures. Furthermore, the researchers questioned participants after 
the experiments and found the majority were unaware of the gender stereotyping of 
the word lists and from this concluded that their responses to the critical lures was a 
result of implicit association to the themes of the studied words, rather than the use 
of any strategic processing by the participants. However, this could also be 
interpreted in the light of gist processing since the ability to categorise words into 
themes would require good gist, suggesting those individuals who did produce more 
false alarms to the gender stereotyped lures had better gist memory. 
Incorporating both sex differences and gender stereotypes in the words lists, 
Baust and Ferraro (2004) argued that men would produce more false recognition to 
stereotypical male lists and women to the female lists. The results did not support 
their hypothesis and no sex difference was found, although they did replicate Lenton 
et al.’s (2001) finding that gender stereotyping of the word lists was a significant 
factor in false recognition.  
This leads to the next question: if there are individual differences to 
susceptibility to false recognition and false memories, where do these differences lie 
within a normal population? Given the above findings of a relationship between 
gender stereotype and susceptibility to false recognition a logical choice of research 
has been sex differences. However, studies have found no relationship between sex 
and susceptibility to false recognition (e.g. Clancy et al., 2002; Seamon et al., 2002; 
Baust & Ferraro, 2004). One argument for the failure to find sex differences in these 
studies is the use of small population samples (Voyer, 1996), and this is something 
that will be discussed below. Another area of discrepancy is the variation in the 
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number of word lists used by researchers. For example, Baust and Ferraro (2004) 
only used five word lists, which would have considerably reduced the number of data 
points for each individual. In contrast, the original Roediger and McDermott (1995) 
paradigm used twenty-four lists of fifteen words each associated with a single critical 
lure. In the light of work such as Stadler, Roediger and McDermott (1999) if there 
are individual differences in false recognition to particular critical lures then it would 
seem imprudent to use limited numbers of words lists as this does not accurately 
reflect the wide variety of vocabulary and stimuli which each individual encounters 
every day and are, therefore, likely to produce false recognition to. 
Although other individual traits and differences have been explored they 
often find correlations between only one aspect of the DRM paradigm, such as a 
relationship with false recognition of the critical lures but no correlations for the 
studied words. For example, Peiffer and Trull (2000) examined suggestibility and 
self-esteem in young adult women and found a positive correlation between 
suggestibility and false recall but did not recount the relationship between self-
esteem and veridical recall of the studied words, presumably because the latter was 
not significant. In another study Watson, Bunting, Poole and Conway (2005) divided 
their participants into two groups: those with high working memory span, and those 
with low working memory spans. Participants with high spans had better veridical 
recall for the studied list words than the low span group. However, there was no 
significant difference in false recall of the critical lures except in the warning 
condition phase, when participants were warned prior to the recall phase to avoid 
false recollection of the critical lures. Here, the difference between the two groups in 
veridical recall remained the same as in the first experiment, but this time 
participants with a high working memory span were more able to suppress false 
recall to the critical lures than their low span counterparts. The findings were 
discussed in terms of superior episodic memory for the high working span group, 
hence the higher rates of veridical recall for the studied words, but also allowing 
them to suppress false recognition in the warning condition. 
 The aim of this study was to investigate whether there is a reliable indicator 
of susceptibility to false recognition in the DRM paradigm within a normal 
population. Very few research studies investigating individual differences have 
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engaged with the concept of gist memory as a driving force behind false recognition 
even though a number of findings could be interpreted in this light (e.g. Stadler et al. 
1999). Nor have they engaged with the idea that gist memory is a developmental 
process that can affect false recognition as suggested by ageing studies such as 
Koutstaal and Schacter (1997). However, Lövdén (2003) did investigate the increase 
in false memory with ageing but discussed the findings in terms of changes in 
episodic memory and processing speeds as opposed to the increasing reliance on gist 
memory with age. Any reliable method of investigating individual differences would 
need to show good correlations for both true and false recognition, since good gist 
representation should be reflected in both high rates of correct hits to studied words 
as well as increased susceptibility to false recognition of the critical lures. In light of 
the above research work what methods can we use to investigate individual 
differences? 
 
3.1.1 Second digit to fourth digit ratio (2D:4D) and hemispheric laterality  
In a meta-analysis of research work, Daniel Voyer (1996) criticised a large number 
of studies investigating sex differences and hemispheric laterality (often measured by 
presenting stimuli to the left and right visual fields, or audio stimuli using dichotic 
listening, see Springer & Deutsch, 1981) citing small population samples, 
specifically when applied to studies that also explored hemispheric differences in the 
brain. Since laterality effects were often minimal to begin with, adding sex 
differences to the data often produced conflicting results. However, DRM studies 
investigating sex differences have yielded no significant results. In part, this may be 
due to the small sample populations, for example, Clancy et al. (2002) had only 
eighteen male and fifteen female participants and these were spread over three 
different clinical groups. Or, the failure to find sex differences could be a result of 
limited materials, for example, Baust and Ferraro (2004) only used five word lists 
limiting the number of data points. To ensure there is a robust experimental design 
any procedure should incorporate both a large participant sample and preferably the 
full twenty-four word lists to maximize the data. 
 However, an alternative way of examining sex differences is by viewing 
males and females as opposite ends of a continuum and to find another measurement 
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to rate a person’s ‘physical’ sex. One such rating is the second digit to fourth digit 
ratio. The second digit to fourth digit ratio (2D:4D) is a sexually dimorphic trait 
under the control of the Homeobox gene, which also controls the differentiation of 
the testes and ovaries (Peichel et al., 1997). Male 2D:4D ratio is lower than female 
2D:4D ratio, that is males have relatively longer fourth fingers in relation to their 
second fingers compared with females. Furthermore, there is evidence that the 
2D:4D ratio is determined by the fourteenth week of pregnancy (Manning et al., 
1998) so that adult 2D:4D ratio and hormone levels may be determined by prenatal 
2D:4D ratio and hormone levels. Hence high prenatal testosterone and low 
oestrogen, favoured by a male foetus, will be indicated by a low 2D:4D ratio. 
Conversely, low prenatal testosterone and high oestrogen will be indicated by a high 
2D:4D ratio and hence will favour a female foetus. Manning et al. (2001) argue that 
if low 2D:4D ratio is an indication of high prenatal testosterone, then this may in turn 
be an indicator of more ‘male’ developmental traits such as autism.  
Taking into consideration that 2D:4D ratio may indicate more ‘male’ traits, 
and the work of Beversdorf et al. (2000) which found individuals with autism 
showed reduced false recognition in the DRM paradigm, we can hypothesise that 
there should be a positive correlation between 2D:4D ratio and false recognition of 
the critical lures and hits to the studied words. That is, individuals expressing more 
‘female’ 2D:4D ratios will be more susceptible to false recognition but will also 
produce higher true recognition to studied words. Individuals expressing more ‘male’ 
2D:4D ratios will be less susceptible to false recognition. Furthermore, Bellamy & 
Shillcock (2007) examined hemispheric asymmetry and found the right hemisphere 
was more susceptible to false recognition and post hoc tests indicated this lay with 
the female participants. Therefore, we can also hypothesise that if 2D:4D ratio does 
drive false recognition in the DRM paradigm then this will be especially significant 
in the right hemisphere in individuals with more ‘female’ 2D:4D ratios. 
However, there is a note of caution cited by Springer and Deutsch (1981) 
regarding sex differences and laterality. Similar to Voyer (1996) they argue that 
although the majority of experiments in this field often cite females as being less 
‘lateralized’ than males, there are a number of studies that do not show sex 
differences (and many go unpublished for this reason) since a variety of 
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methodologies may mask individual variability. Furthermore, it is unusual to find a 
study reporting greater lateralization in females as opposed to males, so our results 
may show no differences between male and female based on 2D:4D ratio. Another 
point to bear in mind is that 2D:4D ratio only reflects levels of testosterone at a 
specific moment in pregnancy, not the entire embryonic period, and so there may be 
no differences in group comparisons. With this in mind we wanted to find a way to 
investigate individual differences to false recognition (excluding laterality) using an 
alternative measure of sex differences. 
 
3.1.2 Autism Spectrum Quotient and Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
Daniel Voyer (1996) also suggested that researchers tend to equate biological sex 
differences with individual differences, but the two may not be related. This leads to 
the idea that an alternative way of exploring sex differences might be to view the 
concept of male and female cognition as opposing ends of a continuum not governed 
by outward biological differences.  
 In 1997 Baron-Cohen and Hammer introduced the ‘extreme male-brain 
theory of autism’. This theory was postulated from the observation that autism is 
strongly sex-dependent with a male to female ratio of 4:1. In essence, the theory 
argues that autism is an expression of one end of the sex continuum resulting in 
predominantly ‘male-brained’ characteristics. The next expression of ‘male-brain’ 
characteristics is Asperger’s Syndrome, which has all the related characteristics of 
autism but without the cognitive, and language delay that is a marked feature of 
autism. This is also strongly sex dependent with a male to female ratio of 9:1. Baron-
Cohen & Hammer (1997) argue that autism and Asperger’s lie on a continuum of 
social-communication disability with more ‘female-brains’ lying at the opposing end. 
Normal individuals can, therefore, express autistic characteristics that would fall 
along this continuum. With this in mind Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) developed the 
Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) designed to examine autism characteristics within a 
normal population. It is made up of fifty questions divided into five different areas of 
assessment: social skills, attention switching, imagination, communication, and 
attention to detail. A copy of the self-assessment questionnaire can be found in 
Appendix B. Although the AQ is not designed to be a diagnostic tool, by assessing 
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the questionnaire over a large population, including Asperger’s Syndrome and 
individuals with high-functioning autism as well as controls, Baron-Cohen et al. 
(2001) argued a useful cut-off point of a score of thirty-two or over in a normal 
individual on the AQ may indicate Asperger’s Syndrome. 
 One facet of autistic individuals is an inability to communicate or express 
their emotions, or to interpret those of other people (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 
1997). Where there is reporting of feelings it is often related to bodily sensation 
rather than a specific emotion. This difficulty in expressing emotion and describing 
feelings was first described by Sifnéos (1973), who coined the term Alexithymia. 
Alexithymia is a personality trait and similar to the Autism Spectrum Quotient in that 
the degree to which an individual expresses these traits falls along a continuum. 
Bagby, Taylor and Parker (1994) developed the twenty-item Toronto Alexithymia 
self-assessment scale (TAS-20). Since then the questionnaire has been adjusted and 
tested for its validity until it reached the format most widely used as shown in 
Appendix B (Parker et al., 2003; Taylor et al., 2003). The higher the score on the 
TAS-20 the more Alexithymic traits a person expresses with a score of 61 considered 
a diagnosis of Alexithymia.  
Berthoz and Hill (2005) examined the reliability of the TAS-20 for assessing 
emotion regulation in autism. Adults with autism spectrum disorder and controls 
completed the TAS-20 questionnaire and the Bermond-Vost Alexithymia 
questionnaire (BVAQ-B), which was recently developed as an alternative to the 
TAS-20. Berthoz and Hill found strong test-retest reliability for the TAS-20 scale 
that was able to discriminate between the autism group and controls whereas the 
BVAQ-B did not show the same discrimination. The ability of the TAS-20 scale to 
discriminate between those with autism and controls suggests that in a correlation 
with the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) we should find a positive relationship, that 
is the higher an individual’s AQ score (more autistic traits) the higher their TAS-20 






3.2 Experiment 1: Laterality and 2D:4D ratio and susceptibility to false 
recognition in the DRM paradigm. 
 
This experiment examines if there is a sex difference in susceptibility to false 
recognition. Given the failure of previous work to find any sex differences based 
solely on outward biological features we have chosen second to fourth digit ratio 
(2D:4D) in order to determine sex difference along a continuum. Bellamy and 
Shillcock’s (2007) work indicated in post hoc testing that if there was a difference it 
lay with females, specifically with the right hemisphere being more susceptible to 
false recognition. That is when stimuli are presented to the left visual field – right 
hemisphere (lvf-RH) there is higher false recognition to the critical lures in 
comparison with the right visual field – left hemisphere (rvf-LH). If this is true, then 
we hypothesise that in a large study sex difference, as measured by 2D:4D ratio, will 
reveal more ‘female’ 2D:4D ratio individuals (that is a high second to fourth digit 
ratio) will be more susceptible to false recognition of the critical lures and that this 
should be more pronounced in the lvf-RH.  
  
3.2.1 Participants 
One hundred participants (50 male, 50 female) between the ages of 18 and twenty-
five years old were recruited via the University of Edinburgh’s careers website. All 
the participants were students of the University. All were native speakers of English 
and were dominant right-handed as tested using the Edinburgh Handedness Scale 
(Oldfield, 1971). All had normal or corrected to normal vision with no reading 
difficulties.  The age range was restricted in order to keep the sample as homogenous 
as possible taking into account Voyer’s (1996) criticisms for investigating sex 








3.2.2 Method and Materials 
Subjects sat in front of a computer screen. They were told they were taking part in a 
study to investigate memory. The experiment was divided into two sections. In part 
one of the experiment participants were instructed via the computer screen to study 
the twenty-four lists of fifteen words and answer the maths questions in between 
each word list. The word lists are in Appendix A and are the same as those used by 
Bellamy & Shillock (2007). Although similar to the Roediger and McDermott (1995) 
word lists, the word lists used here were previously pre-tested amongst native 
English speakers since the Roediger and McDermott (1995) word lists were more 
appropriate for American-English speakers (e.g. the word sweet was associated with 
the word candy, which would not be true for native English speakers). The 
mathematical questions between each word list acted as a distracter task and 
prevented rehearsal of the word lists. The word lists and order of presentation of 
words within the lists were presented randomly. The words were presented at 1-
second durations with an interval of 500 ms between each word. Once all twenty-
four word lists had been studied the subjects were instructed to take a break. During 
this time their second to fourth digit ratio was measured. This was carried out by 
photocopying each hand and then measuring the distance from the tip of the relevant 
fingers down to the first basal crease using calibrated Vernier calipers (Manning et 
al., 2001).  Subjects then returned to the computer where they were instructed to 
carry on with the second part of the experiment, which was the recognition phase. 
Participants saw 96 words consisting of 48 words from the studied words lists, 24 
critical lures (from which each word list was derived, see Appendix A), and 24 non-
studied words that had no relation to either the studied words or critical lures. 
Investigation of hemispheric bias was achieved during the recognition phase by 
presenting half the words to either to the left or right visual field. Participants were 
instructed to stare at the central fixation cross and to avoid unnecessary head 
movement during the recognition trial. The words were presented randomly either 
3cm horizontally to the left or the right of the cross for a duration of 120 ms to avoid 
any re-fixation. Participants were instructed to press ‘Yes’ on the computer keyboard 
if they thought the word had appeared on the original studied lists, or ‘No’ if they 
thought the word was new. The ‘d’ and ‘k’ keys were used for the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ 
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responses and these were counterbalanced across participants. The experiment lasted 
approximately one hour and participants were paid £6 for their time. 
 
3.2.3 Design 
This was a mixed design with Visual Field (lvf or rvf) and Type of Word (critical 
lure, studied or non-studied) as the within-participant factors, and sex (male or 
female) as a between participants factor. Response accuracy was the dependent 
measure. Digit ratio was correlated with critical word incorrect, studied word correct 
and non-studied word incorrect. We also used the two-high threshold theory to 
examine corrected true and false recognition rates (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). 
 
3.2.4 Results 
The descriptive statistics for the experiment are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Experiment 1 
 Male N = 50 Female N = 50 Total N = 100 
 Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD 
Age 20.6 1.77 20.3 1.36 20.4 (18 – 25) 1.58 
Digit Ratio 0.96  0.03 0.97 0.03 0.96 (.9 – 1.03) 0.03 
Edinburgh Handedness 9.53  0.54 9.70 0.40 0.96 (8.5 – 10) 0.48 
Left-Visual Field (RH) Mean % SD Mean % SD Mean % SD 
Critical Lure Incorrect (24 
Items) 
62.0 18.14 61.49 18.2 61.75 (0 – 100) 18.03 
Studied Word Correct (48 
Items) 
64.58 14.46 67.66 12.84 66.12 (37.5 – 100) 16.69 
Non-studied Word Incorrect  
(24 Items) 
10.99 12.53 6.99 11.46 8.99 (0 – 58.3) 12.11 
Right-Visual Field (LH) Mean % SD Mean % SD Mean % SD 
Critical Lure Incorrect (24 
Items) 
60.66 20.27 57.50 22.63 59.08 (8.3 – 100) 21.42 
Studied Word Correct (48 
Items) 
67.00 13.85 67.50 16.54 67.25 (20.83 – 
95.83) 
15.18 
Non-studied Word Incorrect  
(24 Items) 
16.83 14.23 11.99 14.50 14.41 (0 – 58.33) 14.50 
 
 
A repeated measures mixed ANOVA was carried out with Word Type (critical, 
studied and non-studied) and Visual Field (left visual field, right visual field) as the 
two within subject factors and participant response as the dependent variable. Sex 
difference (i.e. male or female) was the between group factor. There was a 
significant effect overall for Visual Field and Word Type, F (2, 196) = 499.9, p < 
0.001. Post hoc paired samples t-tests revealed this significance lay with the non-
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studied words (t (1,99) = -3.83, p < 0.001); that is the rvf-LH produced more 
incorrect responses (14.4%) compared with the lvf-RH (8.99%) to the non-studied 
words. There was a significant main effect of Word Type, F (2, 99) = 279.171, p < 
.001. Post hoc analyses revealed that participants were significantly more likely to 
false recognize the critical lures compared with the non-studied words for both the 
lvf-RH and rvf-LH (t (1,99) = 24.7, p < 0.001 and t (1,99) = 19.28, p < 0.001 
respectively. There were no significant differences between the visual fields for 
either critical lures or studied words (see Figure 4). There was no significant 
interaction between Word Type, Visual Field and Sex, F (2, 196) = 0.98, ns.  
 
Critical Incorrect, studied Correct and Non-studied 

















Figure 4: Experiment 1, Critical Lures Incorrect, Studied words Correct and Non-
studied words Incorrect for left and right visual fields. 
 
Because we are interested in the relationship between digit-ratio, laterality and 
recognition, one-tailed Pearson’s correlations were undertaken between critical lure 
incorrect, studied word correct, non-studied word incorrect and digit-ratio. No 
significant correlations were found between digit ratio and any of the word types. 
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In accordance with Snodgrass and Corwin’s (1988) recommendations regarding 
signal-detection theory in memory recognition we used the two-high-threshold 
theory to examine corrected true and false recognition rates (this method of analysis 
is also advocated by Kensinger & Schacter, 1999). In order to obtain corrected true 
and false recognition rates the incorrect rates for the non-studied words are 
subtracted from both the critical lures incorrect and studied words correct. These can 
be seen in Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5: Corrected True and False Recognition rates for each visual field 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA with Word Type and Visual Field as the main subject 
factors and Sex as the between group factor was carried out. There was a significant 
main effect for Word Type, F (1,98) = 13.28, p < 0.001. There was also a significant 
effect for visual field, F (1,98) = 14.62, p < 0.001; that is there were higher rates of 
corrected true and false recognition in the lvf-RH compared with the rvf-LH. There 
was no significant effect for Sex, F (1,98) = 1.89, p = n.s. There were no significant 
correlations found for digit ratio and correct true and false recognition rates for each 
visual field. 
To ensure the difference did not lie at the opposing ends of the continuum of 
digit ratio, the top twelve and bottom twelve scores for second digit to fourth digit 




Figure 6: Corrected true and false recognition rates for low and high 2D:4D ratio 
 
 A mixed ANOVA, with Visual Field (left and right) and corrected true/false 
recognition (Word Type) as the within subject factors and Digit Ratio category as the 
between group factor (e.g. High or Low 2D:4D) was carried out. There was no 
interaction between Visual Field, Word Type or Digit Ratio F (1, 22) = 1.976, p = 
n.s. and the between group analysis of subjects with either high or low 2D:4D ratios 
was also not significant, F (2, 22) = 1.236,  p = n.s.  
 
3.2.5 Discussion 
Laterality effects were only present for non-studied words. However, this is an 
important finding since our argument states that gist memory is the driving factor 
behind false recognition, so it should also improve the discrimination of the non-
studied and studied words since good gist allows maintenance of large amounts of 
related information in memory while at the same time enables the rejection of items 
that do not fit the gist, i.e. the non-studied words. Our findings indicate that that the 
lvf-RH was better at rejecting the non-studied words and so had lower rates of 
incorrect responses compared with the rvf-LH. This suggests that the lvf-RH has 
better gist discrimination than the rvf-LH for non-studied words.  
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These effects were further supported by the laterality differences found for 
corrected true and false recognition, indicating a right hemisphere bias for corrected 
false recognition, which is consistent with the work of Ito (2001) and Bellamy and 
Shillcock (2007). That is, the lvf-RH produced more false recognition of the critical 
lures compared with the rvf-LH indicating that while gist memory may aid in the 
correct rejection of the non-studied words it makes the lvf-RH more vulnerable to 
accepting the critical lures as they fit the overall gist of the previously studied words. 
The lvf-RH also had higher corrected true recognition rates indicating a better signal 
detection for the studied words in the right hemisphere compared with the left.  
The failure to find significant laterality effects for critical lures and studied 
words in the initial analysis is puzzling since the increase in population sample 
should have magnified the laterality effect. However, one suggestion is that if false 
recognition of the critical lure is dependent on gist memory, and gist memory is itself 
a developmental function, then the effects of laterality may be reduced in a 
population that was restricted by age in order to magnify any sex differences (e.g. 
Bellamy and Shillcock used a population ranging from 21 to 32 years of age). Our 
decision to use a narrow age band was based on Voyer’s (1996) recommendation 
that population samples should be as homogenous as possible. However, this 
homogeneity may itself obscure laterality effects that would be seen in a broader 
population, particularly if they relate to developmental traits that increase with age.  
This current study used a population between 18 and 25 years old and as Koutstaal 
and Schacter (1997) found, with increasing age comes increasing reliance on gist 
traces rather than the veridical traces as episodic memory declines. This argument 
suggests that for younger populations there is more reliance on the veridical traces, 
although this does not make them entirely immune to the effects of the gist traces 
hence producing false recognition.  
This experiment also investigated whether 2D:4D ratio and laterality 
influenced susceptibility to false recognition of the critical lures. The failure to find 
significant results for 2D:4D ratio using a large population and the full twenty-four 
word lists suggest that such differences are not an indicator of an individual’s 
susceptibility to false recognition. This may be because, as mentioned in the 
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introduction, 2D:4D ratio is only an indicator of testosterone levels at a specific point 
in embryonic development. 
 
 
3.3 Experiment 2: Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) and the 20-item 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) as predictors for susceptibility to 
false recognition in the DRM Paradigm. 
 
Berthoz and Hill (2005) found a correlation between autism and the 20-item Toronto 
Alexithymia scale (TAS-20). From this we hypothesize that there will be a positive 
correlation between the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) and the TAS-20 scale, that 
is the higher an individual’s TAS-20 score, the higher there AQ scale indicating a 
more ‘male’ brain.  
Furthermore, taking into account previous work involving individuals with 
high-functioning autism (e.g. Beversdorf et al., 2000) we hypothesize that the 
individuals with more ‘male-brained’ traits (i.e. high TAS-20 and AQ scores) will 
produce less corrected false recognition to the critical lures. This would be in 
harmony with what Beversdorf et al. (2000) reported that individuals with autism 
were less susceptible to false recognition of the critical lures. But Beversdorf et al. 
(2000) also found higher recognition to the studied words in individuals with autism 
compared with controls. However, it should be noted this difference was only 
significant in the ‘YES’ responses as opposed to the ‘DEFINITELY’ responses to 
studied words and was in a very small population sample of only 8 autism patients 
compared with 16 controls. They concluded that this was because individuals with 
autism have a much higher category memory for the studied words (although it 
should be noted that this finding had been in relation to categories of proper names in 
a case study of one autism patient, Mottron et al., 1996). Furthermore, Beversdorf et 
al. (2000) do not comment on the results for non-studied words in that autism 
patients produced more incorrect responses compared with controls. Therefore their 
conclusion that autism patients produce more veridical recognition to studied words 
may not be entirely accurate if their results had been corrected for true recognition by 
subtracting the incorrect responses of the non-studied words. 
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 Our argument proposes an alternative theory to Beversdorf et al. (2000) 
regarding veridical recognition in that individuals with autistic traits and hence more 
‘male-brains’ will have less true recognition to the studied words since they are 
unable to maintain as strong a gist memory for the categories of words, but at the 
same time this inability to form gist memory also makes them less susceptible to 
false recognition of the critical lures. In contrast, those with more ‘female’ brains 
should be more susceptible to false recognition but will also fair better on the 
veridical recognition of the studied words. There should, therefore, be a negative 
correlation between false recognition of critical lures and AQ/TAS-20 scores, and 
there should be a negative correlation for studied words and AQ/TAS-20 scores. 
 
3.3.1 Participants 
One hundred and fifty participants (55 male, 95 female) between the ages of eighteen 
and sixty-nine years old were recruited via the University of Edinburgh’s careers 
website or via word of mouth by 2nd and 3rd year psychology students who carried 
out the experiment as part of their projects. All the participants were students of the 
University. All were native speakers of English, had no reading difficulties and 
normal or corrected to normal vision. Those recruited via the career’s website were 
paid £6 for participating. All had a minimum of 13 years of education. 
 
3.3.2 Method and Materials 
The materials and method were identical to Experiment 1, except for the recognition 
phase words were presented in the centre of the screen for a duration of 500 ms. 
After the study phase participants were instructed to take a break and complete the 
questionnaires (see Appendix B) before moving on to the recognition phase. 
Questionnaires included the TAS-20 (Parker et al., 2003), the Autism Spectrum 
Quotient (AQ) (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
(Oldfield, 1971). Once they completed the questionnaires they were told to move on 
to the recognition phase and focus on the central cross, which appeared for 500 ms 
between each word. Each word appeared for up to 500 ms and disappeared the 
moment the participant entered their response. Participants were instructed to press 
‘Yes’ on the keyboard if they thought the word was present in the original studied 
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lists and ‘No’ if it wasn’t. The ‘d’ and ‘k’ keys on the keyboard were used for the 
responses and were counterbalanced across participants. 
 
3.3.3 Design 
This was a mixed design with Word Type (critical lure, studied or non-studied) as 
the within-participant factors, and Sex (male or female) as a between participants 
factor. Response accuracy was the dependent measure. Results from the Autism 
Spectrum Quotient (AQ) and Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) were correlated 
with each other and critical word incorrect, studied word correct and non-studied 
word incorrect. We also used the two-high threshold theory to examine corrected 
true and false recognition rates (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). Individual response 
bias was calculated using Snodgrass and Corwin’s (1988) formula for two-high 
threshold signal detection where response bias b’ = FA / [1 – (H – FA)], where FA = 
the total number of false alarms (that is critical lure incorrect and non-studied word 
incorrect) and H = total number of hits (that is studied words correct). A response 
bias of b’ = 0.5 would indicate a neutral bias; a b’ greater than 0.5 indicates more 
liberal responses (that is a greater tendency to say ‘yes’ to the stimuli); b’ less than 

















The descriptive statistics, including results for the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) 
and the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) for Experiment 2 are shown in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Experiment 2. 
 Male N = 55 Female N = 
95 
N = 150 
 Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean (ranges) SD 
Age 23.95 9.57 26.02 10.7
3 
25.26 (18 – 63) 10.33 
Autism Spectrum 
Quotient 
18.1 6.14 14.17 5.42 15.61 (4 – 37) 5.99 





SD Mean % (ranges) SD 
Critical Lure Incorrect  
(24 Items) 
66.89 14.88 67.98 14.5
2 
67.58  
(33.3 – 95.8) 
14.61 
Studied Word Correct  
(48 Items) 
71.02 12.42 71.29 13.2
2 
71.19  
(33.3 – 100) 
12.89 
Non-studied Word 
Incorrect (24 Items) 
15.68 13.39 17.10 13.6
2 
16.58  




55.34 19.20 54.18 17.8
9 
50.88  




51.21 19.81 50.88 18.7
8 
50.99  
(-4.16 – 95.83) 
19.10 
 
A repeated measures mixed ANOVA with Word Type as the within subject factor 
and Sex as the between subject factor found a significant main effect for Word Type, 
F (1,148) = 460.68, p < 0.01. Participants had a higher rate of false recognition to the 
critical lures than the non-studied words. Test of between-subject effects found no 
significance for Sex, F (2,148) = 0.645, n.s.  
 The scatter plot for AQ and TAS-20 indicated a positive linear relationship 
between the two variables (see Figure 7). The correlation for the two was significant, 




Figure 7: Scatter plot for AQ and TAS – 20 
 
The higher the TAS-20 score, the higher an individual’s AQ. Using regression 
analysis it is possible to predict a participant’s AQ from their TAS-20 score. The 
equation is Y’ = 0.428 + (0.320X) where X is an individual’s AQ and Y’ is the best 
prediction for their TAS-20 score. 
In the next set of correlations (shown in Table 3) AQ and TAS-20 scores 
were correlated with critical lure incorrect (i.e. false recognition), studied word 
correct and non-studied word incorrect. There was no significant correlation for non-
studied words and the AQ or TAS scores.  There was a significant negative 
relationship for both AQ (r = -0.24, df = 148, p < 0.001) and TAS-20 scores (r = -
0.26, df = 148, p < 0.001) in relation to the critical lure incorrect. There was also a 
significant negative relationship for both AQ (r = -0.15, df = 148, p < 0.05) and 
TAS-20 scores (r = -0.14, df = 148, p < 0.05) for studied words correct. That is, 
individuals with higher AQ and TAS-20 scores were less susceptible to false 

















(1 – tailed) p 
Critical Lure Incorrect -0.24 < 0.01 -0.26 < 0.01 
Studied Correct -0.15 < 0.05 -0.14 < 0.05 
Non-studied Incorrect -0.042 n.s 0.12 n.s 
Corrected True 
Recognition 
-0.075 n.s -0.17 < 0.05 
Corrected False 
Recognition 
-0.15 < 0.05 -0.25 < 0.01 
Response Bias -0.21 < 0.01 -0.084 n.s 
 
To ensure there was no response bias effect, correlations were run for both corrected 
true and false recognition. A significant negative relationship for corrected false 
recognition was found for both AQ (r = -0.15, df = 148, p < 0.05) and TAS-20 (r = -
0.25, df = 148, p < 0.001); that is the higher the individual’s AQ and TAS-20 scores 
the lower their false recognition. There was no significant relationship for AQ and 
corrected true recognition, however the negative relationship for TAS-20 scores and 
true recognition persisted (r = -0.17, df = 148, p < 0.05); the higher a person’s TAS-
20 scores the lower their true recognition. A stepwise linear regression found that for 
true recognition TAS-20 scores explained 34% of the variance, F (1, 148) = 5.142, p 
< 0.05; AQ scores were not significant. For corrected false recognition stepwise 
regression found that TAS-20 scores explained 60% of the variance in corrected false 
recognition, F (1, 148) = 12.787, p < 0.01. AQ scores were entered second and 
accounted for a further 21% of the variance in false recognition F (2, 147) = 6.455, p 
< 0.01. Lower false recognition is, therefore, associated with high TAS-20 and AQ 
scores. 
Individual response bias was calculated using Snodgrass and Corwin’s (1988) 
formula for two-high threshold signal detection. A significant negative relationship 
was found for response bias and AQ scores (r = -0.21, df = 148, p < 0.001), that is 
the higher an individual’s AQ the more conservative their response bias, which is 







The results supported the hypothesis that individuals with more ‘male’ brained 
characteristics (that is high AQ and TAS-20 scores), were less susceptible to false 
recognition but also less veridical recognition to the studied words. Conversely, 
‘female’ brains (that is low AQ and TAS-20 scores) produced more veridical 
recognition but in turn were more susceptible to false recognition of the critical lures. 
Of further interest is the conservative response bias associated with higher AQ 
scores, suggesting a better discrimination between true and false recognition in more 
‘male’ brains. The reduced false recognition is a finding that corresponds to the work 
of Beversdorf et al. (2000). However, in contrast to Beversdorf et al. (2000) we 
found that individuals with more ‘male-brain’ characteristics (i.e. high AQ and TAS-
20 scores) produced lower recognition to the studied items. This supports our 
arguments that by relying more on episodic or literal information, as opposed to 
semantic or gist information, individuals with more ‘male-brained’ characteristics do 
not maintain the gist of the studied words and therefore produce less veridical 
recognition.  
The results also found a positive correlation between Autism Spectrum 
Quotient (AQ) scores and the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia scale (TAS-20). That is, 
the higher an individual’s AQ score (more ‘male’ brained), the higher their TAS-20 
scores (more Alexithymic traits).  This corresponds with Berthoz and Hill’s (2005) 
findings that people with autism spectrum disorders expressed more Alexithymic 
traits in terms of poor verbalizing and expression of emotional states. 
 Since there were correlations for TAS-20/AQ and both false and true 
recognition the results indicate that both assessments are good indicators of an 
individual’s susceptibility to false recognition. Regression analysis suggests that the 
TAS-20 scale is the more reliable indicator but it should be noted that since this 
experiment was carried out the Autism-Spectrum Quotient questionnaire has 
undergone various modifications for a diversity of languages (e.g. Dutch: Hoekstra et 
al., 2008) and ages (e.g. adolescence, Baron-Cohen et al., 2006) and a later version 




3.4 General Discussion 
This chapter set out to find if there were indicators that would predict an individual’s 
susceptibility to false recognition. Sex differences were ruled out as a factor in false 
recognition since both digit ratio and sex did not produce significant results, although 
individuals did show a right hemisphere bias for corrected false recognition. 
However, the results for the Autism-Spectrum Quotient and the 20-item Toronto 
Alexithymia scale did indicate individual: ‘male’ brains are less susceptible to false 
recognition but ‘female’ brains have better true recognition. This would suggest that 
‘female’ brains rely more on gist details when encoding information into the 
memory, giving them wider access to veridical details but putting them more at risk 
of encoding misleading information. In contrasts the ‘male’ brain is good at 
discriminating between true and false recognition by relying more on episodic or 
literal memory. The cost of this, however, is a reduction in veridical memories. Why 
should this be so? 
In the introduction we argued that an individual’s susceptibility to false 
recognition might be an important consideration when considering the validity of 
eyewitness testimony. However, the results in the second experiment have shown 
that for the ‘silver-lining’ of reduced susceptibility to false recognition there is a 
‘cloud’ of decreased veridical recognition. So while a more ‘male’ brained witness 
may be less susceptible to false recognition and perhaps misleading information, they 
may also retain less veridical details and vice versa for the ‘female’ brain. Schacter 
and Dodson (2001) also note this paradoxical nature of human memory arguing that 
the ‘sins of the memory’ produce either ‘Vices or Virtues’. Memory errors are a side 
effect of a cognitive system that has adapted to allow humans to store vast quantities 
of information without having to encode every perceptual detail. It would be 
impossible, and highly impractical, if every time we woke up our brains started to 
notice every specific event of our day. Gist memory allows information to be 
bundled together in packages that can be accessed as and when required. Anderson 
and Schooler (1991) suggest a model of memory as being intrinsically reliant on the 
environment of the individual. Individuals encode only what they need to know and 
what is of relevance to their surroundings. Information within this framework that is 
familiar and frequently used does not require our specific attention. If we fit gist 
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memory into this argument we can see how certain types of memory errors, such as 
those in the DRM paradigm occur. The critical lures are easily overlooked since they 
fit with the environment of the studied word list that the critical lure generated. 
This argument is familiar and takes us full circle back to Bartlett’s model of 
memory schemata in which each individual constructs a memory environment 
relative to their needs, knowledge and surroundings. It is, perhaps, no wonder that in 
the effort to be efficient our memories readily accept misleading information if it fits 
with the schemata we have acquired.  
In addition, if poor gist memory is associated with more male brain features 
such as autistic traits and alexithymia, and if children exhibit lower gisting abilities 
(e.g. Wells, 1986,) then it suggests a strong developmental relationship for this 
particular process. This suggests that for individuals with autism gist memory is not 
as well formed and they rely on more veridical or literal information to make their 
memory decisions. If this is true then we should be able to see this developmental 
difference in gist memory quite early on in children with high-functioning autism 
compared to their age-matched peers. Wells (1986) noted that the ability to develop 
themes and gist begins around the ages of eight to twelve years of age and will 
continue to develop right through until adulthood. Furthermore, Brainerd, Reyna and 
Forrest (2002) noted an increasing pattern of false and true recognition in the DRM 
paradigm with increasing age, and Ackil and Zaragoza (1998) found children were 
more susceptible to forming false memories in the light of misleading questions. To 
explore this further in the next chapter we examine false recognition in children and 







Chapter Four: False Recognition in Adolescents and Adults with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined how individual differences affect true and false 
recognition in the Deese, Roediger and McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Experiment 2 
showed those individuals with higher scores on the Autism Spectrum Quotient 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Parker et al., 2003) 
had reduced false and true recognition on the DRM. This suggests (along with 
research on populations of differing ages, see Chapter Two) that individuals with 
autism spectrum disorder (ASD) might show reduced false recognition in the DRM 
paradigm as result of poorly developed gist memory.  
To date there have only been two investigations into false recognition in ASD 
populations. Beversdorf et al. (2000) carried out a study on high functioning autism 
using the DRM paradigm and found a reduction in false recognition in ASD 
individuals compared with controls. They also argued that people with autism faired 
better on the studied items due to better category memory but their results failed to 
take in to account the proportion of incorrect responses to the non-studied items.  
Beversdorf and colleagues note “in ASD, the diminished degree of 
hippocampal neuronal arborization results in a reduction in the amount of associative 
information stored in neocortical areas” (Beversdorf et al., 2000, p. 8737). If the 
amount of associative information stored is reduced then gist representation in ASD 
individuals will also be poor (since gist, by its nature, relies on maintaining strong 
associative links). ASD individuals, therefore, will fail to maintain the associative 
links between the studied words and this in turn will reduce false recognition to the 
critical lures. However, it is likely that gist memory also enables individuals to 
distinguish between the studied and non-studied items. Hence reduced gist memory 
could result in ASD individuals producing higher rates of incorrect ‘Yes’ responses 
to the non-studied, unrelated items meaning that overall their corrected true 
recognition should be lower compared with controls, not higher as indicated by 
Beversdorf et al. (2000).   
The second investigation into false recognition in autism individuals by 
Bowler et al. (2000) did not find a reduction in false recognition compared with 
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controls. Why should there be this conflict? Bowler et al. (2000) used individuals 
with Asperger’s, which although related to Autism has one notable difference in that 
Asperger’s individuals do not have developmental delay of spoken language 
(although conversely they often present with dyslexia, for review see Ehlers & 
Gillberg, 1993). Comparing individuals with Asperger’s Syndrome to individuals 
with high functioning autism may be the main cause for these conflicting results 
since individuals with Asperger’s Syndrome could still have good gist memory for 
words due to more developed linguistic functions compared with ASD individuals. 
Secondly, they used different methods to analyse their data: Beversdorf et al. (2000) 
examined corrected false recognition Bowler et al. (2000) did not. Finally, they used 
different methods. Beversdorf et al. (Ibid.) used recognition; Bowler et al. (Ibid.) 
used free recall of the word lists. 
Primarily, this research aims to further explore false recognition in 
individuals with ASD (Current definitions of ASD, Autism and Asperger’s 
Syndrome can be found in Appendix I). The first hypothesis is that if gist memory is 
impaired in ASD individuals then they will produce lower levels of false recognition 
and lower corrected true recognition of the studied words compared with controls 
(Experiment 3a). Furthermore, the inability of autism individuals to maintain gist 
should be demonstrated by a negative response bias in the word condition, whereas 
controls should have a positive response bias.  
The second aim of our research is to extend the DRM paradigm employing 
the Schacter et al.’s (1999) ‘distinctiveness heuristic’. This states that when normal 
individuals study pictures as opposed to words in the DRM paradigm, false 
recognition is reduced due to the distinctiveness of the perceptual details which 
individuals can encode from pictures. This is lacking in words, where the semantic 
features are encoded as opposed to any individual distinct properties resulting in 
higher false recognition for the critical lures. Schacter and colleagues have examined 
various populations including individuals with Alzheimer’s disease. For example, 
they found people with Alzheimer’s could employ the distinctiveness heuristic to 
lower their false recognition, which had previously been found to be higher than that 
of normal individuals (Budson et al., 2000). This paradigm using pictures has yet to 
be extended to a clinical autism population. 
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The work of Whitehouse et al. (2006) suggests that people with ASD might 
have impairments in ‘inner speech’, or internal dialogue. So when seeing a picture of 
an object they do not name the object in their thoughts and so lack the capability of 
binding the name to the features of the object being displayed. This suggests that 
when given a set of pictorial stimuli in the study phase (Experiment 3b), people with 
autism will perform in a similar manner as they did in the word condition, unable to 
use the semantic features so that when presented with the critical lures they should 
show low false recognition, but they may also have difficulties distinguishing 
between the studied and non-studied, unrelated items, producing low corrected false 
recognition. In effect, the performance of ASD individuals in a picture-only 
condition should not, therefore, differ from the word-only condition.  If they rely 
solely on perceptual features, as suggested by Whitehouse et al. (Ibid.), then the 
picture condition may produce increased recognition of the studied pictures 
(compared with the word-only condition) but will also mean they cannot use gist 
representation or the distinctiveness heuristic to suppress false recognition to the 
non-studied pictures. This predicts that Autism individuals should, therefore, in the 
picture-only condition show some increase in corrected true recognition due to a 
positive response bias (that is a tendency to respond ‘Yes’) compared with their 
performance in the word-only condition.  
In contrast, normal individuals should be able to employ the ‘distinctiveness 
heuristic’ and suppress their false recognition whilst at the same time using the 
distinct features to increase corrected true recognition. Controls should also show a 
neutral response bias in the picture-only condition since there are fifty-percent 
available correct ‘no’ responses and fifty-percent correct ‘yes’ responses in the 
recognition phase.  
If Whitehouse et al.’s (2006) ‘inner speech’ theory is correct, in Experiment 
3c by giving individuals with autism both perceptual and gist details in the form of 
words and pictures, it is possible that encoding both types of information may 
increase their gist performance. Crucially, this will mean that they show increased 
false recognition to the critical lures and will have the tools to suppress false 
recognition to the non-studied items since these will not fit the gist of the studied 
categories. In contrast normal individuals should demonstrate an increase in false 
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recognition compared with their performance in the picture only condition since the 
added semantic information from the words will to some extent override the 
perceptual details of the pictures.  
 
We can summarise the hypotheses as follows: 
Experiment 3a Words: ASD individuals will show reduced false recognition to the 
critical lures and reduced corrected true and false recognition to the studied items in 
comparison with controls. Additionally, if ASD individuals do have poor gist 
memory they will not be able to filter out the non-studied, unrelated items and so 
overall will produce lower corrected true and false recognition in comparison with 
controls. 
Experiment 3b Pictures: ASD individuals will show low false recognition to the 
critical lures as found in the word condition, but some increase in corrected true 
recognition since the addition of perceptual features should improve their 
discrimination of the non-studied, unrelated items. Controls will be able to use the 
distinctiveness heuristic to suppress nearly all the false recognition to the critical 
lures and non-studied unrelated items hence showing an increase in corrected true 
recognition in comparison with their performance on the word-only condition.  
Experiment 3c Words and Pictures: ASD should show an increase in corrected true 
and false recognition in comparison with their performance in Experiments 3a and b. 
Controls may show an increase in corrected false recognition since the gist 
representation of the words in this condition may override the perceptual details and 
hence result in higher false recognition to the critical lures. In this condition we 
argue that ASD individuals will be able to encode both semantic and perceptual 
details and hence their pattern of performance in Experiment 3c should be 








Note on Participants: 
Due to the difficulty in recruiting individuals with ASD in the UK we accepted the 
help of Professor Domingo Garcia-Villamisar, who works as a clinician at the 
Asociación Nuevo Horizonte in Madrid. The Asociación is a residential care centre 
for adults with ASD based just outside of Madrid in Spain. Individuals stay at the 
centre for varying degrees of time depending on their current home status and the 
level of care required. They are taught day-to-day living skills, education, and 
occupational work in order to provide them with the ability to live as independently 
as possible outside of the Asociación. Participants were recruited directly by 
Professor Garcia-Villamisar who provides clinical psychological services for the 
residents.  
 Professor Garcia-Villamisar was provided with the program and materials 
required to run the DRM paradigms outlined below. However, there was a technical 
problem during the collection of the data, which resulted in a considerable delay in 
the production of the results from Madrid. Due to time constraints, a second Spanish-
speaking centre was approached, this time in Bogota, Colombia.  
The Fundación Integrar institute in Colombia works on a similar premise to 
The Asociación in Madrid, except that the attendees are children and young adults 
with various developmental difficulties including ASD. ASD individuals were 
recruited for the experiments by the clinicians Leidy Diana Castro Jaramillo, and 
Yaneth Milena Cuadros Pardo, both from the University of Antioquiaáá. The 
permission of the parents was attained in all cases. Clara Lucia Avila, a 
phonoaudiologist from the National University of Colombia, was trained to use the 
DRM programs and collected the data results. The Spanish word lists originally 
provided for work in Spain were subsequently altered (see Appendix C) to 
accommodate the linguistic variations between European Spanish and Colombian 
Spanish. All the data from both institutes was subsequently returned to this 






4.2 Experiment 3a,b and c: False recognition in adolescents to young 
adults with autism spectrum disorder. 
 
4.2.1 Patient and Control Data 
Individuals with Autism were all recruited from the Fundación Integrar institute in 
Columbia. Controls were age matched and were recruited locally. Table 4 shows the 
demographic data for ASD individuals and the controls. 
 
Table 4: Demographic data for participants. 
Autism Individuals 
N=13       Controls N=12       
Subject No. Age Sex 
Years of 
School Subject No. Age Sex 
Years of 
School 
1 20 F n/a   1 18 F 11 
2 18 M 11   2 17 M 11 
3 26 M 11   3 13 F 8 
4 17 M U   4 15 F 11 
5 12 F 6   5 13 F 8 
6 18 M 11   6 13 F 8 
7 12 M 6   7 22 F U 
8 14 F n/a   8 26 M U 
9 14 M 7   9 14 M 9 
10 13 F 7   10 17 F 11 
11 13 F 7   11 18 M U 
12 14 F 8   12 14 F 8 
13 13 M 6        
  15.69   8.00     16.67   9.44 
  4.03   2.16     4.01   1.51 
 
Eighteen ASD individuals were recruited, but five were discounted from the study 
due to failure to complete the task or lost data. The clinical neuropsychology data for 










Table 5: Clinical neurospychology data for autism individuals. 
Subject WISC III    ICAP        IDEA     
No. Total IQ MS SCS PLS SWC GII S      CL A/F S Total 
1 62 12 17 14.7 12 13 6 9 9 9 33 
2 70 6.2 7.3 11.6 13.1 10 6 6 6 6 24 
3 87 12 17 17 17 16.5 6 6 6 6 24 
4 73 6.2 6.8 13.1 8.8 8.1 6 6 6 6 24 
5 61 5.5 4.9 6.3 6.4 5.1 6 6 6 6 24 
6 70 6.9 11.2 10.8 12.2 10.5 6 6 6 6 24 
7 83 5.5 5.1 7 7.7 6.6 6 6 6 6 24 
8 55 5.7 3.4 8.11 5.6 5.1 8 6 8 9 31 
9 89 5.5 12.2 10.4 10.9 9.7 6 6 6 6 24 
10 * 12 13.9 13.1 11.7 12.9 6 6 6 6 24 
11 * 12 13.9 13.1 11.7 13.9 6 6 6 6 24 
12 65 6.2 6.3 7 6.11 7.2 6 6 6 6 24 
13 64 5 6.3 3.9 4.11 4.5 6 6 6 6 24 
KEY              
* 
Patients commenced their intervention too young and at that time IQ was not measured. They both  
are high functioning, in 7 primary level, and do not have any requirement for special education. 
WISC III Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, Third Edition (Spanish) 
ICAP ICAP Inventory for Client and Agency Planning (Bruininks et al, 1986) 
 MS Motor Skills           
 SCS Social & Communication Skills        
 PLS Personal Life Skills         
 SWC Skills Within the Community         
 GII General Independence Index         
IDEA Inventario de Espectro Autista (Rivière, 2002)       
 S Social         
 CL Communication & Language         
 A/F Anticipation/Flexibility         
 S Symbolism         
 Total Total Autism Spectrum Score         
 
4.2.2 Method and Materials 
Three sets of materials were created (see Appendix C). The first were twelve Spanish 
word lists derived from Fernandez, Diez and Alonso (2006) word association norms. 
Because we subsequently wanted to convert these to picture lists we only used 
concrete nouns that could be easily depicted. These were then corrected for 
differences between European Spanish and Columbian Spanish (for example, the 
word car in European Spanish is coche but in Columbian Spanish it is carro). The 
second set of stimuli for Experiment 3b were picture representations of the same 
words, and the third set for Experiment 3c were words and pictures together. There 
are, therefore, three conditions: words, pictures, words and pictures. Each condition 
has a critical item (the bold word in the word list Appendix C indicates the critical 
item that is not presented during the study phase) and fifteen studied items.  
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The method for each condition was identical. Participants were told they were 
taking part in a memory experiment presented on a computer. Participants were 
instructed to study the word lists (or picture groups) in part one of the experiment. 
The stimuli were presented centrally on a computer screen for a duration of 1s per 
item. The 12 lists were presented randomly. In between each list participants carried 
out simple mathematical problems for 30 seconds, which acted as a distracter task. 
When all 12 lists had been studied participants moved on to the recognition phase. 
They saw 24 studied items (top two items from each list), the 12 critical lures, and 12 
non-studied, unrelated items. They were instructed to respond ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ on the 
keyboard to indicate whether the item they saw was on the original lists or not. The 
‘d’ and ‘k’ keys on the keyboard were used for the ‘Yes’ and No’ responses and 
counterbalanced across participants. The participants returned to complete all three 
conditions of the experiment (words, pictures, words and pictures). The presentation 
of the three conditions was counterbalanced across all participants with an interval of 
at least two weeks between each condition. A native Colombian-Spanish speaker, Ms 
Clara Avila, conducted the experiment. 
 
4.2.3 Design 
There are two main independent variables for the within subject design: Stimuli Type 
(critical incorrect, studied correct and non-studied incorrect) and Condition (words, 
pictures, words and pictures). The between subject variable is Group (ASD or 
Control). These will be entered into a mixed ANOVA. The dependent variable is 
response (Yes/No). Using Snodgrass and Corwin’s (1988) recommendations for 
signal detection in memory experiments we will examine Corrected False 
Recognition (critical incorrect minus the non-studied incorrect) and Corrected True 
Recognition (studied correct minus non-studied incorrect). We will also explore 
response bias (see Chapter Three for equation) and use post-hoc t-tests to explore the 







Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics for Experiments 3a, b and c. Experiment 3a 
was the word only condition, Experiment 3b is the picture only condition and 
Experiment 3c is the word and picture condition. 
 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Experiments 3a, b and c. 


























































The responses were subject to a 3 X 3 repeated measures ANOVA was carried out 
with Stimuli Type (critical incorrect, studied correct and non-studied incorrect) and 
Condition (words, pictures, words and pictures) as the two main factors. There was a 
significant main effect for Stimuli Type, F (2, 23) = 241.1, p < 0.001 and Condition 
F (2, 23) = 8.99, p < 0.05. Between group analysis showed a significant interaction 
between Group and Stimuli Type, F (2, 23) = 5.552, p < 0.05 and Group and 
Condition, F (2, 23) = 7.56, p < 0.05. Since the ANOVAs indicated significant 
differences between the three conditions (See Figure 8) in order to explore this in 
depth post hoc analyses using independent samples one-tailed t-tests were carried 
out. The results can be found in Table 7. 
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Critical Incorrect, Studied Correct and Non-studied 

















































Figure 8: Critical incorrect, studied correct and non-studied incorrect for Experiments 
3a,b and c. 
 
Table 7: Post – Hoc Independent Samples t-Test: ASD v Controls 
 N=25 t Sig. (2-tailed) 
  Lower Lower 
 
Words Critical Incorrect 3.633 .001 
 
Words Studied Correct 2.014 .056 
 
Words Non-Studied Incorrect -1.991 .059 
 
Pictures Critical Incorrect -4.145 .001 
 
Pictures Studied Correct .666 .512 
 
Pictures Non-Studied Incorrect -4.255 .001 
 
Words & Pictures Critical Incorrect -.875 .390 
 
Words & Pictures Studied Correct -.062 .951 
 





The independent t-tests show that the critical words incorrect are significantly lower 
(t  (24) = 3.63, p < 0.001) for ASD individuals (M = 0.4, SD = 0.11) compared with 
controls (M = 0.62, SD = 0.19). Furthermore, although the results for studied correct 
and non-studied incorrect just miss significance (p = 0.056 and p = 0.059 
respectively), they indicate a trend for ASD individuals to produce less studied 
words correct and more non-studied words incorrect in comparison with controls. 
Independent t-tests for the picture only condition show ASD individuals (M = 0.39, 
SD = 0.11) have significantly higher critical lures incorrect (t (24) = -4.14, p < 0.001) 
in comparison with controls (M = 0.21, SD = 0.10). The means for ASD individuals 
(M = 0.24, SD = 0.12) for pictures non-studied incorrect are also significantly higher 
(t (24) = -4.25, p < 0.001) compared with controls (M = 0.06, SD = 0.08). 
 Finally, the t-tests show no significant differences for critical lures incorrect, 
studied items correct or non-studied items incorrect between ASD individuals and 
controls in the word and picture condition. 
 As we are also interested in the differing performances within the three 
conditions for ASD individuals we carried out paired-samples t-tests. The results can 
be found in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Paired samples t-tests for the three conditions for ASD and Controls 
 Controls N = 12 ASD N= 13 
Pair Mean SD t Sig (2-tailed) Mean SD t Sig (2-tailed) 
WCI - PCI .41 .23 6.227 .001 .01 .12958 .193 .850 
WCI - WPCI .37 .22 6.032 .001 .07 .20015 1.358 .199 
PCI - WPCI -.03 .16 -.753 .467 .07 .27640 .893 .389 
WSC - PSC -.10 .15 -2.445 .033 -.18 .19972 -3.229 .007 
WSC - WPSC -.08 .16 -1.792 .101 -.19 .12424 -5.581 .001 
PSC - WPSC .03 .07 1.319 .214 -.01 .15482 -.314 .759 
WNSI - PNSI .13 .12 3.770 .003 .10 .24300 1.484 .164 
WNSI - WPNSI .13 .16 2.937 .014 .23 .18550 4.575 .001 
PNSI - WPNSI .00 .07 .000 1.000 .13 .13245 3.685 .003 
WCI = Word critical incorrect 
PCI = Picture critical incorrect 
WPCI = Word & Picture critical incorrect 
WSC = Word studied correct 
PSC = Picture studied correct 
WPSC = Word & Pictures studied correct 
WNSI = Word non-studied incorrect 
PNSI = Picture non-studied incorrect 






Paired samples t-tests indicated that between the three conditions (word, picture, 
word and picture) there were no significant differences for critical lures incorrect for 
the ASD individuals. Controls, however, showed significant differences for the 
critical lures incorrect between the word and picture condition (p < 0.01), the word 
and word and picture condition (p < 0.01), but not between the picture and word and 
picture condition. 
 The studied items correct paired samples t-tests showed significant increases 
for ASD individuals between the word and the picture condition (p < 0.05); the word 
and word and picture condition (p < 0.01); but no differences between the picture 
and word and picture condition. Finally, for the non-studied items incorrect controls 
showed a significant decrease between the word and picture condition (p < 0.01), and 
the word and word and picture condition (p < 0.05). The ASD individuals also 
showed significant decreases for non-studied items for the word and word and 
picture condition (p < 0.01), and the picture and word and picture condition (p < 
0.01). 
 
Signal Detection Analysis 
Using Snodgrass and Corwin’s (1988) recommendations for signal detection we 
explored corrected true and false recognition and response bias for ASD individuals 
and controls. The results are shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9: Corrected True (CTR) and Corrected False Recognition (CFR) and Response 
Bias for controls and ASD individuals. 
 
Table 9 shows the descriptive statistics for corrected true and false recognition. A 
response Bias of 0.5 is a neutral score (that is equal ‘Yes’ and ‘No’), more than 0.5 is 
a liberal response bias (tendency to say ‘Yes’ more) and less than 0.5 is a 
conservative response bias (tendency to say ‘No’ more frequently). 
 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Corrected True Recognition (CTR) and Corrected 
False Recognition (CFR) and Response Bias. 














CTR 0.23 (0.24) 0.49 (0.17) 0.51 (0.19) 0.73 (0.14) 0.66 (0.21) 0.70 (0.16) 
CFR 0.06 (0.18) 0.42 (0.23) 0.15 (0.12) 0.15 (0.09) 0.22 (0.24) 0.18 (0.13) 
Bias b' 0.48 (0.12) 0.66 (0.14) 0.63 (0.18) 0.50 (0.19) 0.50 (0.27) 0.46 (0.28) 
  
The results were subjected to a 2 X 3 repeated measures ANOVA with 
Discrimination (Corrected True Recognition and Corrected False Recognition) and 
Condition (words, pictures, words and pictures) as the two main factors. There was a 
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significant main effect for Condition F (2, 46) = 8.61, p < 0.05. Between group 
analysis showed a significant interaction between Group, Condition and 
Discrimination, F (2, 46) = 4.59, p < 0.05.  
As above we then carried out independent samples t-tests this time for 
Corrected True Recognition, Corrected False Recognition and response Bias. The 
results can be seen in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Independent Samples t-tests for CTR, CFR and Response Bias. 
 
 N = 25 t Sig. (2-tailed) 
  Lower Lower 
Words Corrected True Recognition -3.064 .006 
Words Corrected False Recognition -4.386 .001 
Words Response Bias -3.270 .003 
Pictures Corrected True Recognition -3.187 .004 
Pictures Corrected False Recognition .133 .895 
Pictures Response Bias 1.861 .076 
Words & Pictures Corrected True Recognition -.513 .613 
Words & Pictures Corrected False Recognitions .482 .634 
Words & Pictures Response Bias .321 .751 
 
For the word only condition there were significant differences in means for 
Corrected True Recognition (p < 0.05), Corrected False Recognition (p < 0.001) and 
Response Bias (p < 0.05). ASD individuals, therefore, produced less corrected true 
and false recognition than controls and also show a more liberal response bias; that is 
a tendency to say ‘Yes’. In the Picture only condition there was a significant 
difference between the two groups for Corrected True Recognition (p < 0.05), that is, 
ASD individuals had less correct recognition of the studied pictures in comparison 
with controls. This is due to the fact that in this condition, as we saw above, ASD 
individuals still produced higher false recognition to the non-studied items than 
controls. There were no significant differences between ASD individuals and 




As above, because we are also interested in the differing performances within 
the three conditions for ASD individuals we carried out paired-samples t-tests. The 
results can be found in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Paired Samples t-test for Corrected True Recognition, Corrected False 
Recognition and response Bias (b’) for controls and patients 
 Controls N = 12 ASD N = 12 
Pair Mean SD t Sig (2-tailed) Mean SD t 
Sig (2-
tailed) 
WCTR - PCTR -.24 .14 -5.85 .001 -.28 .30 -3.38 .005 
WCTR - WPCTR -.21 .21 -3.52 .005 -.43 .22 -6.90 .001 
PCTR - WPCTR .03 .10 .96 .357 -.15 .17 -3.05 .010 
WCFR - PCFR .28 .28 3.45 .005 -.09 .23 -1.47 .166 
WCFR - WPCFR .24 .24 3.46 .005 -.16 .35 -1.64 .126 
PCFR - WPCFR .16 .24 2.29 .042 -.07 .24 -1.01 .332 
WBias – Pbias .20 .29 2.35 .039 -.15 .17 -3.18 .008 
WBias - WPBias .04 .24 .55 .595 -.010 .25 -.15 .886 
PBias - WPBias -.24 .14 -5.85 .001 .14 .29 1.74 .108 
WCTR = Word Corrected True Recognition 
PCTR = Picture Corrected True Recognition 
WPCI = Word & Picture Corrected True Recognition 
WCFR = Word Corrected False Recognition 
PCFR = Picture Corrected False Recognition 
WPCFR = Word & Pictures Corrected False Recognition 
WBias = Word response Bias 
PBias = Picture response Bias 
WPBias = Word & Picture response Bias 
 
There were no significant differences for the three conditions for ASD individuals 
and Corrected False Recognition. However, there was for Corrected True 
Recognition with a gradual increase across the three conditions and this was 
significant for words, pictures and words and pictures. There was a significant 
difference for ASD individuals in response bias between the word and picture 
condition (p < 0.05) as these individuals moved from a neutral response bias (b’ = 
0.48) to a more liberal bias (b’ = 0.63). 
 In contrast, controls showed a significant difference between the word and 
picture condition and between the word and word and pictures condition for 
Corrected True Recognition (p < 0.001 and p < 0.05) respectively. Controls also 
showed a significant difference in performance between all three conditions for 
Corrected False Recognition (p < 0.05 for each paired sample). There was also a 
significant difference for response bias between the word and picture condition (p < 
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0.05) as they moved from a liberal response bias in the word condition (b’ = 0.66) to 
a neutral response in the picture condition (b’ = 0.5). There was also a significant 
difference for controls response bias between the picture condition and the word and 
pictures condition (p < 0.001) as they moved from a neutral response bias in the 
picture condition (b’ = 0.5) to a more conservative response bias in the word and 
pictures condition (b’ = 0.46). 
 
4.2.5 Discussion 
We began with several hypotheses regarding the performance of individuals with 
high-functioning autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The first stated that if Beversdorf 
et al. (2001) were correct in arguing the ASD individuals lacked the ability to form 
good associations between words then they would show lower false recognition to 
the critical lures. This was supported by our results, with the ASD group showing 
significantly lower false recognition to the critical lures compared with controls. 
However, we also extended this argument to say that if poor gist association was the 
cause for this difference then it would seem logical to argue that gist memory would 
also result in poor discrimination in ASD individuals; that is they would be unable to 
use gisting details to filter out incorrect false recognition to the non-studied words. 
They would, therefore, show significantly lower corrected true and false recognition 
compared with controls, coupled with a more positive response bias. Our results also 
supported this hypothesis. Corrected true recognition was indeed significantly lower 
in ASD individuals and they had a significantly more positive response bias in 
comparison with controls. 
 Secondly, for the picture only condition we argued that ASD individuals 
lacked what Whitehouse et al. (2006) call ‘inner speech’ and so would be unable to 
internally name the pictures as they appeared. The ASD individuals would, therefore, 
perform in a similar manner to the word-only condition with regards to false 
recognition to the critical lures. Again, results supported this hypothesis with ASD 
individuals showing no difference in performance for critical lures incorrect between 
the word and the picture condition.   
We also stated that since ASD individuals were relying more on perceptual 
features, in the picture-only condition their performance on the studied items should 
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also improve in comparison with the word-only condition. They should, therefore, 
have higher corrected true recognition compared with the word-only condition since 
they get more of the studied pictures correct. This pattern of performance was 
confirmed by paired samples t-tests for the two conditions, which was significant. 
We also argued that their corrected false recognition should show no change between 
the word and the picture condition due to the persistence in incorrectly saying ‘Yes’ 
to the non-studied items increase. The reason for this is an increase in response bias 
from the word condition to the picture condition and this was supported by the paired 
samples t-tests. In contrast, the control group were able to suppress their false 
recognition to the critical lures in the picture-only condition, and since they can use 
gist information they can easily discriminate between the non-studied items and 
studied items and hence produce almost no incorrect responses to the non-studied 
pictures. 
 Finally, we argued that by giving added information in the form of a word 
and picture condition we could help ASD individuals by providing additional 
semantic information and hence aid their gist representation. ASD individuals would 
increase their false recognition to the critical lures. The results supported this 
hypothesis for critical incorrect, studied correct, corrected true and false recognition 
and response bias in that the ASD individuals did not differ significantly from 
controls. 
 In conclusion, our results support the findings of Beversdorf et al. (2001) that 
individuals with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder produce less false 
recognition in the Deese, Roediger and McDermott paradigm. This may be due to an 
inability of ASD individuals to form good gist associations to the studied words. 
Furthermore, this lack of gist representation means that in a picture-only condition 
they still remain unable to discriminate between critical words and studied items and 
also studied items and non-studied items resulting in false recognition compared with 
controls. However, they can use some distinct features to increase their corrected true 
recognition. Finally, by providing them with added information we were able to get 
ASD individuals to perform like controls in a word and picture condition.   
 However, Beversdorf et al. (2000) used adults (Age M = 31.8) and our 
experiment used adolescents and young adults. If gist memory is a process which 
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develops with age, then this may also be true with Autism population. The data from 
the Madrid ASD individuals in the next experiment may help us explore this 
possibility. 
 
4.3 Experiment 4a, b and c: False recognition adults with autism 
spectrum disorder. 
 
4.3.1 Patient and Control Data 
Individuals with Autism were all recruited from the Asociación Nuevo Horizonte, 
Madrid from the clinic run by Professor Garcia-Villamisar. Controls were recruited 
locally in Madrid. 
 
Table 12: Demographic data for participants. 
Autism Individuals 
N=10   Controls N=10     
Subject No. Age Sex Subject No. Age Sex 
1 30 M 1 27 M 
2 30 M 2 45 F 
3 30 F 3 30 M 
4 30 F 4 24 F 
5 33 M 5 29 F 
6 20 M 6 28 M 
7 20 M 7 36 M 
8 32 M 8 28 F 
9 38 M 9 27 F 
10 33 M 10 31 M 
 M 29.60    M 30.50   
 SD 5.62    SD 5.99   
 
Initially, eleven ASD individuals were recruited but one participant was dropped due 
to data loss.  
 
4.3.2 Method and Materials 
The methods and materials were identical to those used in Experiments 3a, b and c. 
The Spanish Word Lists can be found in the Appendix C. Professor Domingo Garcia-







The design was identical to Experiments 3a, b and c. 
 
4.3.4 Results 
Table 13 shows the descriptive statistics for Experiments 4a, b and c. Experiment 4a 
was the word only condition, Experiment 4b is the picture only condition and 
Experiment 4c is the word and picture condition. 
 
Table 13: Descriptive Statistics for Experiments 4a, b and c. 

























































The responses were subject to a 3 X 3 repeated measures ANOVA was carried out 
with Stimuli Type (critical incorrect, studied correct and non-studied incorrect) and 
Condition (words, pictures, words and pictures) as the two main factors. There was a 
significant main effect for Stimuli Type, F (2, 18) = 22.94, p < 0.01 and Condition F 
(2, 18) = 66.66, p < 0.01. Between group analysis showed a significant interaction 
between Group and Stimuli Type, F (2, 36) = 12.88, p < 0.01, and Group and 
Condition, F (2, 36) = 13.77, p < 0.01. Since the ANOVAs indicated significant 
differences between the three conditions (See Figure 10) in order to explore this in 
depth between the two groups post hoc analyses using between group independent 
samples one-tailed t-tests were carried out. The results can be found in Table 14. 
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Critical Incorrect, Studied Correct, Non-studied 


















































Figure 10: Critical Incorrect, studied correct and non-studied incorrect for 
Experiments 4a, b and c. 
 
 
Table 14: Post – Hoc Independent Samples t-Tests: ASD v Controls 
 
 N= 20  (df = 18) 
  t Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
Words Critical Incorrect -0.52 .606 
 
Words Studied Correct .438 .667 
 
Words Non-Studied Incorrect 4.80 .001 
 
Pictures Critical Incorrect 5.10 .001 
 
Pictures Studied Correct -0.03 .973 
 
Pictures Non-Studied Incorrect 5.53 .001 
 
Words & Pictures Critical Incorrect 1.24 .231 
 
Words & Pictures Studied Correct -1.21 .243 
 
Words & Pictures Non-Studied Incorrect 1.21 .243 
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The independent t-tests show that the non-studied words incorrect are significantly 
lower (t (18) = 4.80, p < 0.01) for ASD individuals (M = 0.76, SD = 0.20) compared 
with controls (M = 0.41, SD = 0.11). There were no significant differences found for 
critical words incorrect or studied words correct. Independent t-tests for the picture 
only condition show ASD individuals (M = 0.73, SD = 0.27) have significantly 
higher critical lures incorrect (t (18) = 5.10, p < 0.01) in comparison with controls (M 
= 0.25, SD = 0.13). The means for ASD individuals (M = 0.69, SD = 0.32) for 
pictures non-studied incorrect are also significantly higher (t (18) = -4.25, p < 0.01) 
compared with controls (M = 0.10, SD = 0.10). 
 Finally, the t-tests showed no significant differences for critical lures 
incorrect, studied items correct or non-studied items incorrect between ASD 
individuals and controls in the word and picture condition. 
 As we are also interested in the differing performances within the three 
conditions for ASD individuals we carried out paired-samples t-tests. The results can 
be found in Table 15. 
 
Table 15: Paired samples t-tests for the three conditions for ASD and controls. 
 Controls N = 10 ASD N = 10 
Pair Mean SD t Sig (2-tailed) Mean SD t 
Sig (2-
tailed) 
WCI - PCI .56 .15 11.76 .001 .03 .29 .356 .730 
WCI - WPCI .44 .15 8.88 .001 .29 .23 4.14 .003 
PCI - WPCI -.12 .22 -1.68 .126 .26 .33 2.53 .032 
WSC - PSC .03 .09 .897 .393 .04 .20 .707 .497 
WSC - WPSC -.01 .09 -.408 .693 .08 .19 1.33 .216 
PSC - WPSC -.04 .12 -.998 .344 .04 .08 1.45 .180 
WNSI - PNSI .31 .15 6.33 .001 .06 .22 .950 .367 
WNSI - WPNSI .09 .22 1.262 .239 .29 .34 2.71 .024 
PNSI - WPNSI -.21 .211 -3.257 .01 .22 .27 2.61 .028 
WCI = Word critical incorrect 
PCI = Picture critical incorrect 
WPCI = Word & Picture critical incorrect 
WSC = Word studied correct 
PSC = Picture studied correct 
WPSC = Word & Pictures studied correct 
WNSI = Word non-studied incorrect 
PNSI = Picture non-studied incorrect 





Paired samples t-tests for critical lures incorrect found a significant decrease 
between the word condition and the word and picture condition (p < 0.01) for ASD 
individuals. There was also a significant decrease for critical lures between the 
picture condition and the word and picture condition (p < 0.05). However, there was 
no difference found for critical lures incorrect between the word and picture 
conditions. In contrast, controls showed a significant decrease between the word and 
picture conditions for critical lures incorrect (p < 0.01); and a significant increase 
between the word and the word and picture conditions (p < 0.01). 
 However, there were no significant differences for the two groups for any of 
the studied correct conditions (words, pictures, words and pictures). Finally, for the 
non-studied items incorrect, controls showed a significant decrease between the word 
and picture condition (p < 0.01), but a significant increase between the picture and 
the word and picture condition (p <0.05). In contrast, the ASD individuals showed a 
significant decrease between the word and word and picture condition (p < 0.05), 
and also the picture and word and picture condition (p < 0.05). 
 
Signal Detection Analysis 
The results for signal detection (corrected true and false recognition and response 
bias) are shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: Corrected True (CTR) and Corrected False Recognition (CFR) and response 
bias for controls and ASD individuals. 
 
Table 16 shows the descriptive statistics. A response Bias of 0.5 is a neutral score 
(that is equal ‘yes’ and ‘no’), more than 0.5 is a liberal response bias (tendency to say 
‘yes’ more) and less than 0.5 is a conservative response bias (tendency to say ‘no’ 
more).  
 
Table 16: Descriptive Statistics for Corrected True Recognition (CTR), Corrected False 
Recognition (CFR) and Response Bias. 
  Words (4a) Pictures (4b)   Words & Pictures (4c) 
  ASD M (SD) 
Controls M 







CTR 0.14 (0.16) 0.47 (0.11) 0.16 (0.33) 
0.75  
(0.14) 0.35 (0.36) 0.58 (0.15) 
CFR 0.01 (0.19) 0.40 (0.19) 0.04 (0.26) 0.15 (0.12) 0.00 (0.44) 0.05 (0.25) 
Bias 





 The results were subjected to a 2 X 3 repeated measures ANOVA with 
Discrimination (Corrected True Recognition and Corrected False Recognition) and 
Condition (words, pictures, words and pictures) as the two main factors. There was 
no significant main effect for Condition F (2, 18) = .152, p < n.s. Between group 
analysis showed a significant interaction between Discrimination and Group, F (2, 
36) = 12.48, p < 0.01; and also Group, Condition and Discrimination, F (2, 36) = 
13.58, p < 0.01.  
We again carried out independent samples t-tests for Corrected True 
Recognition, Corrected False Recognition and also included response Bias. The 
results can be seen in Table 17. 
 
Table 17: Post – Hoc Independent Samples t-Tests for CTR, CFR and Response Bias 
 






Words Corrected True Recognition -5.502 .001 
Words Corrected False Recognition -4.591 .001 
Words Response Bias 0.130 .898 
Pictures Corrected True Recognition -5.254 .001 
Pictures Corrected False Recognition -1.158 .262 
Pictures Response Bias 2.168 .044 
Words & Pictures Corrected True Recognition -1.866 .078 
Words & Pictures Corrected False Recognitions -0.293 .773 
Words & Pictures Response Bias -0.765 .454 
 
For the word only condition there were significant differences in means for 
Corrected True Recognition (p < 0.01), Corrected False Recognition (p < 0.01), but 
no significant difference for the Response Bias, with both groups producing liberal 
responses. ASD individuals, therefore, produced less corrected true and false 
recognition than controls as a result of poor discrimination of the non-studied 
incorrect words. In the Picture only condition there was a significant difference 
between the two groups for Corrected True Recognition (p < 0.01) and response bias 
(p < 0.05), that is ASD individuals had less correct recognition of the studied 
pictures in comparison with controls and maintain the liberal response bias. There 
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are no significant differences between ASD individuals and controls in the word and 
picture only condition. 
As above, because we were also interested in the differing performances 
within the three conditions for ASD individuals we carried out paired-samples t-tests. 
The results can be found in Table 18. 
 
Table 18: Paired Samples t-test for Corrected True Recognition, Corrected False 
Recognition and response Bias (b’) for Controls and ASD. 
 Controls N = 10 ASD N = 10 
Pair Mean SD t Sig (2-tailed) Mean SD t 
Sig (2-
tailed) 
WCTR - PCTR -.28 .16 -5.42 .001 -.02 .21 -.312 .762 
WCTR - WPCTR -.10 .20 -1.59 .147 -.21 .32 -2.05 .071 
PCTR - WPCTR .18 .12 4.71 .001 -.18 .28 -2.11 .064 
WCFR - PCFR .255 .20 4.01 .003 -.03 .25 -.391 .705 
WCFR - WPCFR .35 .35 3.21 .011 .01 .43 .058 .955 
PCFR - WPCFR .09 .33 .933 .375 .04 .43 .293 .776 
WBias – Pbias .25 .13 6.11 .001 .06 .28 .686 .510 
WBias - WPBias .07 .14 1.65 .133 .14 .25 1.82 .101 
PBias - WPBias -.18 .21 -2.64 .027 .08 .20 1.29 .229 
WCTR = Word Corrected True Recognition 
PCTR = Picture Corrected True Recognition 
WPCI = Word & Picture Corrected True Recognition 
WCFR = Word Corrected False Recognition 
PCFR = Picture Corrected False Recognition 
WPCFR = Word & Pictures Corrected False Recognition 
WBias = Word response Bias 
PBias = Picture response Bias 
WPBias = Word & Picture response Bias 
 
There were no significant differences between the three conditions for ASD 
individuals for Corrected False Recognition, Corrected True Recognition and 
response Bias. However, there was a trend in the ASD results for a gradual increase 
in Corrected True Recognition across words, pictures and then words and pictures. 
 In contrast, controls showed a significant increase between the word and 
picture condition and a significant decrease between the picture and word and 
pictures condition for Corrected True Recognition (p < 0.01 and p < 0.01) 
respectively). Controls also showed a significant decrease in Corrected False 
Recognition between words and pictures, and between words and words and pictures 
(p < 0.01 and p < 0.05 respectively). There was also a significant difference for 
response bias between the word and picture condition (p < 0.01) as they moved from 
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a liberal response bias in the word condition (b’ = 0.87) to a more neutral response in 
the picture condition (b’ = 0.61). There was also a significant difference for controls 
response bias between the picture condition and the word and pictures condition (p < 
0.05) as they moved from a neutral response bias in the picture condition (b’ = 0.61) 
to a more liberal response bias in the word and pictures condition (b’ = 0.80). 
 
4.3.5 Discussion 
The first hypothesis stated that ASD individuals would show lower false recognition 
to the critical lures in the word only condition. This was not supported by our raw 
(uncorrected) results in Madrid by the independent samples t-test. However, the ASD 
individuals did still produce lower corrected true and false recognition in 
comparison with controls and these were significant as shown by our independent 
samples t-tests. This suggests that asdult ASD individuals still lack the necessary gist 
representation to filter out the non-studied words resulting in a liberal response bias 
and lower corrected true and false recognition. Hence we can still argue that their 
results support the hypothesis since they also have significantly lower corrected false 
recognition in comparison with controls. 
 Secondly, we argued for the picture only condition ASD individuals would 
perform in a similar manner to the word-only condition with regards to false 
recognition to the critical lures. Again, our results for Madrid supported this 
hypothesis with adult ASD individuals showing no difference in paired samples t-
tests for false recognition to the critical lures between the word and picture condition.  
We also hypothesised that ASD individuals should have higher corrected true 
recognition in the picture condition compared with the word-only condition since 
they were able to use more perceptual details to remember the items. This was not 
supported by paired samples t-tests for the two conditions. The Madrid ASD 
individuals produced more false recognition to the non-studied items. We will 
discuss this finding below. However, we also argued that their corrected false 
recognition should show no change between the word and the picture condition and 
this was supported by our results.  
 Finally, we argued in the word and picture condition we could help ASD 
individuals increase their gist memory by providing additional semantic and 
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perceptual details. ASD individuals should show an increase in corrected true and 
false recognition in comparison to Experiments 4a and b. The results only partially 
supported this hypothesis with an increase in corrected true recognition but not 
corrected false recognition. However, their pattern of performance in the words and 
picture condition was comparable with controls with no significant differences 
except the more liberal response bias in the ASD group. 
The results from Madrid support Beversdorf et al. (2001) findings in that 
corrected true and false recognition in a word condition were lower in adult ASD 
individuals than controls. They also support the argument that there is no difference 
in false recognition between the word and picture condition. Also, the ASD 
individuals could use the binding properties and performed like controls in the word 
and picture condition. 
However, the picture condition differed from the Columbian results in that 
there was no increase in corrected true recognition for ASD individuals in 
comparison with their performance on the word condition. This is discussed below. 
 
 
4.4 General Discussion 
Our two experiments are consistent with the findings of Beversdorf et al. (2001) in 
that both ASD groups showed reduced corrected true and false recognition in a word 
DRM paradigm. We also argued their performances would not change with regards 
to false recognition of critical lures and therefore corrected false recognition in a 
picture paradigm since they lacked the ability to ‘name’ pictures and hence access 
semantic and gist details. The results also supported this. The descriptive statistics of 









Table 19: Descriptive statistics for Madrid v Columbia 
    Words   Pictures   Words & Pictures 

























(17.27) Critical Incorrect 
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(10.06) Non-studied Incorrect 














However, we stated that if relying on perceptual details of pictures ASD individuals 
should increase their performance on corrected true recognition, since in both cases 
response bias should increase. However, this was only true for the Columbian 
younger ASD group, the older Madrid group did not show an increase in corrected 
true recognition (Table 20) as a result of the persistence of high false recognition to 
the non-studied, unrelated pictures. 
 
Table 20: Discrimination and Response Bias for Madrid and Columbia 
    Words   Pictures   Words & Pictures 






























































































However, finding these differences between the two groups may not be unusual. 
When we consider the control data we also find there are differences between the 
Madrid controls and the Columbian controls. For example, the adult Madrid controls 
demonstrated a far more liberal response bias across all three conditions. They also 
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produced higher critical lures incorrect, studied words correct, and non-studied 
words incorrect for the word condition and the word and picture condition and these 
results were significant (see Table 21).  This is not surprising given the work of 
Kensinger and Schacter (1999) who use Fuzzy Trace Theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 
1995) to argue that as adults age they begin to rely more on gist memory traces than 
veridical recognition and hence their false recognition to the critical lures increases. 
 
Table 21: Madrid v Columbia Controls 
Controls: Columbia v Madrid t Sig. (2-tailed) 
Age 6.467 .001 
Words Critical Incorrect 2.739 .013 
Words Studied Correct 4.650 .001 
Words Non-Studied Incorrect 3.948 .001 
Words Corrected True Recognition -.200 .844 
Words Corrected False Recognition -.250 .805 
Words Response Bias 4.457 .001 
Pictures Critical Incorrect .780 .445 
Pictures Studied Correct 1.556 .135 
Pictures Non-Studied Incorrect .980 .339 
Pictures Corrected True Recognition .479 .637 
Pictures Corrected False Recognition .004 .997 
Pictures Response Bias 1.636 .118 
Words & Pictures Critical Incorrect 1.913 .070 
Words & Pictures Studied Correct 2.762 .012 
Words & Pictures Non-Studied Incorrect 3.902 .001 
Words & Pictures Corrected True Recognition -1.836 .081 
Words & Pictures Corrected False Recognition -1.636 .117 
Words & Pictures Response Bias 3.338 .003 
 
If controls showed this age difference in false and true recognition performance it is 
not illogical to suggest so too do the individuals with ASD. The comparison between 









Table 22: Madrid v Columbia ASD Individuals 
ASD Individuals: Columbia v Madrid t Sig. (2-tailed) 
Age 6.923 .001 
Words Critical Incorrect 5.252 .001 
Words Studied Correct 6.114 .001 
Words Non-Studied Incorrect 4.798 .001 
Words Corrected True Recognition -1.081 .292 
Words Corrected False Recognition -.636 .532 
Words Response Bias 8.111 .001 
Pictures Critical Incorrect 4.110 .001 
Pictures Studied Correct 1.452 .161 
Pictures Non-Studied Incorrect 4.697 .001 
Pictures Corrected True Recognition -3.230 .004 
Pictures Corrected False Recognition -1.363 .187 
Pictures Response Bias 1.940 .066 
Words & Pictures Critical Incorrect 1.402 .175 
Words & Pictures Studied Correct .794 .436 
Words & Pictures Non-Studied Incorrect 3.744 .001 
Words & Pictures Corrected True Recognition -2.648 .015 
Words & Pictures Corrected False Recognition -1.506 .147 
Words & Pictures Response Bias 2.216 .038 
 
Although the two ASD groups show comparable true and false recognition for the 
word condition, there are differing reasons for the results. The adult Madrid ASD 
group had a more liberal response bias resulting in high incorrect responses to the 
non-studied words. This in turn produced low corrected true and false recognition 
(since corrected true recognition = studied correct – non-studied incorrect and 
corrected false recognition = critical incorrect = non-studied incorrect). The younger 
Columbian group had a more conservative response bias resulting in lower corrected 
true and false recognition due to low critical lures incorrect and low studied words 
correct. 
 Whilst the Columbian ASD group can improve their corrected true 
recognition in the picture condition the same is not true for the adult Madrid ASD 
group. The Madrid group still have high non-studied items correct as a result of a 
more liberal response bias in comparison with the Columbian group. Both groups are 
comparable to their control groups for their patterns of responses in the word and 




 The findings suggest an age difference in ASD individuals’ ability to use gist 
memory to filter out the non-studied items with older participants demonstrating a 
more liberal response bias. We carried out correlations between age and the results 
for the word-only paradigm for all the ASD individuals and controls. The 
correlations can be found in Table 23. 
 



















 r          p r           p r          p r           p r           p r           p 
Controls n = 
23 
(.463) .03 (.615) .01 (.487) .02 (.053) .82 (.027) .90 (.623) .01 
ASD n = 22 (.578) .01 (.714) .01 (.581) .01 (-.114) .60 (-.148) .50 (.771) .01 
 
As can be seen the results for critical incorrect, studied correct and non-studied 
correct and response bias all show significant positive correlations for both the ASD 
and control groups. Both groups show an increase in response bias but this could be 
for different reasons. For example, as controls age they rely more on gist memory 
traces, as suggested by Kensinger and Schacter (1999). For the ASD individuals it 
suggests the reverse is true: as they age the ability to use gist memory to filter out the 
non-studied words becomes harder resulting in the increase in response bias to a 
more liberal response. 
This age difference in ASD individuals suggests that if intervention is 
introduced early enough through education by providing materials that offer the 
binding of both word and picture, there could be the possibility of improving what 
Whitehouse et al. (2006) describe as the lack of ‘inner speech’ in individuals with 
ASD. This offers a further avenue of future research to clearly understand when and 
why this liberal response bias begins in ASD individuals and if it is a result of the 
failure to encode perceptual and/or semantic details. It could also be that like older 
adults, those with ASD cannot make use of the distinctive properties of the pictorial 
stimuli in a similar manner to older adults on a picture paradigm (e.g. Koutstaal & 
Schacter, 1997).  
In conclusion, the work in this chapter has demonstrated that ASD 
individuals do not maintain robust gist representation as well as normal individuals 
resulting in reduced corrected true and false recognition in a word DRM paradigm. 
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The hypothesis related to the picture paradigm was only supported by the Columbian 
data in that ASD individuals did improve their corrected true recognition but 
maintained a static performance for critical lures incorrect. However, the results from 
Madrid indicated the possibility of an age difference in the development of gist 
memory, with the adult Madrid group showing little or no ability to maintain any gist 
representation to filter out their incorrect response to the non-studied items. This 
more liberal response bias was evident across all three conditions. Both groups could 
use the additional information in the word and picture condition to aid gist 
representation, but the adult Madrid group produced less corrected true recognition 
for words and pictures compared with controls (although this just missed 
significance, p = 0.07) indicating that they may not be fully able to utilise all the 
distinct, semantic and perceptual features. This finding suggests that early 







Chapter Five: False Recognition and Gist Memory in Patients with 
Functional Memory Disorder 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Patients presenting with Functional Memory Disorder, that is memory problems 
without any obvious underlying disease, often have their symptoms labelled as 
psychological rather than neurological. Functional Memory Disorder includes 
psychogenic amnesia, medically unexplained memory problems, psychosomatic 
amnesia or dissociative memory disorder. Functional Memory Disorder (FMD) has 
been most recently described by Metternich et al. (2009), who also include the term 
‘functional memory complaint’. They note that a large number of patients who 
present with memory problems have no underlying major psychiatric cause but they 
do often present with elevated stress and depression scores in clinical tests. In some 
instances a patient may be labelled as malingering, which is defined as fabricating or 
exaggerating the symptoms of mental or physical disorders for a variety of gains 
such as financial compensation or simply to gain sympathy. Indeed, Hom and 
Denney (2002) note that differentiating between patients who are wilfully 
exaggerating memory symptoms and those who may have, say, conversion or other 
psychiatric disorders is complicated. However, one of the key differentiations 
between malingering and FMD is that the malingerers have a motive for their 
behaviour, for example financial gain, avoiding school/work or lighter crime 
sentences (Ibid.). FMD patients, in particular those considered in this chapter, do not 
present with any such overt motive. 
Recently, Dr Jon Stone and colleagues have suggested ways in which patients 
with physical functional symptoms can be more adequately assessed and diagnosed 
within a neurological framework (Stone et al., 2005a). Furthermore, in a subsequent 
paper (Stone et al., 2005b) they describe how physical functional symptoms can be 
managed and treated. However, they also note that it is very difficult to discriminate 
between consciously and unconsciously produced physical functional symptoms. 
This is particularly true of FMD (for review see Kihlstrom, 2005) and is further 
complicated by the fact most patients with FMD perform within normal ranges of 
clinical neuropsychology tests for memory (Metternich et al., 2009). A common 
feature of malingerers, specifically when using clinical tests, is they often exaggerate 
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their symptoms on memory tests producing a negative response bias (Hom & 
Denney, 2002). The same cannot be said of FMD patients. 
 The main aim of this work is to investigate false recognition and false 
memory in patients with FMD. Around half the patients referred to 'under-65’ 
memory clinics have memory symptoms that are not due to an underlying disease 
such as dementia. In NHS settings, such symptoms are usually thought to be genuine 
and the explanation is usually given as an underlying psychological problem such as 
depression, although in a significant number of cases no specific psychological 
problem can be found. In medico-legal settings, such memory symptoms are often 
thought to be consciously manufactured for the purpose of financial gain. We will 
investigate FMD by using the Deese (1959), Roediger and McDermott (1995) 
(DRM) paradigm and comparing this performance with normal, healthy individuals. 
This is primarily to see whether the DRM is sensitive to FMD which may in turn 
produce added diagnostic value, rather than the current reliance on questionnaires, 
which rely on subjective responses.  
 The second aim of our experiment is to investigate whether patients with 
FMD are more or less susceptible to provoked confabulation compared with normal 
individuals, using a simple confabulation experiment. Berlyne was amongst the first 
to define confabulation as, “a falsification of memory occurring in clear 
consciousness in association with an organically derived amnesia” (Berlyne, p.38, 
1972). Furthermore, he distinguished between what he called ‘momentary’ (or 
‘provoked’) confabulations and ‘fantastic (or ‘spontaneous’) confabulations. 
Provoked confabulations are fleeting and and invariably prompted by specific 
questions about the subject's memory, sometimes consisting of real memories that 
are subsequently displaced in their temporal context. When later questioned, patients 
often recognize their initial responses as being incorrect. In contrast, spontaneous 
confabulations are characterised by unprompted narratives of irrelevant associations, 
which Berlyne described as ‘wish-fulfilling fantasies’, which may be held with firm 
conviction (Ibid.). In some cases, these patients may actually act upon their 
confabulation such as attempting to leave the hospital as the patient believes he/she 
is in fact leaving work to go home. In all cases, patients present with some form of 
organic amnesia. 
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One characteristic of FMD is that patients believe their current memory 
performance is impaired and they could, therefore, be said to be exhibiting a similar 
memory illusion as shown by amnesic individuals who suffer from spontaneous 
confabulation. However, normal individuals can also be provoked into producing 
confabulations that subsequently lead to false memories. For example, Ackil and 
Zaragoza (2002) examined this phenomenon in adults and children by the use of 
leading questions regarding what they had seen on a video about a birthday party. In 
such a paradigm it may be that FMD patients show a greater susceptibility to 
producing false memories when provoked by mis-information. 
We have shown in previous chapters how the Deese (1959), Roediger and 
McDermott (1995) list learning and recognition paradigm (DRM) has been used to 
explore some neurological diseases, particularly those that involve memory 
impairments (e.g. amnesia, Alzheimer’s disease, autistic spectrum disorders). Where 
there is a reduction in false recognition in the DRM, gist memory is thought to be 
impaired. For normal individuals good gist memory allows strong links to be formed 
between semantically related words, for example, bed, night, pillow, nap, tired, so 
that when the critical lure 'sleep' is subsequently presented during the recognition 
phase they are prompted to falsely respond “yes, the word was on the original list.” 
The ability to maintain the conceptual gist of the studied items also allows normal 
individuals to strongly reject unrelated new words, such as cathedral. However, in 
patients who lack the ability to integrate or retrieve gist representation (particularly 
found in amnesia patients with damage to the medial temporal lobes, see Koutstaal et 
al., 2001), links between studied words and semantically related critical lures are 
harder to form and so false recall/recognition is reduced as amnesia patients are 
unable to retain the semantic links between the studied items. Amnesia patients also 
show a reduction in correct hits for studied items compared with controls (Ibid.). 
 Studies have also looked at individual differences in relationship with 
increased false recognition in the DRM paradigm. For example, Clancy et al. (2000) 
found an elevated level of false recognition in women who thought that they might 
have been sexually assaulted as children compared with normal controls. 
Furthermore, in a related study using the DRM paradigm, Clancy et al. (2002) found 
individuals reporting recovered or repressed memories of alien abduction were also 
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more susceptible to false recognition and recall. In the latter case such false beliefs 
may be regarded as a form of confabulation and individuals suffering from them are 
at a greater susceptibility to false recognition. Although these individuals showed 
higher false recall and recognition compared with normal controls, their pattern of 
correct recall and recognition did not differ from control subjects. Clancy and 
colleagues argued that hypnotic suggestibility, depressive symptoms and schizotypic 
features were all significant predictors of false recall and recognition. 
 The above patterns of either degraded false recall and recognition, or 
increased false recognition caused by psychological trauma or confabulation provide 
us with a basis from which we can predict how FMD patients might perform. This in 
turn gives us four hypotheses. Firstly, if gist memory is impaired in these individuals 
then we would expect them to show reduced false and/or true recognition on the 
DRM paradigm, as has been suggested to be found in cases of organic memory 
problems.  
 The second hypothesis is that this reduced gist memory function will produce 
reduced true and false memory in a confabulation experiment in functional patients. 
In a simple confabulation experiment people are asked leading questions about items 
not present in the picture (for an example of this methodology see Ackil and 
Zaragoza, 2002). Good episodic and gist memory allows healthy individuals to 
answer the true questions, that is questions about items that were present in the 
picture, and subsequently allow them to recall this information when questioned one 
week later. Furthermore, good gist memory will lead healthy individuals to ‘fill-in-
the-gaps’ when asked leading questions about items not present in the pictures, 
particularly if those questions are congruent with the overall context of the picture. In 
contrast the functional patients should again show reduced true and false recognition 
in immediate recall and when questioned one week later, since their gist 
representation will not allow them to fill in the missing ‘gaps’ hinted at through the 
leading questions. 
 However, our third hypothesis argues that if Functional Memory Disorder is a 
form of unconscious confabulation then we would expect our participants to perform 
like patients with a dissociative disorder and show increased false recognition of the 
critical lures in the DRM paradigm (e.g. Clancy et al, 2002). Our fourth hypothesis 
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suggests that these individuals should also, therefore, show an increased tendency for 
provoked confabulation and be more susceptible than normal individuals to turn this 
confabulation into a false memory.  
 
5.2 Neuropsychology Tests 
Assessment was carried out in two separate sessions (although for one patient this 
was carried out over three sessions due to fatigue but it should be noted they carried 
out the confabulation experiment as per the methodology described below). In the 
first session participants undertook standard psychometric assessment in order to 
gain measures of intelligence, executive function, depression, anxiety and memory. 
They also took the first part of the confabulation experiment, which is based in part 
on an experiment used by Ackil and Zaragoza (2002), described below in the 
experimental methodology. The second session took place one week later where 
participants were asked the same questions in order to see if the provoked 
confabulation has become a false memory. In the second session they also took part 
in the Deese (1959), Roediger and McDermott (1998) (DRM) paradigm and 
undertook assessment for malingering using the Tombaugh Test of Memory 
Malingering (TOMM) (Tombaugh, 1996). 
 
The psychometric tests used are as follows: 
1) National Adult Reading Test (Nelson, 1982).  
2) Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) (Wechsler, 1999). 
3) Wechsler Logic test in Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS-III) (Wechsler, 1998). 
4) Controlled Oral Word Association (COWA) letter/word fluency test (Spreen & 
benton, 1969). 
5) Partington’s trail making test (TMT) parts A & B (Partington & Leiter, 1949). 
6) Beck’s Depression Inventory 2nd Ed (BDI-II) (Beck et al., 1996). 







5.3 Participants and Neuropsychology Results 
Fifteen aged-matched controls were recruited via the Psychology department’s 
volunteer panel. All were recompensed for their travel costs. Controls were then 
matched for pre-morbid IQ using the NART. Three controls were subsequently 
excluded, as their pre-morbid IQ was too high. Patients were recruited via the 
memory clinic at the Western General Hospital in Edinburgh. Patients with any 
previous neurological problems or a history of depression were excluded. Eleven 
patients were recruited and all were recompensed for their travel costs. One patient 
was subsequently excluded as it was thought he was exaggerating his memory 
problems and his scores on the Tombaugh Test of Memory Malingering supported 
this. His case is discussed in Chapter Seven. A second patient was excluded as it was 
discovered within two weeks of her recruitment that she had a malignant brain 
tumour. 
 Of the patients recruited five were still in full-time employment, two worked 
part-time and two had taken early retirement.  All the patients have been followed up 
subsequent to the research carried out here for a period of twelve months and none 
had exhibited any organic problems to account for the memory disorder. One patient 
had a diagnosis of Myalgic Encephlopathy (ME/ chronic fatigue syndrome) but was 
still in full-time employment.  Two patients were taking fluoxetine (selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitor) to treat anxiety problems (10 mg once a day). Mild 
anxiety problems were a common issue amongst all nine patients, specifically related 
to worrying about forgetting important events/dates/times/losing possessions etc. A 
commonality in describing their case histories was a gradual onset of symptoms over 
a twelve-month period, often reported by family members and friends and gradually 
becoming evident to the patients themselves. Each patient cited at least one major 
event (such as the loss of a possession, forgetting a payment) that finally made him 
or her ‘aware’ of their memory problem and it was usually this that had prompted 
them to seek medical attention. All nine patients had had an MRI scan in the six 
months prior to participating in this research. All scans were normal. No further 
clinical data was available. 




Table 24: Neuropsychology Results for Patients and Controls 
TEST Group N Mean SD 
Becks Depression Inventory Controls 15 8.40 6.54 
  Patients 9 16.00 12.08 
State Trait Anxiety Scores Controls 15 73.73 16.04 
  Patients 9 87.11 25.84 
NART Full Scale IQ Controls 15 106.40 4.20 
(National Adult Reading Test) Patients 9 100.11 8.57 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale Controls 15 112.67* 7.29 
of Intelligence (III) Full Scale IQ Patients 9 102.00 6.24 
Verbal Fluency Controls 15 12.04** 2.73 
(Average for C, P, & L) Patients 9 8.74 1.02 
Wechsler Logical Memory      
Logical Memory I(Raw Scores)      
Recall Controls 15 46.73** 8.72 
  Patients 9 30.89 60.90 
Thematic Controls 15 17.33* 3.22 
  Patients 9 13.89 3.14 
Logical Memory II (Raw Scores)      
Recall Controls 15 28.53** 5.95 
  Patients 9 17.89 3.51 
Thematic Controls 15 11.13 2.03 
  Patients 9 9.89 2.37 
Total Retention % Controls 15 75.35 10.57 
  Patients 9 66.44 10.68 
Recognition % Controls 15 89.78* 5.69 
  Patients 9 82.15 9.39 
          
Trail Making A Controls 15 30.66 6.77 
  Patients 9 33.29 8.96 
Trail Making B Controls 15 60.55 13.08 
  Patients 9 57.10 13.67 
Tombaugh Test of Memory 
Malingering      
TOMM 1 Controls 15 49.53** 0.64 
  Patients 9 46.22 2.94 
TOMM 2 Controls 15 50.00 0.00 
  Patients 9 49.89 0.33 
* Significance between groups p<0.05; ** Significance between groups 
p<0.01 
 
There were significant differences between patients and controls for the Wechsler 
Logical Memory. Patients had significantly lower recall and thematic recall, although 
the difference in thematic recall was only true for the Logical Memory I. 
Furthermore, one observation was that the patients also had difficulty with the 
chronological sequence of the recall, frequently beginning their recall mid-way 
through the stories and then back-tracking to the start although this was not 
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systematically examined. They also had significantly lower recognition scores than 
the control group, which suggests at this stage that the functional patients have 
difficulty with episodic memory. It should be noted that Metternich et al. (2009) did 
not use the Wechsler Logical Memory in their characterization of FMD patients, and 
in fact argue that on the methods they do use, differences between controls and 
patients for clinical memory tests was not a common finding in FMD. However, our 
findings on the Wechsler Logical Memory do indicate problems in FMD patients, 
and this harmonises with Metternich et al.’s (2009) observation that many patients 
complain of everyday memory failures such as missed meetings, encoding deficits 
(e.g. conversations) and inability to recall familiar numbers. 
 Secondly, FMD patients had lower verbal fluency than the controls. 
However, given Metternich et al.’s (2009) characterization of FMD, this could be 
attributed to poor concentration (one patient forgot what letter she was supposed to 
be doing) and not a deficit of linguistic or executive capabilities per se. Furthermore 
there was no difference between the groups on the Trail Making Test.  
 Although the patients produced significantly lower scores for the Tombaugh 
Test of Memory Malingering Part 1, none fell within the range of suspected 




5.4 Experiment 5: Investigating false recognition in functional memory 
weakness patients in the DRM paradigm 
 
5.4.1 Method and Materials 
Twelve lists of 15 words were used (shown in bold in Appendix A) from the original 
24-list paradigm used in Chapter Three.  The reduced number of word lists was 
chosen so as not to cause the patients fatigue and so have a response that was biased 
due to tiredness. Participants were told they were taking part in an experiment to 
investigate memory. Instructions were presented on the computer screen. Participants 
were told to study the word lists in the first part of the experiment and answer the 
maths questions (which acted as a distracter task) in between each word list. The 
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order of the word lists was presented randomly as were the words within each list. 
Participants saw the words at a rate of 1s per word. The maths distracter task ran for 
30 seconds. After all 12 lists had been studied participants moved directly on to the 
recognition phase of the experiment and were instructed to press ‘Yes’ on the 
keyboard if they thought the word was in the original study phase, and ‘No’ if it was 
not.  The ‘d’ and ‘k’ keys on the keyboard were labelled and used as the ‘yes’ and 
‘no’ response keys. Words were presented at a rate of 0.5s per word.  
 
5.4.2 Design 
This is a between subject design with Word Type as the main factor and response 
(Yes/No) as the dependent variable. We will also use Snodgrass and Corwin’s (1988) 
recommendations for signal detection analysis in this type of memory experiment.  
 
5.4.3 Results 
The results for the DRM paradigm can be seen in Table 25. 
 
Table 25: Descriptive Statistics for critical incorrect, studied incorrect and non-
studied incorrect. 
    
Controls N = 12  
M% (SD) 
Patients N = 9 
M% (SD) 
Critical Incorrect (12 Items) 70.01 (16.00) 64.00 (15.62) 
Studied Correct (24 Items) 79.44 (7.46) 63.45 (12.83) 
Non-studied Incorrect (12 Items) 11.11 (13.24) 13.96 (13.84) 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA with Word Type as the main factor (3) and response 
(yes/no) as the dependent variable was carried out. Word Type was shown to be 
significant, F(2,44) = 130.02, p <0.01, that is both controls and patients showed 
significant false recognition to the critical lures in comparison with the non-studied 
words. 
 Post hoc independent samples t-tests indicated that there was a significant 
difference between patients and controls for correct studied words, t (22) = 3.83, p < 
0.01. That is controls produced more true recognition to the studied items than the 
patients. 
 Figure 12 shows the results for corrected true and false recognition and 
discrimination bias (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). Corrected true recognition is the 
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studied items correct minus the non-studied items incorrect. Corrected false 
recognition is the critical items incorrect minus the non-studied items incorrect. 
Response bias is calculated using the following formula: b’ = FA/1-(Hits – FA) 




Figure 12: Corrected true and false recognition and response bias. 
 
Independent samples t-tests were carried out which found a significant difference 
between patients and controls for corrected true recognition, t (22) = 2.50,  p < 0.05 
but not for corrected false recognition, p n.s. Furthermore there was also a significant 
difference in response bias, t (22) = 3.075,  p < 0.01, that is patients had a more 
conservative response bias than controls; that is they were more likely to respond 
‘No’. 
 We also carried out independent samples t-tests to investigate response 
latencies between the controls and patient group. The results were insignificant for 
all three stimuli (critical lures, studied words and non-studied words); that is, 
patients’ response latencies were comparable to controls, see Table 26.  
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Table 26: Response Latencies for Controls and Patients in the DRM Paradigm. 
Response 
Latencies Critical Lures Studied Words 
Non-studied 
Words 
Controls M (SD) 1115.60 (758.37) 986.55 (300.01) 1031.88 (356.99) 
Patients M (SD) 1085.33 (259.69) 1006.98 (356.23) 1000.02 (298.69) 
 
5.4.4 Discussion 
The results for the DRM paradigm indicate that the FMD patients produced less true 
recognition than controls. These findings do not support the third hypothesis that 
suggested FMD patients would be suffering from a form of dissociative disorder and 
so would be more likely to produce false recognition. Furthermore, they also do not 
support the first hypothesis, which argued that if there was a problem with gist 
memory then patients would perform in a similar manner to patients suffering from 
amnesia (Schacter et al., 1996), or those with Alzheimer’s disease (Balota et al., 
1999) who produced reduced false recognition to the critical lures. However, given 
that their true recognition was significantly lower than that of controls does partially 
support hypothesis one in that true recognition has also been found to be lower in 
amnesia patients in comparison with controls (Koutstaal et al., 2001). 
 These findings, and their implications for the role of gist memory, will be 
discussed further in the general discussion alongside the results from the 




5.5 Experiment 6: Investigating Provoked Confabulation and False 
Memories in Functional Memory Weakness patients. 
 
5.5.1 Method and Materials 
Participants were presented with five coloured still-photographs of famous 
celebrities. Each picture was studied for ten seconds before carrying out fifteen-
seconds of simple mathematical problems that acted as a distracter task. The pictures 
were presented randomly. An example of the types of pictures can be seen in Figure 
13. All the pictures and questions can be found in Appendix E. 
 108 
 
Figure 13: Example of picture stimuli used in Experiment 6: The Two Ronnies. 
  
Immediately after seeing the pictures, participants were asked two questions about 
each picture. One question would be a TRUE question; that is it was about items 
present in the picture. For example, ‘What colour suit was Ronnie Corbett wearing in 
the picture?’ A correct response would be ‘Orange’; a miss would be ‘Don’t know’ 
or the incorrect colour.  The second question asked was designed to elicit a 
confabulated answer; ‘What was on the desk between the Two Ronnies?’ A correct 
response should be ‘Don’t know’ or ‘Nothing was on the desk’. An incorrect FALSE 
response would be a confabulated answer such as, ‘A jug of water’. When 
participants returned one week later they were asked the same questions again to 
determine if any confabulated answers had subsequently become false memories; 
that is if participants persisted in the notion that the incorrect FALSE response had 
been present in the original picture. The questions designed to elicit confabulated 
responses were all leading questions about items that were congruent with the overall 
gist of the picture. This is similar to the design of Ackil and Zaragoza (1998) that 
used leading questions about video pictures. 
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This was a between subject design with response as the dependent variable 
for week one and week two, and question type as the independent variable (either 
TRUE or FALSE questions).  The number of correct HITS (that is correct responses 
to TRUE questions) and FALSE alarms (that is incorrect responses to the FALSE, 
leading questions) was calculated for each individual.  
 
5.5.2 Design 
Independent t-tests will explore the differences between the two groups for correct 
and incorrect responses and the differences between Week 1 and Week 2 results.  
 
5.5.3 Results 
The descriptive statistics for the confabulation experiment can be seen in Figure 14. 
 
 







As can be seen from the graph, participants produced false alarms to the leading 
questions that were then maintained as false memories one week later. However, a 
related t-test found no significant difference between week one and week two for the 
rates of false alarms or true recognition within the groups.  
However, there were significant differences between the two groups for true 
recognition. The functional memory patients produced significantly less true 
recognition to the TRUE questions compared with controls for week one, t(22) = 
2.28, p < 0.05; and for week two, t(22) = 3.30, p <0.01. 
 
5.5.4 Discussion 
The results for the confabulation experiment showed that patients produced less true 
recognition compared with controls, but there were no significant differences for 
false recognition. This does not support the fourth hypothesis that argued if these 
patients were suffering from some form of unconscious confabulation then they 
would produce more FALSE answers to the leading questions. It also only partly 
supports the second hypothesis that suggested that a failure in gist and episodic 
memory would result in a reduction in the TRUE and FALSE alarms since patients 
would not be able to maintain the overall thematic gist of each picture. 
 However, the finding that the FMD patients produce less true recognition 
supports the results from the DRM paradigm, which found less correct recognition to 
the studied words in comparison with controls. 
 
5.6 General Discussion and Conclusion 
Nine patients who presented with Functional Memory Disorder were tested on both 
the DRM paradigm and a confabulation experiment to determine if their gist memory 
was impaired. Although the results did not fully support the hypotheses, specifically 
that patients would show reduced gist memory and hence reduced false recognition 
in the DRM and reduced false memory in the confabulation experiment, patients did 
produce significantly less true recognition in both the DRM paradigm and the 
confabulation experiment compared with controls. 
 This reduction in true recognition in the patient group is congruent with the 
neuropsychology findings in the Wechsler Logical memory. One argument for these 
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findings suggests that patient have problems with their episodic memory. However, 
gist memory is also required to maintain the associations between the studied items 
in the DRM paradigm. We saw in Chapter Three that individuals who had low 
correct responses to the studied items also produced low false recognition to the 
critical lures. It may be that FMD patients have a minor deficit in their gist memory 
that presents as poor recognition of the studied items. We also found in Chapter 
Four that adolescents and young adults with Autism had significantly lower 
corrected true recognition that was accompanied by a more conservative response 
bias in comparison with controls. There was a similar pattern with the FMD patients 
who also showed a more conservative response bias in comparison with controls. 
 Additionally, response times between controls and FMD patients in the DRM 
paradigm were not significantly different. As we will see later in Chapter Seven 
response times are a crucial aspect of the malingering profile in the DRM paradigm, 
and so these findings suggest FMD patients are not malingering. The comparable 
response latencies would also rule out the suggestion that FMD patients may not be 
motivated when undergoing neuropsychology testing. 
 In conclusion, the exploration of patients with Functional Memory Disorder 
has shown that in the DRM paradigm (1998) patients produce significantly lower 
true recognition of the studied items. One of the problems with FMD diagnosis, as 
pointed out by Metternich et al. (2009), is that the process often relies on subjective 
questioning and interpretation rather than any objective quantitative analysis. It may 
be that the DRM offers a clue and a quantitative measure as to the impairments these 
patients are suffering from with regards to their memory problems. The 
confabulation experiment is unlikely to offer the same flexibility since it relies 
heavily on using pictures that are culturally and chronologically significant. 
 The discovery that the DRM may possibly offer a method to investigate 
malingering will be discussed in Chapter Seven, but in Chapter Six we will use a 
variety of DRM paradigms to investigate a case study of a patient with amnesia. 
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Investigating the performance of amnesia patients in the DRM paradigm has 
revealed a pattern of recognition in which patients produce reduced true and false 
recognition (for review see Schacter, Verfaellie, & Koutstaal, 2002). Schacter and 
his colleagues have argued that this indicates a failure not only in episodic memory 
in amnesia patients, but also in their gist memory, that is the memory for semantic 
features as opposed to just the memory for distinctive features. This chapter explores 
the relationship of gist and episodic memory further through performance of amnesia 
patient DA on DRM-style paradigms.  
 
6.2 DA: A Case Study 
DA is a 32-year-old woman at the time of testing who was diagnosed with dense, 
anterograde amnesia. She was first seen at the Royal Hospital for Sick Kids in 
October 1982 aged 7. Her history revealed that she had suffered anoxia at birth and 
subsequently had difficulties breathing. She was taken into intensive care where she 
stayed for two weeks until her respiratory difficulties improved.  DA only began 
walking at 17 months with a tendency to walk on the inside of her right foot and fall 
off. These problems persisted. The examination at 7 years of age revealed truncated 
ataxia and minimal right hemiparesis. These were strongly suspected to be the result 
of the asphyxia at birth. In 1983 a neurology examination noted clumsiness and 
persistent minor mirror movements and she was later labelled as having mild 
cerebral palsy. Moreover, specific writing and spelling problems were noted.  
DA was referred to the hospital again in 1987 at the age of 12 after an 
episode of what was later suspected to be temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE). DA had 
spoken nonsense for several minutes and appeared to have glazed eyes. Afterwards 
she needed to lie down. Several further episodes of altered awareness and confusion, 
followed by headaches and tiredness ensued. An EEG was normal but TLE was 
strongly suspected due to the nature of her episodes and given her history of anoxia 
and she was prescribed Carbamazepine to control the seizures. 
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In the same year a letter expressed concerns about her progress in school. She 
required remedial help in English, maths and geography. In 1989 a further letter from 
her school stated that, “the greatest problem at school has been that of short term 
memory failure”. Furthermore, a letter from her neurologist states, “She finds that 
when she is in school she cannot remember something that she has read for example 
5 minutes ago or if her father asks her to carry out a message by the time she gets to 
the shop she often cannot remember what the message was…her long term memory 
appears intact and if she learns something slowly she will retain it”. 
Carbamazepine withdrawn in 1989 in order to investigate her memory 
difficulties further and an assessment in 1989 confirmed severe memory difficulties 
particularly for verbal information with only 8% immediate recall of stories and she 
could not recall anything following a 45-minute interval. There were then three 
further episodes of confusion during which she “wandered about, not knowing what 
she was doing”. Carbamazepine was reinstated.  
DA’s seizures recurred in 1990 and according to a letter from her neurologist 
they consisted of “blanking and talking nonsense in keeping with a left sided origin 
affecting speech”. These were typical complex partial seizures and her neurologist 
further comments, “her eyes glaze over, she becomes unaware of what is going on 
with no memory of the event. She talks nonsense, flushes, wants to lie down and 
sleep”. Her seizures became worse occurring on alternate days so her Carbamazepine 
was increased to 600 mgs.  
To summarise her early history; DA completed 11 years of formal education 
having attended school between the ages of five an sixteen. Her medical history 
includes mild cerebral palsy with clumsiness, mild right hemiparesis and complex 
partial seizures most likely the result of temporal lobe epilepsy that responded well 
to Carbamazepine treatment. EEGs were repeatedly normal as was her CT scan. 
However, she had an anterograde amnesia, which appears to predate her epilepsy, 
and is strongly suspected to be the result of her birth asphyxia.  
There were no reports of further seizures from when she was a teenager 
although in 2004 she began to suffer from migraines. DA is married with two 
children and had been working as a nursery assistant. However, she left her job due 
to concerns about her memory difficulties, which were seriously affecting her work 
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following complaints from staff. DA’s husband also reported that during this time he 
thought her memory had deteriorated. DA had a standard FLAIR and T2 coronal 
MRI scan of the temporal regions in 2005 that was reported to show no abnormality 
or sclerosis through routine radiological examination (see Appendix J). DA 
underwent a full clinical neuropsychology assessment in 2006 (see Table 27). At the 
time of the current study her TLE was under control but she was still on 
Carbamazepine, 200mgs. 
  DA’s premorbid IQ as predicted by the NART was in the average range. 
Her Full Scale IQ scale (IQ = 77) is equivalent to the 6th percentile for a normal age-
matched population. Although her Digit Span was within the normal range she 
performs below average on Comprehension (age scaled score 5), Information (age 
scaled score 5) and Similarities (age scaled score 6). Her Vocabulary is in the Low 
Average range. Her performance on Matrix Reasoning and Picture Completion are in 
the Low Average range and her performance on Block Design is in the Average 
range. DA’s immediate recall for the Logical Memory stories (WMS-III) was in the 
Low Average range or slightly below average and her immediate recall of the 
thematic content was Average. However, she was unable to recall details from either 
of the two stories after a thirty-minute delay even when given a reminder. 
Her performance on Word list Learning Test (immediate and delayed recall) 
was below average. She was unable to recall any words following a distracter list or 
again after a 30 minute delay. However, her word recognition was intact (Total 
recognition = 23) placing her in the average range. Her results for Trail Making Part 
A were just below average indicating she may have mild slowing in speed of 
information processing. In contrast DA’s executive functions appeared relatively less 









Table 27: DA’s Neuropsychology Results 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence III (1999) Wechsler Memory Scale III (1998) 
Prorated Full Scale IQ 77   Logical Memory 1   
Prorated Verbal IQ 78    Score Age adjusted score 
Prorated Performance IQ 80   Recall Total 25 6 
      1st Recall 16 7 
Scaled Scores     Learning Slope 2 8 
Vocabulary  7   Thematic Score 17 10 
Information  5   Logical Memory 2   
Similarities  6    Score Age adjusted score 
Comprehension 5   Recall Total 0 1 
Digit Span (6 forwards, 5 backwards) 9   % Retention 0 1 
      Thematic Score 0 1 
Block Design 8       
Picture Completion 6   Word Learning List 1   
Matrix Reasoning 7    Score Age adjusted score 
        1st recall score 3 5 
NART     Recall Total score 20 4 
National Adult Reading Test (Nelson, 1982) Learning slope 2 6 
Total Errors  27   Contrast 1 0 10 
Predicted full scale IQ          97   Contrast 2 5 4 
            
Speed of Information Processing   Word Learning List 2   
Trail Making Test Part A (Partington & Leiter, 1949)  Score Age adjusted score 
44s 
10th to 25th 
percentile   Recall Total score 0 5 
        Recognition Total   
Executive Function    Total Score 23 11 
Verbal Fluency, F, A, S    % Retention 0 4 
F 8          
A 11    Rey Osterrieth Complex Figure (1944) 
S 15    Figure Copy  35/36 
Total 34    Figure recall delayed 0 
Animals 21    Figure recall retained 0 
              
Trail Making Test Part B (Partington & Leiter, 1949) Doors & People Test (Baddelely et al., 1994) 
99 s 25th to 50th percentile    Raw Age 
        scaled score    
Language Function    People 7 3 
Graded Naming Test (McKenna & Warrington, 1983) Names 20 11 
  15    Shapes 9 <1 
        Doors Test 13 4 
 
Although her score on the letter fluency tasks was relatively low (particularly on the 
F words) her total score (Total = 24) is consistent with that predicted by her age, 
years of education and her reading score on the NART. Hence there is no evidence of 
a disproportionate deficit on this test. This is also the case for her performance on the 
Similarities subtest (age scale score 6), which is dependent on executive processes. 
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Although her score is below average, it is in line with her scores on three other 
Verbal subtests (Information, Comprehension and Vocabulary), which do not rely to 
the same extent on executive processes. Her score for Animal Naming (Total = 21) 
was between the 25th and 50th percentile for her age and years of education.  Her 
performance on the Graded Naming Test (15) showed no evidence of any deficit and 




6.3 Experiment 7a: DA and Controls in the word DRM Paradigm 
 
Given the findings of Schacter et al. (2002) and their work on amnesia patients, we 
can predict that in the DRM paradigm DA would produce reduced true and false 
recognition in comparison with controls. DA would be unable to maintain robust gist 
memory and hence discriminate between critical lures, studied words and non-
studied words. In this condition she should also demonstrate a more liberal response 
bias; that is she would be more likely to response ‘Yes’ during the recognition phase 
in comparison with controls. 
  
6.3.1 Participants 
A total of fifteen age-matched controls were recruited via the University of 
Edinburgh’s careers website. Participants were all dominant right-handed, native 
speakers of English and were between the ages of 18 and 37 (M = 25.5). All were 
undergraduates or post-graduates at the University. They were paid £5 for their 
participation. DA was also reimbursed for her time and travel costs across all the 
experiments. 
 
6.3.2 Method and Materials 
Twelve lists of 15 words were used (shown in bold in Appendix A) from the original 
24-list paradigm used in Chapter Three.  The reduced number of word lists was 
chosen so as not to cause DA fatigue and result in a response that was biased due to 
tiredness. All the participants were told they were taking part in an experiment to 
investigate memory. Instructions were presented on the computer screen. Participants 
were told to study the word lists in the first part of the experiment and answer the 
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maths questions (which acted as a distracter task) in between each word list. The 
order of the word lists was presented randomly as were the words within each list. 
Participants saw the words at a rate of 1s per word. The maths distracter task ran for 
15 seconds. DA was instructed that if she found a math problem too difficult she 
could just press ‘ENTER’ and move on to the next question. After all 12 lists had 
been studied participants moved directly on to the recognition phase of the 
experiment. They were told a word would appear on the screen and they were to 
press ‘Yes’ on the keyboard if they thought the word was in the original study phase, 
and ‘No’ if it was not.  The ‘d’ and ‘k’ keys on the keyboard were labelled and used 
as the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ response keys. Words were presented at a rate of 0.5s per word.  
 
6.3.3 Design 
We used Crawford and Garthwaite’s (2002) statistical analysis for case studies. We 
examined signal detection using Snodgrass and Corwin’s (1988) recommendations 
for memory experiments looking at corrected false recognition (critical lure incorrect 
minus non-studied incorrect) and corrected true recognition (studied correct minus 
non-studied incorrect). Response bias is calculated using the following formula: b’ = 
FA/1-(Hits – FA) where FA = false alarms to critical and non-studied items and Hits 
= correct studied items (Ibid.). Finally, we also explored signal detection analysis 
using A’ prime as used by Schacter, Israel and Racine (1999) to examine item-
related and gist specific signal detection (see below in results). 
 
6.3.4 Results 
The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 28. The raw data for all participants in 










Table 28: Descriptive statistics for critical incorrect, studied correct, non-studied 








(12 Items)       
Words Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect CTR CFR b' 
DA % 33.33 66.67 62.50 37.50 66.67 33.33 0.25 0.29 0.71 
Controls M% 34.44 65.60 67.74 32.22 87.47 12.53 0.55 0.53 0.63 
Controls SD 14.73 14.73 12.90 12.90 13.05 13.05 0.19 0.21 0.23 
n=15        Significance t = -1.53 -1.11 0.33 
         p = 0.07 0.14 0.37 
            % Below 7.43 14.36 62.9 
 
DA’s performance was below average in comparison with controls for both 
Corrected True (CTR) and Corrected False Recognition (CFR), however, only CTR 
tended towards significance, p = 0.07 (see Figure 15).  
 
 
Figure 15: Corrected true and false recognition for DA and controls in the word DRM 
 
Signal Detection Analysis  
Schacter et al. (1998) used signal detection analysis to explore their results by 
dividing up the analysis between item-specific memory for correct studied items 
versus incorrect non-studied items (unrelated); item-specific memory for correct 
studied items versus false recognition to the critical lures (related); and finally, false 
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recognition to critical lures versus non-studied items incorrect (gist-specific). We 
decided to use Schacter et al.’s (Ibid.) analysis in order to make our results 
comparable with Schacter and colleagues work on amnesia patients (see discussion 
for comparisons).  
Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) note that different types of signal detection 
analysis should not be compared with each other since they work from different 
assumptions. In recognition of this we will discuss DA’s signal detection results 
separately, but they do add a useful dimension to her results.  The results can be seen 
in Table 29. 
 
Table 29: Signal detection analysis for DA and controls for word stimuli: significant 
results are in bold 
    Item-Specific Related Item-Specific Unrelated Gist-Specific   
Words   A' b A' b A' b 
DA   0.46 0.37 0.70 0.00 0.73 0.06 
Controls M   0.51 0.47 0.86 -0.59 0.91 -0.62 
Controls SD   0.11 0.35 0.08 0.53 0.09 0.55 
n=15 Significance t = -0.44 -0.28 -1.94 1.08 -1.94 1.20 
 p = 0.33 0.39 <0.05 0.15 <0.05 0.13 
  % Below 33.33 39.30 3.66 85.03 3.66 87.44 
 
The results for item-specific related for both DA and controls show poor 
discrimination of the correct studied words and false recognition to the critical lures. 
This is what we would expect in the DRM word paradigm since controls are 
responding ‘yes’ to the critical lures as their gist memory associates them to the 
studied lists. In contrast, DA’s signal detection for item-specific unrelated and gist-
specific items is significantly lower than controls. This suggests that DA does not 
have the ability to distinguish between non-studied words and critical lures; and 
studied words and non-studied words. 
  
6.3.5 Discussion 
In the word version of a DRM paradigm DA’s performance, although not significant, 
was in the direction predicted. That is she tended towards reduced CTR and CFR. 
This is similar to the findings of Schacter et al. (1996) and Verfaellie et al. (2002) as 
shown in Table 30.  
Schacter et al. (1996) and Verfaellie (2002) found that amnesia patients with 
aetiologies involving medial temporal lobe damage produced higher rates of non-
 120 
studied incorrect responses compared with controls, resulting in lower corrected true 
and false recognition.  
 
Table 30: Results for Experiment 7a in comparison with previous research results on 
amnesia patients (Corrected true & false recognition calculations carried out by this 
author). 
Schacter et al. (1996) (Words) Amnesics Controls 
  Studied Correct 0.54 0.85 
  Non-studied Incorrect 0.34 0.18 
  Critical Incorrect 0.6 0.83 
  Corrected True Recognition 0.2 0.67 
  Corrected False Recognition 0.26 0.65 
Verfaellie et al. (2002) (Words) Amnesics Controls 
  Studied Correct 0.48 0.74 
  Non-studied Incorrect 0.33 0.12 
  Critical Incorrect 0.64 0.7 
  Corrected True Recognition 0.15 0.62 
  Corrected False Recognition 0.31 0.58 
Experiment 7a   DA Controls 
  Studied Correct 0.63 0.68 
  Non-studied Incorrect 0.38 0.13 
  Critical Incorrect 0.67 0.66 
  Corrected True Recognition 0.25 0.55 
  Corrected False Recognition 0.29 0.53 
 
By using A’ Prime signal detection in the same manner as Schacter et al. (1998) to 
explore our results, DA demonstrated a significant impairment in Item-Specific 
Unrelated (correct studied items versus incorrect non-studied items). That is she was 
unable to distinguish the non-studied items from the studied items. Furthermore, DA 
also had a significant impairment of gist-specific detection (critical lures versus non-














Table 31: DA’s signal detection results in comparison with Schacter et al. (1998) 
Schacter et al. (1998) Trial 1 Signal Detection Data 
 Item-Specific Related Item-Specific Unrelated Gist-Specific 
 A’ b A’ b A’ b 
Mixed 
Amnesics 
0.73 0.20 0.42 -0.38 0.78 0.14 
Controls 0.93 0.44 0.57 -0.68 0.9 0.58 
Experiment 7a: Word DRM Paradigm 
 Item-Specific Related Item-Specific Unrelated Gist-Specific 
 A’ b A’ b A’ b 
DA 0.46 0.37 0.70 0 0.73 0.06 
Controls 0.51 0.47 0.86 -0.59 0.91 -0.62 
 
These findings are concurrent with previous work on amnesia patients (e.g. Schacter 
et al., 1998), that is poor gist-specific and item specific-unrelated memory compared 
with controls as can be seen in Table 31. Schacter et al (1998) also found a 
significant difference in item-specific unrelated and gist specific signal detection for 
amnesia patients in comparison with controls. DA is unable to recognize that she has 
not seen a non-studied item and it is this that drives the results for signal detection. In 
Table 31 we compare our signal detection findings with those of Schacter et al. 
(1998). The next experiment examines whether DA’s performance can be improved 








When given extra information to aid veridical memory traces such as in a word and 
picture paradigm DA should be able to increase her discrimination between studied 
and non-studied items and so increase both true and false recognition to a level 
comparable with the controls. This should be in contrast to patients with frontal lobe 
lesions, who were unable to use distinctive features to suppress false recognition in a 
picture paradigm (Budson et al., 2005).  However, it is unlikely that DA’s gist 
memory will be improved in the word and picture paradigm; Schacter et al. (1998) 
showed that even increasing study trials did not increase gist representation in 
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amnesia patients although it did aid the performance of non-amnesic Korsakoff 
patients. DA’s episodic memory should be aided by the additional binding of words 
and pictures. This should help her discriminate between the studied items and the 
non-studied items and so improve both corrected true recognition and corrected false 
recognition. 
For controls the added distinctive information of the pictures should help 
suppress false recognition and provide added veridical information, but unlike a 
picture-only paradigm the words will still offer enough gist traces, so there should 
still be some false recognition to the critical lures. Hence controls should also show 
increased discrimination and a slightly more conservative response bias in 
comparison to their performance in the word-only paradigm. What is important is 
that in the word and picture paradigm DA’s performance should be enhanced so that 
it is similar to controls. The controls will still produce some false recognition due to 
gist information from words, while DA will be able to use the distinct information of 
the pictures to aid her discrimination and improve true recognition. 
 
6.4.2 Participants 
Fifteen age-matched controls were recruited via the University of Edinburgh’s 
careers website. Participants were all dominant right-handed, native speakers of 
English. They were paid £5 for their participation. They were different controls from 
Experiment 7a and were aged between 18 and 40 years (M = 23.6). All were either 
undergraduates or graduates of the university.  
 
6.4.3 Method and Materials 
Twelve lists of 15 words and pictures were used. The lists of words are shown in 
English in Appendix C. And example of the stimuli can be seen in Figure 16.  
 
 
Figure 16: Example of the word and picture stimuli used in the experiment. 
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The pictures used were the English versions of the ones found in Experiments 3 and 
4 (see Chapter 4 and Appendix D). All Participants were told they were taking part in 
a memory experiment presented on a computer. Participants were instructed to study 
the picture groups in part one of the experiment. Each picture was presented centrally 
on a computer screen for a duration of 1 second. The 12 picture groups were 
presented randomly. In between each group participants carried out simple 
mathematical problems for 15 seconds, which acted as a distracter task. When all 12 
picture groups had been studied participants moved on to the recognition phase. 
They saw 24 studied pictures (top two items from each list), the 12 critical lures, and 
12 non-studied, unrelated pictures. Each picture was shown for a duration of 1 
second. They were instructed to respond ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ on the keyboard to indicate 
whether the picture they saw was in the original picture groups or not. The ‘d’ and 
‘k’ keys on the keyboard were used for the ‘Yes’ and No’ responses.  
 
6.4.4 Results 
The descriptive statistics for Experiment 7b are shown in Table 32. The raw data for 
al participants can be found in Appendix G. 
 
Table 32: Descriptive statistics for critical incorrect, studied correct, non-studied 
incorrect and corrected true (CTR) and false (CFR) discrimination and response bias. 
Words &  
Pictures  
 





(12 Items)       
 Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect CTR CFR b' 
DA 58.33 41.67 87.50 12.50 91.67 8.33 0.79 0.33 0.77 
Controls M% 68.40 31.60 82.52 17.48 95.00 5.00 0.78 0.27 0.67 
Controls SD 13.77 13.77 14.60 14.60 8.80 8.80 0.17 0.15 0.19 
n=15        Significance t = 0.06 0.39 0.51 
         p = 0.48 0.35 0.31 
            % Below 52.3 64.78 69.09 
 
As can be seen DA’s performance in the word and picture condition is very similar 
to that of controls. Her true and false recognition discrimination is much improved 
compared with the word only condition. The discrimination performance for controls 
is also improved compared with their performance in the word only condition (word 
only condition CTR = 0.55). Using Crawford and Garthwaite’s (2002) single-case 
study analysis we can see that DA performs well within the control range for 
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corrected true recognition (CTR % below = 52.3), corrected false recognition (CFR 
% below = 64.8) and response bias (b’ % below = 69.1). 
 
Signal Detection Analysis 
The results for signal detection analysis can be found in Table 33. 
 
Table 33: Signal detection analysis for words and picture condition. 
Words and Pictures Item-specific related Item-specific unrelated Gist-specific 
 A' b A' b A' b 
DA   0.83 0.47 0.94 -0.12 0.79 -0.8 
Controls M   0.82 0.31 0.94 -0.68 0.77 -1.5 
Controls SD   0.11 0.36 0.05 0.6 0.14 0.55 
n=15 Significance t = 0.09 0.43 0 0.9 0.138 1.23 
 p = 0.47 0.34 0.5 0.19 0.45 0.12 
  % Below 53.44 66.32 50.00 80.93 55.40 98.73 
 
In the word and picture condition DA’s signal detection is comparable to controls. 
Both DA and controls improve their discrimination, increasing veridical recognition 
and suppressing false recognition to the critical lures. In this instance DA also 
suppresses her false recognition to the non-studied items. Her signal detection for 
unrelated item-specific memory (correct studied items versus incorrect non-studied 
items) has increased from her performance in the word-only condition from 0.70 to 
0.94. DA’s signal detection for related item-specific memory (correct studied items 
versus incorrect critical lures) has also increased form 0.46 in the word-only 
condition to 0.83 in the word and picture condition. However, her gist specific 
memory (critical lures incorrect versus non-studied items incorrect) has not (word 
DRM A´ = 0.73; word and picture DRM A´ = 0.79). 
 
6.4.5 Discussion 
In a word and picture condition DA’s performance is comparable to controls both for 
corrected true and false recognition, and for the signal detection analysis. Koutstaal, 
Verfaellie and Schacter (2001) found in a categorized picture-only condition that 
amnesia patients produced less corrected false recognition compared with controls. 
Schacter et al. (2002) later concluded that the results from these experiments, 
“further confirm that amnesic patients show reduced false recognition under 
conditions where memory for gist, rather than source confusions regarding individual 
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items, is the primary determinant of illusory memory” as well as strengthening the 
claim that gist representation in normal individuals is one of the main drives of false 
recognition in the DRM paradigm (Schacter, et al., 2002, p. 122). However, they did 
not explore a word and picture condition. We have found in our experimental 
condition that the added information of both words and pictures provides DA with 
enough binding information to improve her true recognition and suppress her false 
recognition to the non-studied items.  
This is similar to our findings in Chapter Four for individuals with Autism. 
We found in that series of experiments that the controls increased false recognition in 
a word and picture condition, where previously they had been able to suppress false 
recognition in the picture only condition. Schacter’s argument is still valid since this 
suggests that for controls when placed in a word and picture condition the gist 
memory of the words overrides any advantage controls may have had from the 
distinct features of the pictures and so they produce false recognition to the critical 
lures. DA can now use the features of both word and picture and use this additional 
information to improve her gist representation that was not available to her in a 




6.5 Experiments 8 a, b & c: Famous Faces DRM Paradigm 
 
6.5.1 Introduction 
Face recognition is a specialized cognitive function utilizing different areas of the 
brain than those used for simple object recognition (for review see, Banich, 2004, 
Ch. 6, pp.203 – 212). Young, Hay and Ellis (1985) are among several researchers 
who have explored false facial recognition made by healthy individuals as a result of 
source monitoring errors. 
  These source-monitoring errors imply that episodic memory for facial 
recognition involves several degrees of overlapping information, a model not 
dissimilar to gist memory. This means that distinctive faces, such as famous people, 
are more easily recognized than typical faces since they do not have so many 
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overlapping features compared with more ‘typical’ faces (e.g. Light, Kayra-Stuart & 
Hollander, 1979; Bartlett, Hurry, & Thorley, 1984). However, as we age it would 
also seem that we misidentify faces more often. Bartlett, Strater and Fulton (1991) 
investigated older and younger adults’ face recognition skills and found that older 
adults made more recognition errors for faces than their younger counterparts. 
Furthermore, older adults were more likely to attribute ‘false fame’ to novel faces 
that were in fact not famous. Bartlett et al. (1991) concluded that as episodic memory 
decreases with age so older adults rely more on familiarity features than episodic 
memory when recognizing faces. This is similar to the over-reliance on gist memory 
by older adults in the DRM paradigm found by researchers such as Kensinger and 
Schacter (1999).  
Although there has been no research using the DRM paradigm and famous 
faces, Rapcsak et al. (1999) have examined false facial recognition in frontal lobe 
patients and medial temporal lobe (MTL) patients within a standard old/new 
recognition test. The tests varied by the number of faces participants had to 
remember: 32, 24, 16, and 8 faces. True and false recognition improved as the 
number of faces decreased across all subjects although frontal patients showed a 
higher rate of false recognition compared with either temporal patients or controls. 
Both MTL and frontal patients had lower discrimination rates than controls. Rapcsak 
et al. (1999) concluded that both MTL and frontal patients have poor item-specific 
memory for faces, which means they cannot assign distinct ‘memory nodes’ to the 
individual faces. What differentiated the two patient groups is that frontal patients 
had a far more liberal response bias. The researchers argued that the MTL patients 
could still maintain some monitoring and decision making functions not available to 
the frontal patients.  
In a second experiment using a DRM paradigm of faces Rapcsak and his 
colleagues found frontal patients produced high rates of true and false recognition 
compared with controls. In contrast the MTL patients had poor true recognition 
compared with controls, and although the MTL patients produced false recognition 
of the faces it was not as high as the frontal patients (although it was higher than 
controls). Rapcsak et al. (1999) argued that the MTL patients were having difficulty 
not only with their gist memory but also with general encoding and categorization 
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about what the study items had in common. The frontal lobe patients still have this 
gist-based memory to access, so their false recognition is down to the failure of 
strategic memory retrieval. The frontal lobe patients’ pattern of increased false 
recognition is very similar to that seen in ageing populations where false recognition 
responses are due to feelings of false familiarity (Bartlett et al., 1984). 
With these findings in mind we can develop a research question investigating 
DA’s false recognition to famous faces in a DRM paradigm. We suggest that 
although she will be able to gist within the categories of famous faces she will not 
form enough gist representation to separate the categories from each other, so will 
again demonstrate false recognition of both critical lures and non-studied items. 
 
6.5.2 Experiment 8a: DA and Controls and Famous Faces (Sports’ 
Personality Condition) 
This paradigm uses famous faces categorized according to occupation (actor, singer 
etc.), nationality (UK or US) and sex. In this experiment we used British sporting 
personalities as the non-studied items. 
  
6.5.3 Participants 
Fifteen controls were recruited via the University of Edinburgh’s careers website. 
Participants were all dominant right-handed, native speakers of English. They were 
paid £5 for their participation. They were different participants to Experiments 7a 
and b. Participants were aged between 21 and 39 years (M = 27). 
 
6.5.4 Method and Materials 
Photographs of famous people were collected via the internet and then reduced to 
black and white copy and matched for size using Adobe© Photoshop© CS3. We used 
head and shoulder pictures. There were two categories of occupation: singers and 
actors. These were then subdivided according to nationality (UK or US) and sex 
resulting in eight categories: UK female singer, US female singer, UK male singer, 
US male singer, UK actress, US actress, UK male actor, US actor. To create the 
stimuli for the experiment a pilot study was run asking age-matched individuals to 
name their top ten famous people for each category, including sports personalities. 
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From this the names were rated with the highest frequency name appearing in 
position number one. This subsequently became the critical lure. The resulting list of 
names and recall items can be found in Appendix F. Once we had selected the list we 
piloted the pictures of the faces for familiarity with controls. An example of the 
stimuli used can be seen in Figure 17. 
All Participants were told they were taking part in a memory experiment 
presented on a computer. Participants were instructed to study the picture groups in 
part one of the experiment. Each picture was presented centrally on a computer 
screen for a duration of 1 second. The 8 picture groups were presented randomly. In 
between each group participants carried out simple mathematical problems for 15 
seconds, which acted as a distracter task. When all 8 picture groups had been studied 
participants moved on to the recognition phase. They saw 16 studied pictures (top 
two items from each list), the 8 critical lures, and 8 non-studied, unrelated pictures. 
Each picture was shown for a duration of 1 second. They were instructed to respond 
‘Yes’ or ‘No’ on the keyboard to indicate whether the picture they saw was in the 
original picture groups or not. The ‘d’ and ‘k’ keys on the keyboard were used for 
the ‘Yes’ and No’ responses.  
 
 











The descriptive statistics for Experiment 8a are shown in Table 34. The raw data for 
all participants can be found in Appendix G. 
 
Table 34: Probabilities for critical, studied and non-studied items and the corrected 
true (CTR) and false (CFR) discrimination rates and response bias b' 
Faces 
(Sports) 





(8 Items)    
 Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect CTR CFR b' 
DA 12.50 87.50 62.50 37.50 50.00 50.00 0.13 0.38 0.63 
Controls M% 84.78 15.22 86.01 13.99 90.13 9.87 0.76 0.05 0.12 
Controls SD 16.35 16.35 11.72 11.72 12.14 12.14 0.10 0.21 0.69 
n=15        Significance t = -6.15 1.50 0.72 
         p = <0.01 0.08 0.24 
            % Below 0.00 92.19 75.70 
 
DA’s corrected true recognition (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) was significantly lower 
than that of controls, p < 0.01. Her corrected false recognition just misses 
significance. DA appeared to have a more liberal response bias than controls (a 
greater tendency to respond ‘Yes’ in the recognition phase) although this was not 
significant.   
 
6.5.6 Discussion 
In this paradigm DA produced far more false recognition to both critical lures and 
non-studied items than controls. However, it became clear that DA had problems 
with familiarity regarding the use of sports personalities as the non-studied items, 
which may have affected the response bias. To make sure her responses were not just 
a result of failure to know the people she was seeing we asked her to rate her 
familiarity with the pictures used. DA was confident of the critical items; and could 
name many and identify their occupations. However, when it came to the sports 
personalities she could not name them or identify their occupations, frequently 
stating they were singers or television presenters. To identify whether she was at 
least recognizing them as famous faces we used a simple recognition paradigm in 
which DA was shown individual sports personalities and the critical lures alongside 
two other non-famous faces that were matched as closely as possible to the famous 
person, see Figure 18. 
 130 
 
Figure 18: Example of the stimuli used in the familiarity rating experiment. 
 
For each selection DA was asked to point out the famous person (these were 
presented randomly either in position 1, 2 or 3) and to rate her familiarity on a scale 
of 1 to 5 with 5 being very familiar and 1 being unfamiliar. We also asked her if she 
could tell us anything about the person she had selected. In all cases DA was 
extremely good at identifying the famous face from the selection, what became 
apparent, however, was her familiarity with the sports personalities was poor. Where 
as she could identify, for example, Sean Connery and say he was an actor and that 
she was very familiar with his face, she could select Tim Henman but could not say 
where she knew him from and hence had poor familiarity ratings for him. DA’s 
familiarity ratings alongside her actual recognition scores in the DRM for the critical 







Table 35: Results from the familiarity experiment. DA responded on a scale of 1 to 5, 
with 1 being unfamiliar and 5 being familiar. 









famous person in 
familiarity 
experiment 
Familiarity Name? Occupation? 
Elvis Presley No Yes Yes 5 Correct Correct 
Tom Cruise No Yes Yes 5 Correct Correct 
Jennifer Aniston No Yes Yes 5 Correct Correct 
Charlotte Church No No Yes 5 Correct Correct 
Barbara Streisand No Yes Yes 5 Correct Correct 
Sean Connery No Yes Yes 5 Correct Correct 
Robbie Williams No Yes Yes 5 Correct Correct 
Kate Winslet No Yes Yes 3 No No 
  
Incorrect = 
0.875  Total =  38   
Non-Studied 
Pictures 
       
Jane Torville No Yes Yes 3 No Incorrect 
Tim Henman No No Yes 4 No No 
Kelly Holmes No No Yes 3 No No 
Seb Coe No No Yes 2 No Incorrect 
Steve Redgrave No Yes No 3 No No 
David Beckham No Yes Yes 4 Correct Correct 
Jonathon Edwards No No Yes 2 No Incorrect 
Denise Lewis No Yes No 1 No Incorrect 
  
Incorrect = 
0.5  Total = 22   
 
DA was unfamiliar with the sports personalities so her discrimination responses may 
be affected by false responses to the sports personalities based on poor familiarity. 
Because of this uncertainty as to whether DA’s responses were a result of poor 
discrimination due to unfamiliarity we decided to run the experiment again, this time 
using non-studied items that we knew DA would be very familiar with, in this case 
day-time television presenters. 
 
 
6.5.7 Experiment 8b: DA and Controls and Famous Faces (Day-time TV 
Personality Condition) 
Day-time TV personalities were selected in the same way we accumulated the 
stimuli for Experiment 8a, DA was also asked what sort of programs she enjoyed 






Fifteen controls were recruited via the University of Edinburgh’s careers website. 
They were aged between 23 and 38 years (M = 27.89) Participants were all dominant 
right-handed, native speakers of English. They were paid £5 for their participation 
and had not taken part in any of the previous experiments. They were either 
graduates or post-graduates at the University.  
 
6.5.9 Method and Materials 
The stimuli were identical to Experiment 8a but we switched over the critical lures 
for the current number one position studied item. So for example, Tom Cruise now 
became a studied item and Tom Hanks became the critical lure. We used television 
personalities to replace the sports personalities and an example of the pictures can be 
seen in Figure 19 (the names are listed in Appendix F). 
 
 
Figure 19: Example of the TV personality pictures. 
 
The experiment methodology and design was identical to that described in 








The descriptive statistics for Experiment 8b are shown in Table 36. The raw results 
for all participants can be found in Appendix G. 
 
Table 36: Descriptive statistics for critical incorrect, studied correct and non-studied 







Non-studied Pictures  
(8 Items)    
Faces (TV) Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect CTR CFR b' 
DA 75.00 25.00 62.50 37.50 100 0 0.625 0.25 0.4 
Controls M% 87.45 12.52 89.98 10.01 94.93 5.02 0.85 0.08 0.19 
Controls SD 14.13 14.13 8.09 8.09 7.86 7.86 0.11 0.11 0.65 
n=15        Significance t = -1.98 1.50 0.31 
         p = <0.05 0.08 0.38 
            % Below 3.38 92.16 62.05 
 
DA’s discrimination of the non-studied lures is improved in comparison to 
Experiment 7a and she correctly rejects all the non-studied faces. However, her 
corrected true recognition is significantly lower than controls, p < 0.05 (Snodgrass & 
Corwin, 1988). DA’s discrimination for corrected false recognition just misses 
significance, p = 0.08. DA’s responses for the critical lures are very different from 
Experiment 8a (Experiment 7a critical lure incorrect = 0.875), presumably due to the 
change in critical lure for the second most common person for each group. 
 
Signal Detection Analysis 
The results for the signal detection analysis can be seen in Table 37. 
 
Table 37: Signal detection analysis for DA and controls in the DRM TV faces 
paradigm. Significant results are in BOLD. 
    Item-Specific Related Item-Specific Unrelated Gist-Specific   
Faces (TV)   A' b A' b A' b 
DA   0.78 -0.18 0.91 -1.39 0.81 -1.88 
Controls M   0.94 -0.15 0.96 -0.42 0.60 -2.13 
Controls SD   0.05 0.54 0.03 0.58 0.17 0.95 
n=15 Significance t = -3.09 -0.05 -1.61 -1.62 1.20 0.26 
 p = <0.05 0.48 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.40 






From the signal detection analysis we can see DA has difficulties with her 
discrimination of studied items and critical lures (item-specific related). This is 
significantly different from controls, p < 0.05, suggesting that she cannot distinguish 
between studied faces and critical lures as well as controls and produces more false 
recognition to famous faces.  
  
6.5.11 Discussion 
The results for Experiment 8b indicate a trend for DA to produce more false 
recognition to the critical lure famous faces in comparison with controls. We can be 
more certain in arguing this is the case than in Experiment 8a since DA is familiar 
with the non-studied lures in this paradigm. For the TV famous faces DA produced 
an overall familiarity rating of 45 (compared with only 22 for the sports 
personalities). In addition she could name seven of the eight presenters (the 
exception was David Dickinson) but she correctly identified the type of programme 
each was associated with. It would seem that DA can form gist between the 
categories but is unable to use gist within the categories to suppress false recognition, 
which would explain the significant differences for her corrected true recognition 
and item-specific related signal detection in comparison with controls. 
 DA’s item-specific unrelated signal detection (that is studied items versus 
non-studied items) is only at 6% and her corrected true recognition remained 
relatively worse than controls indicating poor episodic memory.  
 In Experiment 7b we saw how adding words and pictures gave DA enough 
information to bring her performance to a similar level to that of controls. Can we do 










6.5.12 Experiment 8c: DA and Controls and Famous Faces and Names 
(Day-time TV Personalities) 
If we can aid DA’s episodic memory in a similar manner to Experiment 7b then 
adding the personality names to their pictures should give DA added information to 
suppress her false recognition to the critical lures.  
 
6.5.13 Participants 
Fifteen controls were recruited via the University of Edinburgh’s careers website. 
They were aged between 25 and 43 (M = 32.2). Participants were all dominant right-
handed, native speakers of English and had not taken part in any of the previous 
experiments. They were all University graduates. They were paid £5 for their 
participation. There was a period of approximately twelve months between 
Experiment 8b and 8c. 
 
6.5.14 Method and Materials 
The stimuli and design were identical to those used in Experiment 8b but each 
picture was accompanied by the name of the famous person printed clearly 




The descriptive statistics for Experiment 8c are shown in Table 38. The raw results 
for all participants can be found in Appendix G. 
 
Table 38: Descriptive statistics for critical incorrect, studied correct and non-studied 
incorrect and corrected true (CTR) and false (CFR) discrimination and bias response 
b'. 
Faces  





Non-studied Pictures  
(8 Items)    
 Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect CTR CFR b' 
DA 50.00 50.00 93.75 6.25 62.50 37.50 0.56 0.13 0.22 
Controls M% 85.84 14.21 87.54 12.52 95.41 4.61 0.82 0.06 0.11 
Controls SD 10.39 10.41 11.07 11.09 5.91 6.05 0.11 0.09 0.15 
n=15        Significance t = -5.25 0.70 0.71 
         p = <0.01 0.25 0.24 
            % Below 0.01 75.2 75.5 
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DA’s corrected true recognition is significantly lower than controls, p < 0.01 
(Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002). DA’s false recognition for the critical lures 
increases from Experiment 7b but she also increases her false recognition to the non-
studied items in comparison with the controls (DA = 0.375, Controls = 0.04). 
 
Signal Detection Analysis 
The results for the signal detection analysis can be seen in Table 39. 
 
Table 39: Signal detection analyses for DA and controls, significant results are shown 
in BOLD. 
    
Item-Specific 
Related Item-Specific Unrelated Gist-Specific   
Faces (TV &WORDS) A' b A' b A' b 
DA   0.84 0.77 0.88 0.61 0.61 0.86 
Controls M n = 15   0.92 0.14 0.96 -0.37 0.57 0.17 
Controls SD   0.07 0.36 0.04 0.70 0.19 0.79 
 Significance t = -1.08 1.69 -1.94 1.36 0.20 2.46 
 p = 0.14 0.06 <0.05 0.10 0.42 <0.05 
  % Below 14.36 94.38 3.66 90.16 57.93 98.63 
 
From the signal detection analysis we can see DA still has difficulties with her 
discrimination of studied items and non-studied items (item-specific unrelated). This 
is significantly different from controls, p < 0.05 and was apparent in her lower 
corrected true recognition (see above).  
 
6.5.16 Discussion 
In the famous faces and names condition DA is unable to use the added information 
to increase her item specific memory and suppress her false recognition. If anything, 
the addition of the names seems to have increased her false recognition of not only 
the critical items but also the non-studied items producing a pattern of response close 
to chance and not dissimilar to what we found in Experiment 8a.  
 
6.6 General Discussion 
Table 40 shows the descriptive statistics for all five experiments and Table 41 the 





Table 40: Overview of the descriptive statistics for Experiments 7a &b, 8a, b, and c. 
  
Critical Lure 




(12 Items)       
  Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect    
Words (7a)         CTR CFR b' 
DA 33.33 66.67 62.50 37.50 66.67 33.33 0.25 0.29 0.71 
Controls 
M% 34.44 65.60 67.74 32.22 87.47 12.53 0.55 0.53 0.63 
Controls SD 14.73 14.73 12.90 12.90 13.05 13.05 0.19 0.21 0.23 
n=15       
Significance t 
= -1.53 -1.11 0.34 
        p = 0.07 0.14 0.37 
            % Below 7.43 14.36 62.94 
Words & Pictures (7b)        CTR CFR b' 
DA 58.33 41.67 87.50 12.50 91.67 8.33 0.79 0.33 0.77 
Controls M% 68.40 31.60 82.52 17.48 95.00 5.00 0.78 0.27 0.67 
Controls SD 13.77 13.77 14.60 14.60 8.80 8.80 0.17 0.15 0.19 
n=15       
Significance t 
= 0.06 0.39 0.51 
        p = 0.48 0.35 0.31 
            % Below 52.3 64.78 69.09 
Faces: Sports (8a)       CTR CFR b' 
DA 12.50 87.50 62.50 37.50 50.00 50.00 0.125 0.375 0.63 
Controls M% 84.78 15.22 86.01 13.99 90.13 9.87 0.76 0.05 0.12 
Controls SD 16.35 16.35 11.72 11.72 12.14 12.14 0.1 0.21 0.69 
n=15       
Significance t 
= -6.15 1.50 0.72 
        p = <0.001 0.08 0.24 
            % Below 0.00 92.19 75.70 
Faces: TV (8b)        CTR CFR b' 
DA 75.00 25.00 62.50 37.50 100 0 0.625 0.25 0.4 
Controls M% 87.45 12.52 89.98 10.01 94.93 5.02 0.85 0.08 0.19 
Controls SD 14.13 14.13 8.09 8.09 7.86 7.86 0.11 0.11 0.65 
n=15       
Significance t 
= -1.98 1.50 0.31 
        p = <0.05 0.08 0.38 
            % Below 3.38 92.16 62.05 
Faces: TV & Names 
(8c)        CTR CFR b' 
DA 50.00 50.00 93.75 6.25 62.50 37.50 0.56 0.125 0.22 
Controls M% 85.84 14.21 87.54 12.52 95.41 4.61 0.82 0.06 0.11 
Controls SD 10.39 10.41 11.07 11.09 5.91 6.05 0.11 0.09 0.15 
n=15       
Significance t 
= -2.24 0.70 0.71 
        p = <0.01 0.26 0.24 
            % Below 0.01 75.2 75.5 
 
Across stimuli we have seen that a patient with dense anterograde amnesia can have 
her performance manipulated to match those of controls only in the word and picture 
condition. Table 41 shows the combined results for signal detection analysis using 
A’Prime. This also includes signal detection analysis for Experiment 8a which 
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although not reported in our results above is included here simply for comparative 
purposes only. 
How can we explain DA’s results in a satisfactory way to understand why her 
performance only improved in the words and picture condition and not in the words 
and famous faces condition? 
Reder et al. (2006) may suggest an answer to this. They tested subjects for 
recognition memory of three different types of stimuli: words, photographs and 
abstract pictures. The subjects were divided into two groups: controls, and those who 
had been injected with the drug Midazolam, which produces temporary anterograde 
amnesia. Reder et al. (2006) found that memory was poorer in the Midazolam 
condition for words compared with controls, but this was smaller in the photographic 
stimuli and almost absent in the abstract condition. They argue that stimuli with 
which the amnesia subjects have a greater pre-experimental familiarity (such as 
words and photographs) are more vulnerable to ‘old’ judgments because it is easier 
to bind the stimuli to an episodic ‘node’. In contrast, abstract pictures are not subject 
to this familiarity bias and so cannot provide episodic binding.  
 We can apply this argument to DA’s case and say that for a DRM paradigm 
using words her poor gist memory makes her more vulnerable to false recognition of 
the non-studied items based on having prior knowledge of the word stimuli. What 
she cannot use is any item-specific information to suppress her ‘old’ judgments of 
non-studied words as, according to Reder et al.’s argument, DA will have strong 
episodic binding to these words from previous experience. What DA does not have is 












Table 41: Overall of the signal detection analysis for Experiments 7a & b, 8a, b & c. 
Signal Detection A'Prime Item-Specific Related Item-Specific Unrelated Gist-Specific   
Words Exp. 
7a   A' b A' b A' b 
DA   0.46 0.37 0.7 0 0.73 0.06 
Controls M   0.51 0.47 0.86 -0.59 0.91 -0.62 
Controls SD   0.11 0.35 0.08 0.53 0.09 0.55 
n=15 Significance t = -0.44 -0.28 -1.94 1.08 -1.94 1.2 
  p = 0.33 0.39 <0.05 0.15 <0.05 0.13 
  % Below 33.33 39.30 3.66 85.03 3.66 87.44 
    Item-Specific Related Item-Specific Unrelated Gist-Specific   
Words & Pictures Exp. 7b A' b A' b A' b 
DA   0.83 0.47 0.94 -0.12 0.79 -0.8 
Controls M   0.82 0.31 0.94 -0.68 0.77 -1.5 
Controls SD   0.11 0.36 0.05 0.6 0.14 0.55 
n=15 Significance t = 0.09 0.43 0 0.9 0.138 1.23 
  p = 0.47 0.34 0.5 0.19 0.45 0.12 
  % Below 53.44 66.32 50.00 80.93 55.40 98.73 
    Item-Specific Related Item-Specific Unrelated Gist-Specific   
Faces (sports) Exp. 8a A' b A' b A' b 
DA   0.26 0.73 0.61 0.16 0.79 0.58 
Controls M   0.9 -0.09 0.93 -0.16 0.57 -1.85 
Controls SD   0.1 0.58 0.07 0.55 0.18 1.07 
n=15 Significance t = -6.2 1.37 -4.43 0.563 1.183 -2.19 
  p = <0.01 0.096 <0.01 0.291 0.13 <0.05 
  % Below 0 90.37 0.03 70.89 87.18 97.74 
    Item-Specific Related Item-Specific Unrelated Gist-Specific   
Faces (TV) Exp. 8b A' b A' b A' b 
DA   0.78 -0.18 0.91 -1.39 0.81 -1.88 
Controls M   0.94 -0.15 0.96 -0.42 0.6 -2.13 
Controls SD   0.05 0.54 0.03 0.58 0.17 0.95 
n=15 Significance t = -3.09 -0.05 -1.61 -1.62 1.2 0.26 
  p = <0.05 0.48 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.4 
  % Below 0.39 47.89 6.44 6.38 87.42 59.87 
    Item-Specific Related Item-Specific Unrelated Gist-Specific   
Faces (TV &WORDS) Exp. 8c A' b A' b A' b 
DA   0.84 0.77 0.88 0.61 0.61 -0.16 
Controls M   0.92 0.14 0.96 -0.37 0.65 -1.93 
Controls SD   0.07 0.36 0.04 0.7 0.15 0.79 
n=15 Significance t = -1.084 1.66 -1.897 1.328 -0.253 2.126 
  p = 0.14 0.06 <0.05 0.1 0.42 <0.05 
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In contrast, for the words and picture condition, controls can use the distinct 
features to suppress false recognition, but false recognition still remains in this 
condition because of the gist information provided by the words due to episodic 
binding. DA is provided with enough distinctive information from the pictures to 
suppress her familiarity judgements as a result of episodic binding, especially for the 
non-studied words. In this condition DA’s performance is comparable to the 
controls.  
 Reder et al.’s (2006) argument may also help us with the case of the famous 
faces. Again, DA is likely to be more vulnerable to false recognition in this condition 
due to her pre-experimental familiarity with the stimuli. Her gist memory is not 
strong enough to allow the differentiation within the groups leaving her vulnerable to 
false recognition of the critical lures and non-studied items due to the familiar nature 
of the stimuli. Poor episodic memory also causes her problems with the studied items 
resulting in persistent differences in corrected true recognition in comparison with 
the control groups across all three conditions using famous faces.  
Adding the names of the famous faces does not help DA in Experiment 8c. 
Names of people are irrevocably bound to the faces and so only add to the episodic 
binding described by Reder et al (2006). Perhaps if we had used the occupations of 
the individuals instead of names we may have provided enough of a novel condition 
that DA could have used this to suppress her false recognition of the critical and non-
studied items. 
  This may explain the findings of Schacter, Verfaellie, Anes and Racine, 
(1998). If we recall from Chapter Two this study examined whether it was possible 
to manipulate levels of false recognition in patients with Korsakoff’s and non-
Korsakoff’s amnesia. This was done by increasing the number of study phases of the 
word lists and then the number of subsequent trials. With each increase in study 
phase Korsakoff patients increased false recognition whereas controls decreased their 
false recognition. In contrast the non-Korsakoff amnesia patients remained relatively 
static in their false recognition performance, which suggests there is no change in 
their gist memory. Once damaged, it seems this cognitive facility remains impaired. 
 There are plenty of criticisms against the use of case studies. The first is that 
the results cannot be used to provide any generality of findings. Comparing DA’s 
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performance against that of Schacter et al.’s (1998) patients is tenuous, as they have 
known pathologies and the experiment paradigms are quite different. The best we 
can offer is the emergence of a pattern of behaviour that seems replicable across a 
number of trials, specifically DA’s poor gist memory performance. This suggests 
that in anterograde amnesia not only is episodic memory damaged but so too is gist 
memory and this cannot be aided by the use of additional distinct information.  
There is also the argument that case studies can result in a bias due to the in-
depth nature of the research. However, in this instance we could argue that it is the 
very in-depth nature that has allowed us to explore so many different paradigms with 
one patient and discover that for DA we can manipulate her performance by using 
words and pictures to bind properties together. Furthermore, we have found that DA 
produces false recognition to famous faces and this offers a future opportunity to 
explore this phenomenon among other anterograde amnesia patients to see if this 
pattern can be replicated. It may be that DA also has a form of prosopagnosia and 
this could also be explored in future work. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
DA’s performance could only be improved to match controls in a word and picture 
condition. In the word-only DRM paradigm DA’s performance, although not 
significant, was in the direction predicted, tending towards reduced corrected true 
and corrected false recognition. This is consistent with the work of previous research 
on amnesia patients such as Schacter, Verfaellie, & Koutstaal, 2002. 
 However, DA did not improve her performance in the famous faces and 
names condition. She persisted in producing false recognition to the critical lures 
suggesting she may have specific problems related to facial recognition.  
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Chapter Seven: GC – A case study investigating the use of the DRM 
paradigm as a test for Memory Malingering 
 
7.1 Introduction 
GC is a 43-year-old man who first presented amongst the functional memory 
weakness patients. There had been some concern that he was exaggerating his 
memory difficulties and he performed poorly on the Tombuagh Test of Memory 
Malingering (Tombaugh, 1996). For this reason his data were excluded from the 
patient set presented in Chapter Five and examined separately. For this reason it 
raised the question, how does someone who is malingering perform on the DRM 
word paradigm? 
Over the course of this thesis we have argued that the DRM paradigm is 
driven by gist memory resulting in participants producing high levels of false 
recognition to the critical lures in comparison with the non-studied words. If it is 
driven by gist memory then this suggests we are looking at an implicit cognitive 
behaviour that is difficult for participants to overtly control. That is false recognition 
of the critical lures is difficult to suppress. Furthermore, it should be hard for controls 
to mimic the behaviour of amnesia patients since this would require memorizing 
large quantities of data (for example, 12 word lists each consisting of 15 words) in 
order to replicate the pattern of reduced true and false recognition seen in amnesia 
patients (e.g. Schacter, Verfaellie & Pradere, 1996). 
 Current tests of memory malingering rely on the premise that a malingerer 
will produce a negative response bias to a memory test; that is, they will assume that 
to produce the same results as an individual with genuine memory problems that the 
favoured response will be to answer ‘no’, i.e. ‘No, I have not seen this before’, or 
‘No, I do not remember this’. Determining whether an individual is wilfully 
malingering is a sensitive issue as some may be suffering from conversion disorders, 
others may not be motivated to concentrate, and others may have genuine memory 
problems but may be exaggerating these in order to receive help (Hom & Denney, 
2002). Furthermore, a number of forensic tests are capable of determining the 
difference between malingerers and participants with no neurological impairment, 
but are insensitive to genuine memory impairment (e.g. Tombaugh Test of Memory 
Malingering, 1996). Other clinicians may rely on a range of established memory tests 
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such as the Wechsler Memory Scale (Wechsler, 1987), in order to determine if a 
patient’s performance is a valid indication of their actually ability (for review see 
Mittenberg et al. in Hom & Denney, 2002). 
 However, one concern with the majority of the available forensic tests for 
malingering is they rely on the malingerer producing a negative response bias and 
work from the assumption that the participant is always trying their hardest during 
testing, since the majority focus on forced-choice recognition (i.e. determining 
whether an item, be it a word or picture for example, was present in the study phase). 
Unfortunately this opens these tests up to the possibility that the results can be faked. 
For example, if you know that to pass the Tombaugh Test of Memory Malingering 
requires adopting a normal response strategy then it becomes impossible to 
differentiate the malingerer from the normal subject.  
The current method of establishing whether a test can be used for identifying 
malingerers is to ask normal participants to take the test pretending they have a brain 
injury that affects their memory. Unsurprisingly the participants often adopt a 
negative response bias. However, a question arises from this methodology: if the 
participant knew the outcome of a real patient’s performance on the test that had 
genuine memory problems, would they be able to mimic the performance? This is 
important because despite best intentions someone who is wilfully malingering can 
(albeit with some cost) obtain copies of the current range of neuropsychology tests 
and so replicate the desired result. This is increasingly becoming an issue in 
countries where litigation and ‘no win, no fee’ injury cases are common.  
Clinicians and neuropsychologists are increasingly being called as expert 
witnesses to testify in courts in cases where malingering is suspected. A test of 
memory malingering should be able to differentiate between a malingerer, a normal 
subject and one with neurological impairment. However, we would add to this that a 
test of memory malingering should also be extremely difficult if not impossible to 
replicate the actual performance of a memory patient. That is, even if the malingerer 
were aware of the test methodology and outcome they would still not be able to 
replicate the performance of a memory-impaired individual. 
The DRM paradigm provides us with three hypotheses for testing memory 
malingering: 
 144 
1) Performance on the DRM will be different between a malingerer, a genuine 
memory patient and controls, since someone ‘faking’ a memory problem will adopt a 
negative response bias whereas amnesia patients tend towards a positive response 
bias in the DRM paradigm (e.g. Schacter, Verfaellie & Koutstaal, 2002). 
2) An informed participant will not be able to replicate the performance of an 
amnesia patient in the DRM paradigm since it would require learning not only the 
word lists but also the pattern of response seen in amnesia patients. 
3) Participants who are malingering will have longer response latencies: given that 
they have to memorize the word lists and then replicate the performance of an 
amnesia patient, having to actively ‘think’ about their responses in the DRM 
paradigm’s test phase will significantly increase response latencies. 
 The three experiments reported below will therefore examine a malingerer’s 
performance on the DRM in comparison with controls and our amnesia patient’s 
data, DA from Chapter Six. We will also examine whether by asking a participant 
group to perform on the DRM paradigm as they think an amnesia patient might 
perform they can replicate the pattern of response typically seen in amnesia patients. 
Finally, using participants who are aware of the DRM word lists and the 
methodology, and who are aware of the performance of a true amnesia patient, we 
will ask participants to perform like an amnesia patient in the DRM paradigm. 
  
7.2 GC: A Case Study 
GC is a 43-year-old man who is retired on incapacity benefit having suffered with a 
long history of depression. At the time of testing he was separated from his wife and 
living with his cousin and did very little during the day except walking his dog. GC 
first came to hospital in 2001 after having a brief period when he could not recall his 
children’s names. He then went blank for an hour but was back to normal upon 
arriving at hospital.  GC was told he had had a ministroke but his MRI scan was 
normal. He suffered no physical weakness at the time. GC was sent to the Western 
General Hospital in Edinburgh to meet consultants at the Memory Clinic. Initially he 
was placed in the functional memory disorder group but there were early concerns he 
was exaggerating his memory difficulties. There were no issues of compensation 
other than his disability living allowance. His cousin attended the appointment with 
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him at the Western General and gave a clear history of GC’s memory problems. 
These centred around paying her for household items that she buys on his behalf, 
forgetting what his intentions are and irritability. She stated that the difficulties GC 
experienced with his memory seemed to be getting progressively worse over the last 
4-5 years. She noted that GC was going out less and less although he was doing 
some unpaid work for friends who run a garage but his memory difficulties were 
making that difficult. GC said he had no problems driving but sometimes has 
difficulty finding the car after he has parked it. He watches television but often has to 
ask his cousin what the programme is about. He has left the cooker on and forgotten 
how to work the computer and he spends too much time sleeping. 
Since depression was suspected GC was prescribed Venlafaxine and he was 
referred for a neurospychology assessment that took place in August 2008. (Please 
note this assessment occurred after GC took part in this experiment which occurred 
in January 2008). To rule out any other causes GC had a full blood count, routine 
biochemistry, dementia antibody test, syphilis serology, folate and B12 test and C-
reactive protein test. All the results were normal. The notes from the 
neuropsychology assessment state that his cognitive screening was 64/100 and his 
Mini-Mental State Examination results were 20/30. His premorbid level was in the 
average range. However, his performance on tests of episodic memory was 
disproportionately poor. Some of the scores for GC were available in his notes: 
 
Information processing speed/working memory 
Digit Span Age Scaled Score  7 




Rey Figure Copy 32 raw (average for age) 
Rey Figure Immediate Recall 10.5 raw (below 10th percentile) 





Boston Naming Test 46/60 
Category Fluency 12 (below 10th percentile) 
Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test  Total 13, Delay 0, RI 7, DI 2 
COWAT p = 10 
Stroop Raw Score 80, Pr value 0.04 (20 – 24th percentile) 
 
Beck’s Depression Inventory = 31 
 
His neurospychology assessment at the time of testing can be seen in Table 42. 
 
Table 42: GC’s Neuropsychology Results. 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. 
Vocabulary score:            37 
Matrix Reasoning score:  52 
2-subtest IQ:                       89 
NART Predicted Full Scale:    92.5 
 
Verbal Fluency Average: 4.67  
(F= 5, A= 4, S=5: 1 minute each) 
 
Beck’s Depression Inventory:       26 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory:         57 
Wechsler Logical Memory 
Part I  
1st Recall Total Score = 4 
Recall Total Score  = 7 
Thematic Total Score = 4 
Learning Slope Range = 2 
Part II 
Recall Total Score = 2 
Thematic Total Score = 1 
Percent Retention = 
33.33% 











Trail Making Part A:    76.3 secs 
Trail Making Part B:  210.0 secs 
Tombaugh Test of Memory Malingering 
Trial 1: 18 
Trial 2: 31 
Retention: 32 
 
GC’s Beck’s Depression Inventory was 26 placing him in the moderate range for 
depression. His STAIT scores were within the normal range. His performance on the 
Wechsler Logical Memory Parts I & II was abnormal and he was unable to recall 
many details even after prompting. In Part II he could recall nothing from the second 
story. This was congruent with the subsequent assessment in August 2008 that noted 
his episodic memory performance was disproportionate. His performance on Trail 
Making Part B is not disproportionate to Trail Making A although it is low (0 to 10th 
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percentile). However, this could be a result of his depression as there can be a 
relationship between depression and impairment in executive functions (for review 
see Fossati et al, 2002).  
 However, his performance on The Tombaugh Test of Memory Malingering 
(1996) was below the normal range. A score of 35 or below on Trial 1 suggests a 
patient is exaggerating their memory symptoms. If the patient subsequently scores 
below 35 on Trial 2 they then carry out the retention part of the test. A score of 
below 35 suggests that the patient is probably malingering. 
 
 
7.3 Experiment 9a: Performance of patient GC on the DRM paradigm in 
comparison with controls and amnesia patient DA. 
 
7.3.1 Participants 
Fifteen controls were recruited via the University of Edinburgh’s careers website. 
Participants were all dominant right-handed, native speakers of English. They were 
paid £5 for their participation. GC was also reimbursed for his time and travel costs 
across all the experiments. 
 
7.3.2 Method and Materials 
12 lists of 15 words were used (shown in bold in Appendix A) from the original 24-
list paradigm used in Chapter Three. These word lists were identical to the ones used 
for DA. All the participants were told they were taking part in an experiment to 
investigate memory. Instructions for the experiment appeared on the computer 
screen. Participants were told to study the word lists in part one of the experiment, 
and answer the maths questions in between each list that acted as a distracter task. 
The maths questions lasted for 15 seconds. The word lists were presented randomly 
as were the words in each list.  Participants saw the words at a rate of 1s per word. 
After all 12 lists had been studied participants moved directly on to the recognition 
phase of the experiment and were instructed to press ‘YES’ on the keyboard if they 
thought the word was in the original study phase, and ‘NO’ if it was not.  The ‘d’ and 
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‘k’ keys on the keyboard were labeled and used as the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ response keys. 
Words were presented at a rate of 0.5s per word.  
 
7.3.3 Results 
As in Chapter Three, using Snodgrass and Corwin’s (1988) recommendations 
regarding signal-detection theory in memory recognition we used the two-high-
threshold theory to examine corrected true and false recognition rates and bias (b’) 
for controls, DA and GC. These can be seen in Figure 20. 
 
 
Figure 20: Corrected true (CTR) and corrected false (CFR) recognition rates and 
response Bias b’. 
 
GC’s corrected true and false recognition rates just missed significance (See Table 
43), however, it can be seen from his responses to critical lures incorrect and studied 
words correct that his responses were significantly different from the Control group, 
which is in contrast to our amnesia patient DA whose results were comparable with 
Controls. In addition his response bias was negative (b’ = 0.36) in comparison with 
the positive response bias of both Controls (b’ = 0.66) and DA (b’ = 0.64). Using 
Crawford and Garthwaite’s (2002) program for statistical analysis of single case 
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studies we found GC’s response bias was significantly different from Controls, p 
<0.05, in contrast to DA (see Table 43). 
 







Incorrect (12 Items) 
Controls n = 15  % 63.89 (SD = 15.00) 67.50 (SD = 12.42) 13.89 (SD = 12.37) 
DA % 66.67 62.50 33.33 
DA probability in t = 0.19, p = 0.42  t  = -0.48, p = 0.32 t = 1.94, p <0.05 
comparison with controls       
GC % 33.33 41.67 16.67 
GC probability in t = -2.00, p < 0.05 t =-2.10, p <0.05 t = 0.42, p = 0.40 





Recognition Bias - b' 
Controls n = 15 0.54 (SD = 0.17) 0.50 (SD = 0.20) 0.66 (SD = 0.12) 
DA 0.25 0.29 0.64 
DA probability in t = -1.65, p = 0.06 t = -1.02, p = n.s t = -0.161, p = n.s 
comparison with controls       
GC 0.25 0.17 0.36 
GC probability in t = -1.65, p = 0.06 t = -1.60, p = 0.07 t = -2.42, p <0.05 
comparison with controls       
 
7.3.4 Discussion 
In this initial experiment we found that GC’s performance on the DRM paradigm is 
significantly different to that of Controls in terms of corrected true recognition, false 
recognition and response bias. Moreover, unlike DA GC produces a negative 
response bias; that is he has a bias to responding ‘no’ to the words during the 
recognition phase of the DRM. In contrast, DA has a positive response bias meaning 
she is more likely to respond ‘yes’ during the recognition phase so the non-studied 
words incorrect are significantly higher than controls, p <0.05. The next step was to 
examine whether Malingering participants can replicate the performance of an 













Fifteen controls were recruited via the University of Edinburgh’s career’s website. 
Participants were all dominant right-handed, native speakers of English. They were 
paid £5 for their participation.  
 
7.4.2 Method and Materials 
The methods and materials were identical to Experiment 9a except in this instance 
prior to beginning the experiment participants were asked to imagine they had been 
involved in an accident that had left them with a head injury and were now suffering 
from amnesia. They were asked to perform the DRM paradigm as if they had 
memory problems. This is accordance with the current published methodology for 
examining current tests of memory malingering (see Hom & Denney, 2002). 
 
7.4.3 Results 
Using Snodgrass and Corwin’s (1988) recommendations regarding signal-detection 
theory in memory recognition we used the two-high-threshold theory to examine 
corrected true and false recognition rates and bias response. These can be seen in 
Figure 21 in comparison with the results for Experiment 9a for Controls, 




Figure 21: Corrected true and false recognition and response bias for Malingerers, 
Controls, DA and GC. 
 
At first glance it would appear as though the Malingering group can produce a 
similar pattern of performance as our amnesia patient, DA. However, the response 
bias for the Malingering group was negative (b’ = 0.44) in comparison with DA who 
produces a positive response bias (b’ = 0.64), that is DA is more likely to respond 
‘yes’ whereas the Malingering group were more likely to respond ‘no’ in the test 
phase.  This difference in response bias between Malingerers versus DA was 
significant using Crawford and Garthwaite’s (2002) statistical program for case 
studies, p <0.05 (see Table 44). 
An independent sample t-test was run to compare Malingerers with Controls 
for Corrected True Recognition, Corrected False Recognition and Bias. As can be 
seen from Table 44 the results were significant (p < 0.05) as the Malingerers adopted 
















Incorrect (12 Items) 
Malingering n = 15 52.74 (SD = 18.23) 45.90 (SD = 13.54) 25.52 (SD = 22.18) 
DA % 66.67 62.50 33.33 
DA probability in t = 0.75, p = n.s t = 1.11, p = n.s t = 0.53, p = n.s 
comparison with 
malingerers       
GC % 33.33 41.67 16.67 
GC probability in t = -1.07, p = n.s t = -0.28, p = n.s t = -0.40, p = n.s 
comparison with 





Recognition Bias - b' 
Malingering n = 15 0.11 (SD = 0.19) 0.21 (SD = 0.18) 0.44 (SD = 0.10) 
DA 0.25 0.29 0.64 
DA probability in t = 0.71, p = n.s t = 0.43, p = n.s t = 1.94, p <0.05 
comparison with 
malingerers       
GC 0.25 0.17 0.36 
GC probability in t = 0.71, p = n.s t = -0.21, p = n.s t = -0.78, p = n.s 
comparison with 





Recognition Bias - b' 
Malingering 0.11 (SD = 0.19) 0.21 (SD = 0.18) 0.44 (SD = 0.10) 
Controls 0.54 (SD = 0.17) 0.50 (SD = 0.20) 0.66 (SD = 0.12) 
Malingering v 




Although Malingerers were able to produce the same pattern of reduced corrected 
true and false recognition as our amnesia patient it is not due to the same response 
bias, and this finding was significant. Furthermore, when questioned about the tactics 
they used to mimic the performance of an amnesia patient the Malingerers argued 
that an amnesia patient was unlikely to remember the studied words so they favoured 
a negative response in the test phase. This produced significant differences when the 
Malingerers’ results were also compared with the Controls. As we have seen, DA 
produced a positive response bias. A negative response bias on the part of the 
Malingerers means the non-studied words are correctly rejected. This is not the case 
with the amnesia patients who produced false recognition to the non-studied words 
due to a positive response bias (e.g. Schacter et al., 2000). GC’s pattern of response 
is not significantly different to those of the Malingerers’, which suggest he is 
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malingering in order to replicate an amnesia patient. However, one final question 
remains: if the malingerer knows the pattern of response for an amnesia patient will 
they then be able to replicate those results more closely in the DRM paradigm? 
 
 
7.5 Experiment 9c: Performance of Informed-malingering participants 
on the DRM paradigm. 
 
7.5.1 Participants 
Fifteen controls were recruited for this experiment. All were students of the 
Psychology Department at the University of Edinburgh who had some previous 
knowledge of the DRM paradigm. All were paid £5 for their participation. 
 
7.5.2 Method and Materials 
The methods materials were identical to Experiment 9a. Participants were all given 
one week to study and memorise the word lists. They were also familiarised with 
Schacter’s research on false recognition for amnesia patients. Before undertaking the 
DRM paradigm they were told to replicate the pattern of response seen in amnesia 
patients undertaking the DRM paradigm. To help them each had a graph (see Figure 
22) depicting the pattern of responses typically seen in the DRM paradigm with 
amnesia patients (that is the reduced false recognition of critical lures and high false 




Figure 22: Sample graph given to the Informed Malingering group. 
 
7.5.3 Results 
Again we used Snodgrass and Corwin’s (1988) recommendations regarding signal-
detection theory in memory recognition with the two-high-threshold theory to 
examine corrected true and false recognition rates and bias response. The Informed 
Malingering results can be seen in Figure 23 in comparison with the results for 
Experiment 9a for Controls, Experiment 9b for Malingerers, and DA and GC. 
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Figure 23: Corrected true (CTR) and corrected false (CFR) recognition rates and 
response bias b’ for Informed malingerers, Malingerers, Controls, GC and DA. 
 
As in Experiment 9b it appears at first glance as though the Informed Malingering 
group can perform like our amnesia patient DA. There were no significant difference 
for either true or false recognition (see Table 45), moreover the Informed group also 
produced the positive response bias seen in amnesia patients (e.g. Schacter et al., 
2002).  
 







Incorrect (12 Items) 
Informed Malingering n 
= 15 (Inform Maling) % 60.31 (SD = 20.30) 68.41 (SD = 13.74) 38.80 (SD = 22.82) 
DA % 66.67 62.50 33.33 
DA v Inform Maling t = 0.34, p = n.s t = -0.41, p = n.s t = -0.04, p = n.s 
GC % 33.33 41.67 16.67 





Recognition Bias - b' 
Informed Malingering n 
= 15  0.30 (SD = 0.30) 0.22 (SD = 0.34) 0.65 (SD = 0.15) 
DA 0.25 0.29 0.64 
DA v Inform Maling t = -0.16, p = n.s t = 0.20, p = n.s t = -0.06, p = n.s 
GC 0.25 0.17 0.36 
GC v Inform Maling t = -0.16, p = n.s t = -0.14, p = n.s t = -1.87, p <0.05 
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However, the hypothesis stated that attempting to replicate the performance of an 
amnesia patient in the DRM paradigm would increase the time participants needed to 
‘think’ about their responses in the recognition phase. The response latencies for the 
Informed Malingering group are shown in comparison with the results for 
Experiment 9a, 9b and DA and GC in Figure 24. We have also included here the 
response latencies for the Functional Memory Disorder patients discussed in Chapter 




Figure 24: Response Latencies for participants in Experiment 9a, b and c. 
 
Using Crawford and Garthwaite’s (2002) case study statistical program we compared 
the Informed Malingering group’s response latencies to that of Controls, DA and GC 


















Controls v Malingerers t = -3.68, p < 0.01 t = -2.87, p < 0.01 t = -3.64, p < 0.01 
Controls v Maling Inform t = -8.84, p < 0.01 t = -9.16, p < 0.01 t = -7.31, p < 0.01 








DA v Controls t = -0.29, p n.s t = -1.39, p n.s t = -0.74, p n.s 
DA v Malingerers t = -1.53, p n.s t = -1.64, p n.s t = -2.01, p < 0.05 








GC v Controls t = 4.55, p < 0.01 t = 4.08, p < 0.01 t = 3.05, p < 0.01 
GC v Malingerers t = 2.50, p < 0.05 t = 1.67, p = 0.06 t = 1.79, p < 0.05 
GC v Maling Inform t = 0.06, p n.s t = -0.13, p n.s t = -0.24, p n.s 
 
Independent samples t-tests were carried out to compare the response latencies for 
Controls, Malingerers and Informed Malingerers. There were significant differences 
across all three groups for all three stimuli (Critical, Studied and Non-studied) with 
both Malingerers and Informed Malingerers producing slower response latencies 
than Controls. Furthermore, the Informed Malingerers also performed significantly 
more slowly than the Malingerers.  
The Informed Malingerers had significantly slower response latencies 
compared with DA across all three word types in the recognition phase, p <0.01. 
However, DA’s response latencies were not significantly different from the original 
Control group in Experiment 9a (see Table 46). We also compared GC’s 
performance with the original Control group participants’ response latencies. As can 
be seen from Table 45 his response latencies were significantly slower than the 
Control group, p <0.01 for all three stimuli. However, there was no significant 
difference between GC’s response latencies and those of the Informed Malingerers. 
  We have included the Functional Memory Patients here because one of the 
arguments that can be used is that these patients are malingering. We have also 
compared their response latencies to the controls in Experiment 9a, GC, DA, 
Malingeres and Informed Malingeres. Their results can be found in Table 47, with 
the significant results shown in bold.  
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Table 47: Comparison of the Functional Memory Disorder patients response latencies 








Functional (n=9) v Controls (n=15) t = 0.98, p n.s t = 0.67, p n.s t = 0.78, p n.s 
Functional (n=9) v Malingerers (n=15) t = 4.51, p < 0.01 t = 2.64, p < 0.01 t = 4.12, p < 0.01 
Functional (n=9) v Maling Inform (n=15) t = 8.31, p < 0.01 t = 8.05, p < 0.01 t = 8.41, p < 0.01 
Functional v DA t = -1.06, p n.s t = -0.22, p n.s t = - 0.23, p n.s 
Functional v GC t = 3.24, p < 0.01 t = 4.08, p < 0.01 t = 4.57, p < 0.01 
 
Independent samples t-tests were carried out to compare the response latencies of the 
Functional Patients with Controls, Malingerers and Informed Malingerers. There 
were no significant differences in response latencies between the controls and 
Functional patients.  There were significant differences in response latencies between 
the Functional patients versus Malingerers and Informed Malingerers with the 
Functional patients having faster response latencies across all three word types. 
Crawford and Garthwaite’s (2002) statistical program for case studies was used to 
compare the Functional patients with DA and GC. As can be seen from Table 47 the 
response latencies for the Functional patients did not differ significantly from DA. 
However, there were significant differences between GC and the Functional patients 
with GC performing slower across all three words types. 
 
7.5.4 Discussion 
The Informed Malingering group could produce the pattern of reduced true and false 
recognition seen in our amnesia patient, DA. However, the cost of this additional 
effort during the recognition phase was significantly slower response times in 
comparison to both DA ( p < 0.01) and Controls (p < 0.01). GC also had significantly 
slower response latencies than the Control group, in contrast to DA who produced 
comparable response latencies to Controls. 
 A common observation from all of the participants who acted as Informed 
Malingerers was that it was extremely difficult to suppress false recognition to the 
critical lures and also to force a ‘no’ response to the studied words. This observation 
is reflected in the high response latencies for the Informed Malingerers. GC’s 
performance was, therefore, like an Informed Malingerer, possibly because he 
 159 
believed the task required thought to decide which words to reject and which to 
accept. 
 We included the response latencies from the Functional Memory Disorder 
patients from Chapter 5 since a common assumption is that they may be malingering. 
Their response latencies were comparable with both controls and patient DA 
suggesting they were not malingering. 
 
7.6 General Discussion and Conclusion 
Only the Informed Malingerers could produce a pattern of response similar to the 
trends found by Daniel Schacter and his colleagues for patients with amnesia. 
However, since this pattern of response required consideration of the answers during 
the recognition phase of the DRM paradigm the result was significantly increased 
response latencies, a pattern that was not found with our amnesia patient DA whose 
performance was comparable to Controls. The results are summarized in Table 48. 
 
Table 48: Summary of findings for Experiments 9a, b and c. 
DA Reduced corrected true and false recognition compared with 
Controls, coupled with a significantly positive response bias. 
DA’s response latencies = Controls. 
GC Reduced corrected true and false recognition compared with 
Controls coupled with a significantly more negative response 
bias. Response latencies significantly slower than both Controls 
and DA. 
Malingering Similar to GC with a negative response bias. Slower response 
latencies in comparison with Controls. 
Informed Malingering Performed like DA but produced significantly slower response 
latencies. 
 
The underlying theory that the Deese, Roediger and McDermott paradigm is driven 
by gist memory has presented us with an unusual platform for these experiments, that 
is, to test for memory malingering. Current tests rely on the assumption that someone 
attempting to mimic memory problems will produce a negative response bias. 
Furthermore, a large proportion of the current malingering tests rely on recognition 
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memory for visual stimuli in relation to which participants can, to some extent, 
overtly monitor their responses (Dom & Henney, 2002). 
 However, gist memory responding in is implicit making it difficult to 
suppress false recognition to critical lures in the DRM paradigm whilst at the same 
time remembering to reject some of the studied words. As we have seen our amnesia 
patient, DA, produced a positive response bias. Because of this DA produced high 
rates of ‘Yes’ responses to the non-studied words as she is unable to exclude them in 
the recognition phase. Although GC and the Malingering group could perform in a 
similar pattern to amnesia patients they relied on negative response biases, which is 
in direct contrast to DA. The Informed Malingering group could perform like DA 
and produce the positive response bias but there was a cost in deciding what words to 
reject and accept resulting in significantly slower response latencies. 
 Sadly, tests for memory malingering are often used improperly for financial 
gain as they are easy to feign if the participant knows the outcome of the test. For 
example, The Tombaugh Test for Memory Malingering (1996) relies on the fact that 
it looks like a difficult test to complete requiring participants to ‘memorise’ fifty 
pictures. Because it is, in reality, a test of visual recognition, amnesia patients 
perform well, usually scoring above 45 out of 50. However, to ‘mimic’ the 
performance of an amnesia patient all an informed participant would have to know is 
that amnesia patients perform like controls. However, the same does not seem to be 
true for the DRM paradigm as a test for memory malingering. Even our Informed 
Malingerers could not perform like DA because the recognition required thought in 
order to mimic the pattern of corrected true and false recognition and this resulted in 
significantly slower response latencies. Furthermore, by including the response 
latency data for the Functional Memory Disorder patients in Chapter 5 we have 
shown that these patients, given their performance on the DRM paradigm, are very 
unlikely to be malingering since their results were comparable to controls and DA. 
 Another advantage of the DRM paradigm is that the stimuli are easy to 
produce in any language and circumstance and hence multiple parallel versions can 
be produced for repeated assessment. It is impossible for most people to memorise 
all the known word association lists of a given language. 
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 Previously, in Chapter Six we argued that the use of case studies is always 
contentious particularly when dealing with cognitive behaviours where all you have 
is one individual compared with a small group of normal controls. However, 
sometimes case studies can themselves open up opportunities for further research. 
GC’s performance on the DRM was unusual enough to prompt this researcher to 
explore why his pattern of responses was different, not only to Controls but also to 
DA, and subsequently only comparable with someone pretending to have amnesia. 
However, people who are malingering memory symptoms are quite rare and often do 
not want to come forward for tests. The value of the DRM paradigm can only be 
explored by testing further case studies of those suspected of malingering in order to 
find out if these results can be replicated.
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Chapter Eight: Final Discussion 
 
Memory is a crazy woman that hoards colored rags and 
throws away food.  
 ~ Austin O'Malley 
 
 
The author Austin O’Malley’s quote rather succinctly describes the hazards of 
human memory. This thesis began with an excerpt from Ann Packer’s Clausen’s 
Pier in which a young woman tries to recall the details of her absent father. She 
recalls telling her mother about events she can remember from her past involving her 
father but, to her dismay, her mother discounts these events and says she is mistaken, 
since her father had already left them by then. The young woman remembers the 
pain she felt in learning her recollections are not true, since it feels like she is losing 
her father again. She also relates the frustration she feels that she only has three 
episodes in her life when she can recall her father, and all three are tied to negative 
emotions. Yet as O’Malley states what our memory chooses to keep and throw away 
is not always convenient to our individual desires. 
This poses a problem, particularly in the legal sphere, since questioning 
witnesses in a court of law relies on the premise that human memory is somehow 
infallible and can play back the necessary events with great detail, as and when 
needed. But the issue of the reliability of human memory is more complicated: as we 
found in Chapter Three, even within normal populations there is a wide disparity in 
the extent to which individuals can be affected by false recognition and therefore, 
presumably, false memory. For some time researchers have tried to find reliable 
measures of individual susceptibility to false recognition but they have, to some 
extent, involved clinical population groups. Clancy et al. (2002) looked at people 
who thought they had been abducted by aliens and also at women who had reported 
sexually abuse in childhood (Clancy et al., 2000). Bremner et al. (2000) examined 
women with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and Moritz et al. (2005) 
investigated people with depression. The general findings were that all these groups 
had an increased susceptibility to false recognition. The problem with this 
generalization is that it gives the impression that false recognition is somehow 
‘abnormal’ since the findings were amongst ‘abnormal’ populations. However, the 
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huge interest in the Deese (1959), Roediger and McDermott (1995) paradigm (DRM) 
came about in part because it was ‘normal’ individuals who were exhibiting false 
recognition and memory. This suggests that false recognition is a perfectly normal 
phenomenon of human memory not isolated to clinical populations. 
It seemed important, therefore, to find a way of measuring normal false 
recognition within a general population. The choice of using the Autism Spectrum 
Quotient (AQ) (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and the Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
(Parker et al, 2003) was driven by the fact both tests were designed to examine traits 
in normal populations, although the TAS-20 can be used as a diagnostic tool for 
Alexithymia. Both were designed along the premise that certain human behaviours 
and patterns of thought fall along a normal continuum. For example, at one end of 
the Autism Spectrum Quotient are people with more ‘male-brained’ traits such as 
Asperger’s and Autism, at the other end individuals who express more ‘female-
brained’ traits. We subsequently found that those individuals who expressed more 
Alexithymic traits had higher scores on the Autism Spectrum Quotient suggesting 
they were expressing more ‘male-brained’ attributes. Furthermore, they were less 
susceptible to false recognition in the DRM paradigm. However, there was a cost to 
this reduction in false recognition in that they also produced less veridical 
recognition to the studied words. Conversely, those individuals who had lower TAS-
20 and AQ scores produced more veridical recognition to the studied items, their cost 
being higher false recognition to the critical lures. What is important is that all the 
subjects exhibited true and false recognition along a continuum. At one end of the 
continuum we have individuals with more ‘male-brain’ traits (that is high AQ and 
Tas-20 scores) who produce less false recognition but also less veridical recognition, 
and conversely at the other end of the continuum more ‘female-brained’ individuals 
who produce more false recognition but also more veridical recognition. 
This led us to ask what happens to false recognition within a population that 
expresses the upper end of these ‘male-brained’ traits; so we turned our attention to 
individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder in Chapter Four. We found that within 
this population individuals expressed both reduced corrected true and false 
recognition in comparison with controls. Furthermore, there was the suggestion that 
gist memory in the Autism group would also be subject to developmental changes 
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with the ASD adults in Madrid being unable to use the additional associative 
information provided by the words and picture condition to improve their gist 
memory, something that the adolescent to young adult group in Columbia could do. 
We also found a difference between the control groups in Columbia and Madrid. The 
adults in Madrid were not as good at suppressing false recognition in the picture-only 
condition as their younger counterparts in Columbia. This was not surprising given 
past research has also shown differences in false recognition as a result of age 
development (see Chapter Two). 
However, what was surprising was that there should be this change in 
performance for Autistic individuals, which we found in our subsequent correlations 
for age and responses in the word DRM paradigm. There were significant positive 
correlations for critical incorrect, studied correct, non-studied incorrect and response 
bias. For ASD individuals this indicated that as they age they rely more on a positive 
response bias. This could be argued to be similar to controls who also showed an 
increase in response bias, which Kensinger and Schacter (1999) argued is an 
increasing reliance on gist memory as people age. However, as normal adults age 
although there is an increase in false recognition to the critical lures, they still have 
the ability to filter out the non-studied words by using gist memory. In contrast, the 
ASD individuals increased response bias did not seem to be driven by gist memory 
since they have high rates of false recognition to the non-studied words in 
comparison with controls suggesting they do not have the gist memory to filter out 
the unrelated items. 
Beversdorf et al. (2000) suggested that ASD individuals’ lack of false 
recognition was due to a lack of gist memory. But if this were true then we would not 
have found the differences between the two ASD groups in Chapter Four. This leads 
to the suggestion that not only does the level of gist memory fall along a continuum 
but may also have a developmental property, even within individuals with Autism. In 
turn, this opens up the possibility that the development of gist memory in ASD 
individuals might be improved if intervention is given at an early age. Furthermore, 
the reason that the results of Beversdorf et al. (2000) and Bowler et al. (2000) 
contradicted one another could be that the one major diagnostic difference between 
adult individuals with Asperger’s Syndrome and adult Autism Spectrum Disorder, is 
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that the Asperger’s adults still have intact gist memory due to better linguistic 
development.  
Eysenck (1986) in his A Handbook of Cognitive Psychology also suggests 
that memory falls along a continuum. He noted that the traditional distinction of 
memory into episodic and semantic memory is somewhat controversial since both 
are so interdependent. He illustrates his point with the following anecdote: 
 
I know that two inverted V’s on the front of a car indicate that the 
car is a Citroën, and this information forms part of my semantic 
memory. However, my daughter Fleur only discovered this 
fascinating and useful piece of information when I told her about it 
recently, and it is presumably stored in her episodic memory. In 
ways that remain unclear, repeated exposure to certain kinds of 
information seems to produce a shift from episodic to semantic 
memory.  
Eysenck, p.306, 1986. 
 
A suggestion could be that it is gist memory that plays this crucial role of forming 
the continuum between episodic and semantic memory and that is why we find such 
wide diversity among normal population groups and between age groups. According 
to Brainerd et al. (2002) gist memory is the trace of the meaning present in the 
memory event, and this itself can fall along a continuum of precision according to 
the context. In this case they use the example of buying a Guiness beer: on one level 
the individual may only maintain a general gist of the event in terms of ‘beers’ but on 
another level they retain the gist of the even in terms of ‘stout beers’. We could, 
therefore, retain just easily the gist of episodic events (i.e. maintaining the gist of all 
the book purchases I made for this thesis) and the gist of the semantic events (i.e. all 
the meaning of the knowledge I read in those books). So gist memory does not exist 
independently of episodic and semantic memory but may play a fundamental role in 
holding those events together. So when someone asks me what my favourite book on 
memory is I might rely initially on gist to scan the surface of the episodic and 
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semantic events in order to make my decision based either on the contents or on the 
events leading to the purchase of the book. 
 This brings us full circle back to the work of Bartlett (1932) and his theory of 
memory schemata. Bartlett did not see memory divided into separate commodities 
but rather as bundles of information loosely connected that were reconstructed in a 
variety of ways according to the trigger of the situation. Specifically, when 
discussing his work on story recall such as the War of the Ghosts he comments that 
“So long as the details which can be built up around it are such that they would give 
it a ‘reasonable’ setting, most of us are fairly content, and are apt to think that what 
we built we have literally retained” (1932, p.176) regardless of the fact this 
reconstructed memory may no longer be true to the original event. Bartlett himself, 
when constructing his theory on remembering, discusses the idea of memory traces, 
or groups of traces bound by schemata (Ibid., p.197). In this theory we can perhaps 
see the first germination of the concept of gist memory because Bartlett disliked the 
term ‘schema’ saying “It is at once too definite and too sketchy” when trying to 
describe a function that is occurring all the time (Ibid., P.201). Perhaps he too would 
have preferred the term ‘gist memory. Since the memory process is, in Bartlett’s 
theory, continuous there is no mention of concepts such as semantic and episodic 
memory but rather a perpetual renegotiation of memory schema. Any new 
information must “become not merely a cue setting up a series of reactions all carried 
out in a fixed temporal order, but a stimulus which enables us to go direct to that 
portion of the organised setting of past responses which is most relevant to the needs 
of the moment” (Ibid., p.206). Bartlett’s theory can be linked to gist memory in that a 
cue may inadvertently weight the recall towards the wrong schema. For example, 
when seeing the critical lures in the recall phase of the DRM paradigm the weight of 
the schemata (gist) draws normal individuals to incorrectly respond ‘yes’ because it 
fits the current need of the situation resulting in false recall. Although Bartlett never 
refers to semantic and episodic memory, nor did he use the term ‘gist’, his theory 
could be likened to a weaving with episodic and semantic memory (or Bartlett’s 
schemata) forming the weft and the warp with gist acting as the shuttle continually 
threading its way between the two. 
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Typically, when a patient presents with memory problems, clinicians describe 
the impairments in terms of episodic and semantic memory deficits. But this raises a 
key concern: some patients may fall through the cracks of current clinical memory 
diagnoses because their impairment lies with gist memory which could have subtle 
repercussions for both episodic memory and semantic memory that are not apparent 
in current clinical tests. This could be true of Functional Memory Disorder patients 
in Chapter Five, who showed a significant difference in their true recognition to the 
studied items in comparison with controls in the DRM paradigm. As we saw in 
Chapter Three individual differences indicate that gist memory is implicated in both 
true and false recognition and early impairment of gist memory could well display 
itself as a deterioration in true recognition of the studied items, false recognition of 
the critical lures or the non-studied items. 
 However, including false memory recognition in a clinical diagnosis of 
memory impairment may seem counterintuitive to those with no previous awareness 
of false memory research. False recognition may imply ‘lying’ and as such 
‘abnormal’ behaviour, yet research has shown false memories are just as prevalent as 
true ones and there is a growing awareness that this is part of the normal memory 
make-up.  
Functional Memory patients have usually been labelled as suffering from 
depressive disorders. Metternich et al. (2009) suggest that it is depression that is 
causing the memory impairments: as the depression increases so too do the 
impairments, forming a self-perpetuating circle of symptoms. The association 
between memory problems and depression is not a new one, (for example, 
Antikainen et al., 2001) but poses a problem for our patients in Chapter Five since 
their depression scores in the Becks’ Depressive Inventory were only mild as were 
their scores for the State-Trait Anxiety Scale and none were diagnosed with clinical 
depression. Furthermore, in research investigating the relationship between false 
recognition and depression it was found that patient groups produced more false 
recognition (e.g. Clancy et al., 2002; Zoellner et al., 2000). This was not true of our 
Functional patients who produced less veridical recognition not only in the DRM, 
but also in the confabulation experiment after a week’s delay. 
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The Functional Memory group, it would seem, produce a distinct pattern of 
impairment that is difficult to detect using current clinical measures. It could 
reasonably be argued that their results on the DRM paradigm and the Wechsler 
Logical Memory were due to malingering but as we saw in Chapter Seven the pattern 
of a malingerer on the DRM is itself quite distinctive, the key being the delayed 
response latencies in the recognition phase and the adoption of a negative response 
bias. In fact it was the significant difference in response latencies, coupled with a 
poor performance on the Tombaugh Test of Memory Malingering that raised the 
suspicion GC was exaggerating his memory problems. No such pattern was found in 
the Functional Memory patients who had no differences in their response latencies or 
bias compared with the control group. It is more likely to be that their gist memory is 
showing early stages of some form of damage or impairment. However, encouraging 
clinicians to explore false recognition as a matter of routine may be some way off. 
Perhaps a better direction is to show how false recognition can give us an 
insight into gist memory in specific populations and take the stance of examining 
how we can improve its development. Chapter Four introduced our Autism groups 
and argued that underdeveloped gist memory resulted in reduced true and false 
recognition. However, we also demonstrated that by providing additional 
information on items in the form of the words and pictures condition we could aid 
the gist representation in the younger Autism group in Columbia. Future studies 
could examine whether our Functional Patients could be aided by using the words 
and picture condition, but the initial aim of that work was primarily to investigate 
how their memory performance was impaired given the lack of research in that field.  
In Chapter Six we introduced our amnesia patient, DA, who suffers from 
anterograde amnesia. With her help we were able to explore a wide range of stimuli 
in the DRM paradigm, including famous faces. We found that DA’s performance on 
the word-DRM paradigm followed the trend of previous research on amnesia 
patients (e.g. Schacter et al., 19996) in that she tended towards reduced true and false 
recognition suggesting impaired gist memory. With this in mind we decided to see if 
the words and picture condition could aid her memory performance in the same way 
as our Autism patients. In this condition DA’s performance matched that of controls. 
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Her improvements were due to utilising the distinct features of the pictures and 
hence we saw an improvement in her item-specific discrimination.  
In the famous faces condition we could not match DA’s performance to 
controls, even when using the names and faces of the famous people.  The work of 
Reder et al. (2006) suggested that our methodology did not provide sufficiently 
distinctive and unique stimuli to aid DA’s suppression of false recognition. However, 
we also suggested that DA might suffer from a mild form of prosopagnosia and that 
this condition itself may be an example of the failure to form correct gist 
representation of faces. The addition of their names does not provide a significantly 
unique cue for her to then filter out the non-studied pictures. 
Finally, the possibility of the Deese, Roediger and McDermott paradigm 
being used a clinical tool was no better highlighted than by the discovery that it 
could possibly be used to detect memory malingering. This helps support a 
supposition that false recognition is part of normal behaviour since GC’s 
performance was significantly different to both controls and our amnesia patient, 
DA. 
In the light of this thesis there are several areas where work could be 
extended. Primarily it would be important to see if the malingering work can be 
extended, specifically using it to explore other suspected cases of memory 
malingering. It would also be interesting to see if a unique famous faces condition 
(perhaps using occupations rather than names) could provide distinctive enough 
features for amnesia patients to suppress false recognition. This could also be 
extended to explore why as people age they increase false recognition to faces and as 
Bartlett, Strater and Fulton (1991) discovered, even attribute ‘false fame’ to 
photographs of people who are not famous. This could be another avenue for 
exploring gist memory since we saw that while DA could still maintain some form of 
gist representation within categories of personalities she was not able to discriminate 
between the categories. It could be that as we age we are also susceptible to this 
degeneration of gist memory for faces and this may also be of use in dementia 
research. For example, do patients with Alzheimer’s disease improve their gist 
representation if given the occupations or the names of famous faces?  
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The work on Autism patients is also a good area for further research 
opportunities because it may be a way of improving the underdevelopment of gist 
memory by increasing the use of educational tools using both words and pictures.  
 
Perhaps a better name for this thesis might have been: Who needs True Memory 
anyway? Greater recognition needs to be given to the role of false recognition and an 
acceptance that this is, frustratingly, a normal paradox of human recollection. This is 
important not only from the legal perspective, but also in understanding that what 
may go wrong with memory may not always be obvious to current clinical testing 
since, like the legal domain, it relies on the assumption that it is true recollection that 
is important. Yet false memories are just as important to an individual as the true 
ones since neither can be distinguished from the other. False recollections are a 
product of efficient memory systems allowing us to interpret and perceive our world.  
 
When asked why I became so interested in false memory research I often cite an 
event that I remember with absolutely certainty: One summer’s day I returned home 
from school to sit and watch the 25th lunch of the space shuttle, the 10th for the 
orbiter Challenger. I sat in the warm sunshine of my parents’ living room, switched 
on the television and like millions around the world watched in horror as the shuttle 
then exploded seconds after launch. 
Yet this memory is not true. The Challenger disaster occurred on 28th January 
1986 and so it could not have been a warm summer’s day. Furthermore, by January 
1986 my parents had divorced and my mother and I had moved out of the marital 
home. I only discovered this fact a few years ago and perversely felt robbed of a 
memory that had been so important to me. It made me question the reliability of so-
called flash-bulb memories since a great deal of research suggested that these were 
somehow inviolate (Brown & Kulick, 1977). Yet as Talarico and Rubin (2003) 
discovered such memories were just as subject to false intrusions as everyday 
memories it is just that individuals feel more confident about these recollections. Yet 
with this knowledge in hand I still cannot recall the shuttle disaster in any other way 
than at my parents’ home. At one time I may have wrestled with this issue: Was the 
event so shocking that all I could do was recall it in the atmosphere of the security of 
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my parents’ house? Was the divorce itself a trigger for this false memory? Whatever 
the cause the memory remains as unchanged as ever and so has become part of the 
autobiographical details of my life, but what it did help me realise is that memory is 
fragile and subject to error.  
 
There is a clip of Professor Elizabeth Loftus1 on the networking site YouTube. Her 
following words seem a fit conclusion for this work: 
 
1“If there were three words that I would come up with to describe what memory is, I 
would say memory is suggestive, it’s subjective, it’s malleable.” 
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Appendix A: Word Lists for the DRM Paradigm used in Chapter 3, 5, 
6 & 7. (Lists in bold are the abbreviated word lists used for patient 
studies, Chapter 5, 6 & 7). 
 
Studied Phase (Critical Lures at the top are not part of the study phase) 
Anger Black Bread Chair Cold Doctor Foot Fruit 
rage white butter table hot nurse shoe apple 
fear dark jam legs ice hospital ball basket 
hate cat board stool winter ill mouth tree 
fury blue sandwich seat wet injection toe juice 
red funeral flour back freeze health ankle pear 
temper colour milk desk snow stethoscope sock ripe 
violence grief yeast wood frozen patient sole salad 
wrath green dough sofa chilly prescription walk banana 
fight death crust cushion heat pills smell strawberry 
chaos ink roll sitting weather treatment boot orange 
hatred bottom slice swivel fridge office run dessert 
mean coal wine furniture air medical sore vegetables 
emotion brown loaf arm shiver surgeon step bowl 
shouting raven toast rocking Arctic clinic odour cocktail 
enrage grey bap bench frost cure hand berry 
        
Galaxy High King Man Mountain Music Needle River 
stars low queen woman hill note thread water 
universe sky royal boy steep sound pin stream 
planet tall ruler uncle climb pop eye lake 
bar tower prince person summit score sewing wide 
space airplane crown wife top sheet sharp boat 
cosmos altitude England male molehill stave point tide 
infinite flying palace father peak song prick swim 
Milky-Way kite throne strong plain book thimble flow 
black hole rise chess friend glacier stereo haystack runs 
nebula far sovereign beard goat singing thorn barge 
constellation vertigo subjects being bike guitar hurt creek 
satellite hopes monarch handsome climber record sting brook 
moon giant castle muscle range piano stitch fish 
sun lofty leader suit valley tune cloth bridge 















Studied Phase continued. 
Rough Sleep Slow Soft Spider Sweet Thief Window 
smooth dreams fast hard web sour steal pane 
ready bed down warm insect sugar robber glass 
ground night quick comfort fly tooth crook ledge 
tough pillow snail feathers arachnid chocolate burglar sill 
sandpaper awake stop cosy crawl good money curtain 
stubble peace coach cuddly tarantula taste police frame 
surface rest delay gentle poison sticky bad house 
coarse slumber traffic touch bite nice law open 
uneven doze tortoise fluffy creepy honey jail broken 
justice tired hesitant furry animal syrup criminal closed 
rugged snore speed downy ugly toffee villain view 
cut nap bus kitten feelers heart crime breeze 
bark nightmares sluggish skin small cake bank sash 
rocky yawn wait tender nasty wrapper dishonest soul 
gravel drowsy idle snug eerie pie pillage shutter 
 
Recall Phase       
Studied Words       
 rage white butter table hot nurse shoe apple 
 fear dark jam legs ice hospital ball basket 
 stars low queen woman hill note thread water 
 universe sky royal boy steep sound pin stream 
 smooth dreams fast hard web sour steal pane 
 ready bed down warm insect sugar robber glass 
         
Critical Lures       
 anger black bread chair cold doctor foot fruit 
 galaxy high king man mountain music needle river 
 rough sleep slow soft spider sweet thief window 
         
Non-Studied Words       
 cathedral truth enzyme boomerang station exile walrus judge 
 skeleton Orient clown saucepan helicopter diamond computer gift 





Appendix B: Questionnaires used In Chapter 3. 
 
PARTICIPANT NO:……………………….. 
TO BE COMPLETED BY PARTICIPANT 
ALL INFORMATION REMAINS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 
 
Name:...........................................     Sex:........................................... 
 
Age:...................................               Today’s Date................................. 
 
The next few pages are a series of questionnaires. Please read the instructions for each one 
carefully. 
The AQ  
How to fill out the questionnaire 
Below is a list of statements. Please read each statement very carefully and rate how 
strongly you agree or disagree with it by circling your answer. 
 DO NOT MISS ANY STATEMENT OUT. 






















3. If I try to imagine something, I find it very easy to 










4. I frequently get so strongly absorbed in one thing that 































7. Other people frequently tell me that what I’ve said is 










8. When I’m reading a story, I can easily imagine what 























10. In a social group, I can easily keep track of several 

































































16. I tend to have very strong interests which I get upset 





















18. When I talk, it isn’t always easy for others to get a 





















20. When I’m reading a story, I find it difficult to work out 










































































27. I find it easy to “read between the lines” when 










28. I usually concentrate more on the whole picture, 





















































33. When I talk on the phone, I’m not sure when it’s my 































36. I find it easy to work out what someone is thinking or 










37. If there is an interruption, I can switch back to what I 





















39. People often tell me that I keep going on and on about 










40. When I was young, I used to enjoy playing games 










41. I like to collect information about categories of things 

















































































































THE EDINBURGH HANDEDNESS INVENTORY 
 
Please indicate your preferences in the use of hands in the following activities by putting a tick in the 
appropriate column. 
 
Some of the activities require both hands. In these cases the part of the task, or object, for which 
hand preference is wanted is indicated in brackets. 
 
Please answer all of the questions, and only leave a blank if you have no experience at all of the 
object or task. 
EDINBURGH HANDEDNESS INVENTORY CONT… 
 
 LEFT RIGHT 
 
1 Writing   
2 Drawing   
3 Throwing   
4 Scissors   
5 Toothbrush   
6 Knife (without fork)   
7 Spoon   
8 Broom (upper hand)   
9 Striking Match (match)   
10 Opening Box (lid)   
    
i Which foot do you prefer to kick with?   










Using the scale provided as a guide, indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements by circling the corresponding number. Give only one answer for each 
statement. 
 
Circle 1 if you STRONGLY DISAGREE 
Circle 2 if you MODERATELY DISAGREE 
Circle 3 if you NEITHER DISAGREE NOT AGREE 
Circle 4 if you MODERATELY AGREE 









DECILE  Leave these spaces blank 
 
 viii 











1. I am often confused about what 
emotion I am feeling 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. It is difficult for me to find the right 
words for my feelings 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I have physical sensations that even 
my doctors don’t understand. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I am able to describe my feelings 
easily. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I prefer to analyze my problems rather 
than just describe them. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. When I am upset, I don’t know if I am 
sad, frightened or angry. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I am often puzzled by sensations in 
my body. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. I prefer to just let things happen rather 
than to understand why they turned 
out that way. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I have feelings that I can’t quite 
identify. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. Being in touch with emotions is 
essential. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I find it hard to describe how I feel 
about people. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. People tell me to describe my feelings 
more. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. I don’t know what’s going on inside 
me. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. I often don’t know why I am angry. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
15. I prefer talking to people about their 
daily activities rather than their 
feelings. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. I prefer to watch ‘light’ entertainment 
shows rather than psychological 
dramas. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. It is difficult for me to reveal my 
innermost feelings, even to close 
friends. 


















18. I can feel close to someone, even in 
moments of silence. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. I find examination of my feelings 
useful in solving personal problems. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. Looking for hidden meanings in 
movies or plays distracts from their 
enjoyment. 
 




Thank you for your participation. 
Please remember all results remain strictly confidential. 
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Appendix C: Spanish Word Lists for the DRM Paradigm used in 
Chapter 4 and stimuli list for Chapter 6, Experiment 7b (Word & 
Picture condition, picture examples in Appendix C). 
 
Studied Phase: Association List as for Latin American Spanish (Columbia, 
Experiments 3a,b & c), words in brackets are the ones used for the European 
Spanish speakers (Experiments 4a, b &c). 
PIE FOOT SILLA CHAIR PAN BREAD 
zapato shoe mesa table comida meal 
mano hand sofá sofa sanduche 
(bocadillo) 
roll 
pierna leg estufa (cocina) cooker agua water 
medias 
(calcetín) 
sock cajones drawers vino wine 
dedo finger taburete stool cruasán croissant 
cuerpo body cojín cushion mantequilla butter 
uña nail mecedora rocking chair harina flour 
bota boot banco bench trigo wheat 
tobillo ankle biblioteca bookcase jamón ham 
rodilla knee escritorio desk queso cheese 
codo elbow armario wardrobe tomate tomato 
balón football lámpara lamp lechuga lettuce 
sandalia sandal cama bed miel honey 
cuello neck televisor television huevo egg 
oreja ear teléfono telephone pastel cake 
      
REY KING MÉDICO DOCTOR AGUJA NEEDLE 
reina queen ambulancia ambulance hilo thread 
corona crown enfermera nurse coser sew 
león lion jeringa syringe maquina de 
coser 
sewing machine 
espada sword estetoscopio stethoscope dedal thimble 
príncipe prince anatomía anatomy pinchar prick 
princesa princess bisturí scalpel alfilers pins 
caballero knight camilla stretcher ojal buttonhole 
castillo castle enfermero male nurse dobladillo hem 
mago wizard portero porter material material 
bosque forest pastilla (píldora) pill cactus (cacto) cactus 
trono throne venda bandage bordar embroider 
estrella star tijeras scissors botón button 
dragón dragon cirujano surgeon brújula compass 
cetro sceptre tirita sticking plaster cremallera zip 












Studied Phase Continued. 
MANZANA APPLE VIOLÍN VIOLIN SOMBRERO HAT 
plátano banana guitarra guitar gorro bonnet 
naranja orange arpa harp jersey jumper 
pera pear piano piano boina beret  
uvas grapes flauta flute corbata tie 
melocotón peach trompeta trumpet chaqueta (abrigo) coat 
melón melon trombón trombone guante glove 
piña  pineapple mandolina mandolin bufanda scarf 
fresa strawberry laúd lute camisa shirt 
frambuesa raspberry clarinete clarinet pantalón trousers 
limón lemon fagot bassoon correa (cinturón) belt 
lima lime oboe oboe falda skirt 
grosella redcurrant tambor drum traje suit 
kiwi kiwi platillos (címbalos) cymbals vestido dress 
higo fig banjo banjo camiseta t-shirt 
zarzamora blackberry maracas maracas bolso handbag 
      
GATO CAT ARAÑA SPIDER CARRO (COCHE) CAR 
perro dog mariposa butterfly bicicleta bicycle 
ratón mouse insecto insect furgoneta van 
tigre tiger libélula dragonfly autobús bus 
pantera panther grillo cricket camión lorry 
ciervo deer abeja bee autocar coach 
pájaro bird babosa Slug  tren train 
gacela gazelle caracol snail máquina steam train 
lobo wolf ciempiés centipede avión aeroplane 
hiena hyena polilla moth barcaza canal barge   
guepardo cheetah tijereta earwig coche (carro) cart 
leopardo leopard cucaracha cockroach helicóptero helicopter 
rata rat escarabajo beetle motocicleta motorbike 
conejo rabbit escorpión scorpion ciclomotor moped 
hámster hamster oruga caterpillar yate yacht 
curi (cobaya) guinea pig avispa wasp barco boat 
 
Recognition Phase English    
Studied Words    
shoe table nurse orange dog 
hand sofa banana ambulance mouse 
queen meal thread beret guitar 
bicycle roll sew jumper harp 
crown van fly butterfly  
Critical Lures     
foot chair doctor apple cat 
king bread needle hat violin 
car spider    
Non-studied Words    
book stapler ghost jigsaw padlock 
alarm clock flower trophy torch snorkel 







Recognition Phase Spanish    
Studied Words    
zapato mesa ambulancia plátano perro 
mano sofá enfermera naranja ratón 
reina comida hilo boina guitarra 
corona sanduche (bocadillo) coser jersey arpa 
bicicleta furgoneta mariposa insecto  
Critical Lures    
pie silla medico manaza gato 
rey pan aguja sombrero violín 
carro (coche)  araña    
Non-studied Words    
libro grapadora rompecabezas candado  
despertador flor trofeo esnórkel  
soldado fantasma dado linterna  
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Appendix D: Examples of the picture/ word & picture stimuli used 






Appendix E: Pictures and questions used for confabulation 
experiment in Chapter 5. 
 
True: What colour was Ronnie Corbett’s jacket? 
False: What was on the desk between the Two Ronnies? 
 
True: What were Laurel and Hardy staring at? 




True: What sort of dress was 
Barbara Streisand wearing? 
 
False: What was on the seat next to 
her? 
 
True: What was Michael Caine 
holding in his hands? 
 
False: What time was on the clock 























True: What sort of suit was 
Richard Burton wearing? 
 
False: What did Elizabeth Taylor 
have round her left wrist? 
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Appendix F: Lists of Famous Faces used in Experiment 8a, b and c 
in Chapter 6 (Critical lures are in bold). 
 
US Actor US Actress UK Actor UK Actress 
Tom Cruise Jennifer Aniston Sean Connery Kate Winslet 
Tom Hanks Meryl Streep Richard Burton Helena Bonham-
Carter 
Harrison Ford Julia Roberts Anthony Hopkins Judy Dench 
Brad Pitt Marilyn Monroe Ewan McGregor Minnie Driver 
George Clooney Sigourney Weaver Hugh Grant Catherine Zeta-Jones 
Kiefer Sutherland Halle Berry Ian McKellan Emma Thompson 
Clint Eastwood Jodie Foster Michael Caine Barbara Wndsor 
Jack Nicholson Angelina Jolie Alan Rickman Helen Mirrem 
Al Pacino Sandra Bullock John Cleese Liz Hurley 
Robert De Niro Susan Sarandon Jude Law Joanna Lumley 
Leonardo di Caprio Gwyneth Paltrow Robbie Coltrane Maggie Smith 
    
US Male Singer US Female Singer UK Male Singer UK Female Singer 
Elvis Presley Barbara Streisand Robbie Williams Charlotte Church 
Frank Sinatra Dolly Parton Cliff Richard Shirley Bassey 
Michael Jackson Madonna Mick Jagger Annie Lennox 
Eminem Cher Elton John Dido 
Stevie Wonder Bette Midler Ozzy Osbourne Victoria Beckham 
Barry Manilow Diana Ross John Lennon Lulu 
Neil Diamond Aretha Franklin Freddy Mercury Emma Bunton 
Buddy Holly Britney Spears Davod Bwie Dusty Springfield 
Roy Orbison Tina Turner Paul McCartney Geri Halliwell 
Bob Dylan Whitney Houston Sting Kate Bush 
Prince Mariah Carey Phil Collins Amy Winehouse 
    
Non-studied Sports’ Personalities 
 David Beckham Tim Henman Denise Lewis  
Steve Redgrave Kelly Holmes Jane Torville  
Jonathan Edwards Sebastian Coe   
    
Non-studied TV Personalities 
Fern Britton Vanessa Feltz Davina McCall  
David Dickinson Jeremy Kyle Oprah Winfrey  
Noel Edmonds Richard Madeley   
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Appendix G: Control Raw Data for Experiment 7a, b, 8a, b and c. 
 
Experiment 7a: DRM Word 
Paradigm  






Subject Sex Age Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
1 M 37 4/12 8/12 13/24 11/24 10/12 2/12 
2 F 34 3/12 9/12 16/24 8/24 10/12 2/12 
3 F 36 3/12 9/12 20/24 4/24 12/12 0/12 
4 F 28 3/12 9/12 19/24 5/24 12/12 0/12 
5 M 34 6/12 6/12 16/24 8/24 12/12 0/12 
6 M 27 3/12 9/12 14/24 10/24 12/12 0/12 
7 F 28 4/12 8/12 19/24 5/24 10/12 2/12 
8 M 18 1/12 11/12 18/24 6/24 11/12 1/12 
9 F 18 6/12 6/12 12/24 12/24 11/12 1/12 
10 M 19 5/12 7/12 14/24 10/24 8/12 4/12 
11 F 21 3/12 9/12 20/24 4/24 12/12 0/12 
12 F 21 8/12 4/12 10/24 14/24 11/12 1/12 
13 M 20 3/12 9/12 19/24 5/24 9/12 3/12 
14 M 20 4/12 8/12 18/24 6/24 7/12 5/12 
15 F 21 6/12 6/12 16/24 8/24 10/12 2/12 
   M% 25.47 34.44 65.60 67.74 32.22 87.47 12.53 
   SD 6.96 14.73 14.73 12.90 12.90 13.05 13.05 
DA F 32 4/12 8/12 15/24 9/24 8/12 4/12 
 
Experiment 7b: Word & 
Picture DRM 






Subject Sex Age Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
1 F 18 11/12 1/12 22/24 2/24 10/12 2/12 
                 2 F 20 8/12 4/12 16/24 8/24 10/12 2/12 
3 F 23 7/12 5/12 23/24     1/24 12/12 0/12 
4 F 20 8/12 4/12 19/24 5/24 12/12 0/12 
5 F 23 6/12 6/2 22/24 2/24 0.75 0.25 
6 F 27 10/12 2/12 21/24 3/24 12/12 0/12 
7 F 19 8/12 4/12 20/24 4/24 0.83 0.17 
8 F 24 8/12 4/12 22/24 2/24 12/12 0/12 
9 F 27 9/12 3/12 21/24 3/24 12/12 0/12 
10 F 22 11/12 1/12 21/24 3/24 12/12 0/12 
11 F 25 7/12 5/12 13/24 11/24 12/12 0/12 
12 F 40 7/12 5/12 23/24 1/24 12/12 0/12 
13 F 19 10/12 2/12 24/24 0/24 12/12 0/12 
14 F 22 6/12 6/12 17/24 7/24 12/12 0/12 
15 F 25 7/12 5/12 13/24 11/24 12/12 0/12 
  M% 23.60 68.40 31.60 82.52 17.48 95.00 5.00 
  SD 5.36 13.77 13.77 14.60 14.60 8.80 8.80 













Pictures (8 Items) 
Subject Sex Age Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
1 M 23 6/8 2/8 11/16 5/16 7/8 1/8 
2 F 25 8/8 0/8 16/16 0/16 8/8 0/8 
3 F 26 8/8 0/8 15/16 1/16 8/8 0/8 
4 F 29 6/8 2/8 12/16 4/16 7/8 1/8 
5 F 24 6/8 2/8 14/16 2/16 7/8 1/8 
6 F 29 6/8 2/8 14/16 2/16 8/8 0/8 
7 F 21 7/8 1/8 14/16 2/16 6/8 2/8 
8 M 20 8/8 0/8 13/16 3/16 5/8 3/8 
9 M 28 8/8 0/8 12/16 4/16 8/8 0/8 
11 F 32 4/8 4/8 11/16 5/16 6/8 3/8 
12 F 30 8/8 0/8 16/16 0/16 8/8 0/8 
13 M 39 5/8 3/8 13/16 3/16 7/8 1/8 
14 F 26 8/8 0/8 16/16 0/16 8/8 0/8 
15 F 21 7/8 1/8 16/16 0/16 8/8 0/8 
  M% 27.00 84.78 15.22 86.01 13.99 90.13 9.87 
  SD 5.24 16.35 16.35 11.72 11.72 12.14 12.14 
DA F 32 1/8 7/8 10/16 6/16 4/8 4/8 
 







Pictures (8 Items) 
Subject Sex Age Correct Correct Incorrect Correct Correct Incorrect 
1 F 38 8/8 0/8 14/16 2/16 8/8 0/8 
2 M 33 8/8 0/8 11/16 5/16 8/8 0/8 
3 M 35 5/8 3/8 15/16 1/16 6/8 2/8 
4 F 40 6/8 2/8 14/16 2/16 7/8 1/8 
5 F 33 7/8 1/8 14/16 2/16 8/8 0/8 
6 F 28 8/8 0/8 16/16 0/16 8/8 0/8 
7 F 22 7/8 1/8 15/16 1/16 7/8 1/8 
8 F 25 8/8 0/8 15/16 1/16 7/8 1/8 
9 F 29 6/8 2/8 14/16 2/16 8/8 0/8 
10 F 21 5/8 3/8 13/16 3/16 7/8 1/8 
11 F 21 6/8 2/8 14/16 2/16 8/8 0/8 
12 F 20 8/8 0/8 16/16 0/16 8/8 0/8 
13 F 26 7/8 1/8 14/16 2/16 8/8 0/8 
14 F 27 8/8 0/8 15/16 1/16 8/8 0/8 
15 F 20 8/8 0/8 16/16 0/16 8/8 0/8 
  M%  27.87 87.45 12.52 89.98 10.01 94.93 5.02 
  SD  6.65 14.13 14.13 8.09 8.09 7.86 7.86 














Pictures (8 Items) 
Subject Sex Age Incorrect Correct Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
1 F 37 8/8 0/8 16/16 0/16 8/8 0/8 
2 F 28 6/8 2/8 15/16 1/16 8/8 0/8 
3 F 32 7/8 1/8 16/16 0/16 8/8 0/8 
4 F 43 7/8 1/8 12/16 4/16 8/8 0/8 
5 M 29 6/8 2/8 14/16 2/16 7/8 1/8 
6 F 47 6/8 2/8 12/16 4/16 8/8 0/8 
7 M 26 7/8 1/8 12/16 4/16 7/8 1/8 
8 F 28 8/8 0/8 16/16 0/16 8/8 0/8 
9 F 33 6/8 2/8 11/16 5/16 7/8 1/8 
10 F 25 8/8 0/8 12/16 4/16 8/8 0/8 
11 F 30 7/8 1/8 14/16 2/16 7/8 1/8 
12 F 28 6/8 2/8 15/16 1/16 8/8 0/8 
13 M 31 8/8 0/8 15/16 1/16 7/8 1/8 
14 F 32 7/8 1/8 16/16 0/16 8/8 0/8 
15 F 25 6/8 2/8 14/16 2/16 7/8 1/8 
   M% 31.60 85.84 14.21 87.54 12.52 95.41 4.61 
   SD 6.36 10.39 10.41 11.07 11.09 5.91 6.05 
























Appendix H: Patient demographics for frontal lesions from Budson 







Appendix I: Definitions of Autism, Asperger’s Syndrome and 
Autism Spectrum Disorders. 
The following definitions were taken from the National Autistic Society’s website at 
www.autism.org.uk 
 
What is Autism? 
Autism is a lifelong developmental disability. It is part of the autism spectrum and is 
sometimes referred to as an autism spectrum disorder, or an ASD. The word 'spectrum' is 
used because, while all people with autism share three main areas of difficulty, their 
condition will affect them in very different ways. Some are able to live relatively 'everyday' 
lives; others will require a lifetime of specialist support. The three main areas of difficulty 
which all people with autism share are sometimes known as the 'triad of impairments'. They 
are: 
• difficulty with social communication 
• difficulty with social interaction 
• difficulty with social imagination. 
 
What are the characteristics of autism? 
The characteristics of autism vary from one person to another but are generally divided into 
three main groups. 
Difficulty with social communication 
People with autism have difficulties with both verbal and non-verbal language. Many have a 
very literal understanding of language, and think people always mean exactly what they say. 
They can find it difficult to use or understand: 
• facial expressions or tone of voice 
• jokes and sarcasm 
• common phrases and sayings 
Some people with autism may not speak, or have fairly limited speech. They will usually 
understand what other people say to them, but prefer to use alternative means of 
communication themselves, such as sign language or visual symbols. 
Others will have good language skills, but they may still find it hard to understand the give-
and-take nature of conversations, perhaps repeating what the other person has just said (this is 
known as echolalia) or talking at length about their own interests. 
Difficulty with social interaction 
People with autism often have difficulty recognising or understanding other people's 
emotions and feelings, and expressing their own, which can make it more difficult for them to 
fit in socially.  
Difficulty with social imagination 
Social imagination allows us to understand and predict other people's behaviour, make sense 
of abstract ideas, and to imagine situations outside our immediate daily routine. Difficulties 
with social imagination mean that people with autism find it hard to: 
• understand and interpret other people's thoughts, feelings and actions 
• predict what will happen next, or what could happen next 
• understand the concept of danger 
• engage in imaginative play and activities 
• prepare for change and plan for the future 
• cope in new or unfamiliar situations. 
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Other related characteristics 
• Love of routines 
• Sensory sensitivity 
• Special interests 
• Learning disabilities 
•  
What is Asperger’s syndrome? 
While there are similarities with autism, people with Asperger syndrome have fewer 
problems with speaking and are often of average, or above average, intelligence. They do not 
usually have the accompanying learning disabilities associated with autism, but they may 
have specific learning difficulties. These may include dyslexia and dyspraxia or other 
conditions such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and epilepsy. 
 
What is the difference between Autism, High-functioning Autism 
(HFA) and Asperger’s syndrome? 
• Both people with HFA and AS are affected by the triad of impairments common to all 
people with autism. 
• Both groups are likely to be of average or above average intelligence. 
• The debate as to whether we need two diagnostic terms is ongoing (the term Autism 
Spectrum Disorder is becoming more popular as a diagnosis). 
• However, there may be features such as age of onset and motor skill deficits which 
differentiate the two conditions. 
 
Diagnostic Tools 
There are a variety of tools used by clinicians to diagnose Autism Spectrum Disorder. They 
include:  
American Psychiatric Association. 1994. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental 
disorders (DSM-IV-TR). 4th ed. Washington, DC: APA. 
 
Baird, G. et al. (2000). A screening instrument for autism at 18 month of age: A six-year 
follow-up study. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 39, 
694-702. 
 
Baird, G., et al (2001). Screening and surveillance for autism and pervasive developmental 
disorders. Archives of Disease in Childhood, 84, pp. 468-475. 
 
Baron-Cohen, S. et al (2000). The early identification of autism: the Checklist for Autism in 
Toddlers (CHAT). Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 93, 521-525. 
 
Frankenburg, W. K. et al. (1992). The Denver II: A major revision and restandardization of 
the Denver Developmental Screening Test. Pediatrics, 89, pp. 91-97. 
Garnett, M.S. and Attwood, A. J. (1998). Australian scale for Asperger's syndrome. In: 
Attwood, T. Asperger's syndrome: a guide for parents and professionals. London: Jessica 
Kingsley. 
 
Siegel, B. (1998). Early screening and diagnosis in autism spectrum disorders: The Pervasive 
Developmental Disorders Screening Test (PDDST). Paper presented at the NIH State of the 
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Appendix J: DA’s Clinical MRI Scan. Figures a) and b) are 
overviews of all slices and c) and d) are slices in which the mesial 




































d) Mesial temporal regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
